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Extracting the Eagle’s Talons:  
The Soviet Union in Cold War Latin America  
 
Michelle Denise Reeves, Ph.D. 
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Supervisor:  Mark Atwood Lawrence 
 
While the Cold War in Latin America has been examined from a variety of 
angles, the scholarship on Soviet-Latin American relations is thin, outdated, and based 
almost totally on published sources. Moreover, much of the literature is replete with 
misconceptions about the nature of the Soviet approach to the Western Hemisphere and 
the relationship between Moscow and its regional allies. Using a case study approach, 
and based on substantial research in the archives of the former Soviet Union, this 
dissertation argues that Moscow’s approach to Latin America was more cautious and 
pragmatic than ideological and messianic. Rather than attempting to extend their control 
over the region, the Soviets instead sought to pry Latin American regimes away from 
dependence on the United States and to encourage the region to adopt a non-aligned 
foreign policy. To a degree heretofore not sufficiently appreciated, this approach 
involved the clever use of international organizations, particularly the United Nations and 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, Latin American communists and Soviet 
sympathizers were hugely influential in shaping Moscow’s perceptions of the region and 
its relationship to the United States, and in pressuring Soviet leaders to provide more 
support to their regional allies.  
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 1 
Introduction: The Cold War in Latin America 
America’s sphere of influence, “our own backyard,” “empire’s workshop,” 
“beneath the United States” – all refer to Latin America and in doing so emphasize the 
hegemonic – indeed, imperial – role of the United States in hemispheric relations.  Since 
the days of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has assumed the mantle of guarantor 
of order and stability in the Western Hemisphere, and has engaged in political and 
military interventionism that has frequently proved counterproductive to the maintenance 
of such order and stability. Nevertheless, this nomenclature is indicative of an approach 
to the study of U.S.-Latin American relations that inadequately accounts for the 
motivations and decisions of actors other than U.S. policymakers.   
Analyses that focus exclusively on U.S. foreign policy do not always do justice to 
internal and regional developments in Latin America, nor do they assign sufficient 
agency to actors other than the Norteamericanos.  Ironically, historians on the political 
left, who often claim to recover the voices of victimized Latin Americans, tend to be 
more guilty of this tendency than those on the right, who more often seek to absolve the 
United States of its sins by assigning responsibility for the violence that rocked the 
Western Hemisphere during the Cold War to the Latin Americans and the Soviets.  With 
the clarity of hindsight, we now know that the Soviet threat was in fact far less menacing 
than it seemed at the time, when visions of a red tide washing over the Western 
Hemisphere spooked U.S. policymakers and led to heavy-handed politico-military 
interventionism. This contemporary knowledge has perhaps contributed to the tendency 
of some scholars to deny that U.S. policymakers perceived vital national security interests 
to be at stake in Cold War Latin America.  
 2 
The orthodox interpretation of the U.S. role in Cold War Latin America is that it 
has been counter-revolutionary and yet (paradoxically) highly destabilizing.  The 
influential historian Walter LaFeber exemplifies this perspective.  Portraying revolutions 
in Central America as “inevitable” due to institutionalized inequality and an unfortunate 
geographic proximity to the United States, LaFeber posits U.S. policy as the pivot upon 
which the history of the region hinges.1 U.S. policy in the region failed because it sought 
to assure order and stability through two incompatible means: the implementation of 
widespread democratic reforms, and support for right-wing dictators.  The idea that U.S. 
national security interests were at stake in Cold War Central America was a “false 
belief.”2   
Indeed, most prominent scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations during the 
Cold War seem to agree that the Soviet threat was minimal if not non-existent, and that 
U.S. policies were largely to blame for creating the very opportunities for the expansion 
of Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere that they sought to eliminate.  Peter 
Smith, for example, has argued that because the U.S. approach to Latin America occurred 
within the framework of the East-West conflict, it “managed to accomplish precisely 
what it sought to avoid: revolutionary entanglements with the USSR that could lead to 
Soviet intrusion in the Americas.”3  He has also suggested that U.S.-Soviet conflict in the 
region, particularly during the 1980s in Central America, was “often exaggerated or 
                                                
1 LaFeber writes, “Revolutions in such areas as Central America were inevitable.  The only choice was 
whether North Americans would work with those revolutionaries to achieve a more orderly and equitable 
society, or whether…Washington officials would try to cap the upheavals until the pressure built again to 
blow the societies apart with even greater force.” Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central 
America (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993), p. 16.   
2 Ibid., p. 365. 
3 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 197. 
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imaginary.”4  Gaddis Smith has similarly argued that except for in the case of the Cuban 
missile crisis, the Soviet threat “existed largely in the American imagination.”5  
Recently, several scholars have attempted to shift the focus away from U.S. 
foreign policy and to explore the myriad ways that the Cold War influenced domestic and 
regional political, social, and cultural dynamics, as well as the everyday experiences of 
Latin American people.  Gilbert Joseph, for instance, has lamented the narrow scholarly 
concentration on the motives and consequences of U.S. policy, and has suggested that 
this hidebound approach has obscured myriad possible intellectual agendas.6  In a 
recently published edited volume, he and several other historians seek to re-center Latin 
America’s experience in the Cold War and to examine transnational alliances, grassroots 
organizations, and the clash between local populations, cultural elites, and industry. Greg 
Grandin has been an unapologetic advocate of the reforms championed by indigenous 
socialist and communist parties in Latin America and has carefully examined the ethnic 
and gendered aspects of land reform in Guatemala.7 Hal Brands argues that although the 
Cold War in Latin America was defined by a series of violent conflicts, the origins of the 
chaos and instability that ravaged the continent owed less to U.S. interventionism than to 
the confluence of local, regional, and global dynamics that prevailed at any given time.8 
In the final analysis, the course of the Cold War in Latin America was shaped not only by 
the zero-sum struggle between Washington and Moscow for ideological and strategic 
                                                
4 Ibid., p. 215. 
5 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), p. 
6. 
6 Gilbert M. Joseph, “What We Know and Should Know: Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully into 
Cold War Studies,” in In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War, edited by 
Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 16. 
7 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Illinois: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004). 
8 Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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dominance, but by conflicts over internal political dynamics and power structures, the 
extent – and more importantly, the limits – of U.S. influence, and the emergence of the 
Third World as both a political bloc and a rhetorical device.9 This group of literature 
represents an attempt to place Latin America squarely at the center of Cold War history 
rather than treating the region as a passive subject of U.S. interventionism.10   
SOVIET-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 
Before the Cuban revolution, Latin America was of negligible strategic interest to 
the Soviet Union. Though many in Latin America were inspired by the Russian 
Revolution, ties between the Soviet state and the countries of the Western Hemisphere 
remained weak if not non-existent. In 1924, the Fifth Congress of the Communist 
International (Comintern) took the position that the future of socialist revolution was to a 
significant degree dependent on the fate of colonialism. The Mexican delegate to the 
congress argued that the United States was becoming the world center of imperialism, 
and attention was therefore directed to Latin America as the “‘colonial’ economic base of 
the new imperialism.”11 At the same time, however, the Soviets were hamstrung by an 
overly dogmatic theoretical approach, which held that Latin America’s feudal 
agrarianism had to be supplanted by a capitalist economy before embarking upon the 
transition to socialism. Thus, the most that could be hoped for at this stage in Latin 
                                                
9 Ibid., p. 255. 
10 See also Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Julio Moreno, and Mark Lawrence, eds. Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: 
New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013). 
11 Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), p. 34. See also Edmé Domínguez, “The Latin American Communist Movement: Realities and 
Relations with the Soviet Union,” in Eusebio Mujal-León, ed. The USSR and Latin America: A Developing 
Relationship (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 121-124; and Augusto Varas, “Sovet-Latin 
American Relations Under the U.S. Regional Hegemony,” in Varas, ed. Soviet-Latin American Relations in 
the 1980s (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 14-17. 
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America was a “democratic-bourgeois” revolution.12 Indeed, this is how orthodox 
communists viewed the Guatemalan revolution under Juan Jose Arévalo and his 
successor, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán.  
As historian Nicola Miller has pointed out, this ideological inflexibility took the 
Russian Revolution as its point of reference and utterly failed to grapple with the actual 
social, political, and economic conditions of Latin America.13 With Joseph Stalin at the 
helm, Soviet doctrine became even more rigid, insisting that the only authentic 
revolutionaries were orthodox Marxist-Leninists.14 Under Stalin’s leadership, the 
Comintern was inherently suspicious of any revolutionary movement with indigenous 
roots.15 As one scholar has observed, under Stalin “the original Leninist policy of 
supporting national liberation from imperialism by backing bourgeois nationalism in the 
colonial world had been unceremoniously dumped.”16 Indeed, Lenin’s theses on the 
linkage between vanguard parties and revolutionary change in the colonial and 
“backward” areas of the world suggested that the “revolutionary nationalist” movements 
of a “bourgeois-democratic” flavor were the among the best candidates for alliances with 
the vanguard parties in these areas.17  
The Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 ushered in the Popular Front period, 
during which Latin American communist parties were urged to form broad alliances with 
the petit and national bourgeoisie. The strategy was originally designed for use in China, 
                                                
12 Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America, pp. 34-35. 
13 Ibid., p. 35. 
14 Ibid., p. 40. 
15 Domínguez, “The Latin American Communist Movement,” p. 123. 
16 Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 146. 
17 David E. Albright, Vanguard Parties and Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Soviet Perspectives 
and their Implications (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1990), p. 15. 
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but eventually was applied to all “colonial and semi-colonial territories,” and sought to 
allay Western fears of “Soviet-inspired” rebellions.18 This shift in the Comintern line was 
prompted by Stalin’s desire to strengthen the Soviet strategic position and prevent the 
possibility of a Nazi invasion.19 The people’s front policy facilitated the diversification of 
Soviet diplomatic relations with Latin America but was abandoned by the end of the 
Second World War. By 1948, however, Soviet theorists had hardened their attitudes 
toward bourgeois nationalist movements in the colonial world.20  
Although Latin American communist parties reached the summit of their 
popularity in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and enjoyed the prestige 
attendant to the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany, Stalin did not view Latin America as an 
area ripe for communist influence. Indeed, Stalin and Molotov frequently referred to the 
countries of Latin America as “U.S. satellites” or “pseudo-colonies” of the United 
States.21 Francis Fukuyama has observed that Stalin adhered to “an extremely polarized 
view of international relations, one in which countries not firmly in the socialist camp 
were written off as belonging to the imperialists.”22 In 1943, Stalin dissolved the 
Comintern in the hopes of extending the cooperative relationship that had developed as a 
result of the wartime alliance with the West.23 As that alliance began to deteriorate, the 
burgeoning Cold War convinced U.S. policymakers that the existence of communist 
parties in Latin America could not be tolerated, and the United States pressured its Latin 
                                                
18 Domínguez, “The Latin American Communist Movement,” p. 124. 
19 Varas, “Soviet-Latin American Relations,” p. 15. 
20 Albright, Vanguard Parties, p. 22. 
21 Ilya Prizel, Latin America Through Soviet Eyes: The Evolution of Soviet Perceptions During the 
Brezhnev Era, 1964-1982 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 7. 
22 Francis Fukuyama, “Soviet Strategy in the Third World,” in Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, 
eds. The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1987), p. 25. 
23 Varas, “Soviet-Latin American Relations,” p. 16. 
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American allies to sever diplomatic ties with the USSR and to ban domestic communist 
parties. Most of the region’s communist parties were subsequently outlawed and forced 
to either disband or go underground.  
The Soviet approach to Latin America has always consisted of two (often 
conflicting) types of relations. Regional communist parties have provided Moscow with 
an entrée to the Western Hemisphere, but have sometimes impeded the development of 
state-to-state relations, particularly in countries headed by firmly anti-communist 
regimes. The Kremlin’s support for national liberation movements, moreover, has 
complicated its efforts to establish and strengthen traditional diplomatic, economic, and 
political relations with Latin American countries.24 Kiva Maydanik, a senior researcher at 
the Soviet Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) since 
the 1960s, has argued that, except for during the Khrushchev years, the Soviets never had 
a coherent strategy toward Latin America, nor were there any “clear goals at the regional 
level.”25 Though Maydanik argues that there was an ideological dimension to Soviet 
relations with Latin America, he admits the difficulty of clearly distinguishing 
“ideological” from “diplomatic” concerns.26 Soviet policy toward Latin America was 
“incoherent, reactive…reluctant…ignorant of realities,” and “based on misperceptions.”27 
                                                
24 For an excellent study that examines the conflict between the maintenance of traditional diplomatic 
relations and Soviet meddling in the internal affairs of Latin American states, see Daniela Spenser, The 
Impossible Triangle: Mexico, Soviet Russia, and the United States in the 1920s (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1999). 
25 Kiva Maydanik, “The Ideological Aspects of Soviet Relations with Latin America,” in Edmé 
Domínguez, ed. The Soviet Union’s Latin American Policy: A Retrospective Analysis (Sweden: Göteborgs 
Universitet, 1995), p. 13. 
26 Ibid., p. 14. 
27 Ibid., p. 15. 
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Much of the literature on Soviet-Latin American relations is either outdated or 
highly politicized.28 Many of these works were written during the Cold War and while 
some of their conclusions may yet hold true, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end 
of the Cold War warrants a retrospective on the course of Soviet-Latin American 
relations.29  Although some scholars are measured in their judgments, others are 
downright alarmist and make unsupportable claims about the extent to which Fidel Castro 
and other communist-inspired Latin American leaders were mere marionettes 
manipulated by their Kremlin overlords.30 Fidel Castro was far from a puppet of the 
Soviets; indeed, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, he criticized the imperialist 
mindset of the Soviets almost as much as he did that of the United States.  Moreover, 
during the latter half of the 1960s, the Kremlin found itself at loggerheads with Castro 
over his support for revolutionary guerrilla movements in the Western Hemisphere.  The 
Soviets feared that Castro’s romantic idealism and his commitment to radical change 
through violent means would not only undermine Soviet claims to Third World 
leadership but would also threaten the pursuit of “peaceful coexistence” with the United 
States.31  Just as the U.S. ideological commitment to liberal democracy was often 
                                                
28 Even the titles of some of these works are anachronistic; for instance, The Russians Aren’t Coming: New 
Soviet Policy in Latin America, edited by Wayne S. Smith (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992) and 
The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship, edited by Euesebio Mujal-Leon (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989),  
29 See, for example, James D. Theberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (New York: National 
Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1974); Cole Blasier, The Giant’s Rival: The USSR and Latin America 
(Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987); J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, eds. The 
Soviet Union and Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1970); Howard J. Wiarda and Mark Falcoff, eds., 
The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987); Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America. 
30 Timothy Ashby, The Bear in the Back Yard: Moscow’s Caribbean Strategy (Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books, 1987), pp. 53-55 & 154. 
31 See James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the 
Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), and 
Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
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subordinated to the national security imperative of containing communism, Soviet 
national security concerns frequently trumped the desire to support ideologically friendly 
revolutionary movements and regimes. 
The primary debate over Soviet-Latin American relations, and, more broadly, 
Soviet policy toward the Third World, is whether geopolitical or ideological factors have 
figured most prominently. One scholar has argued that “although the Bolsheviks did not 
believe in reasons of state as such – because Marxism-Leninism dictated goals that stood 
above and beyond merely the state – they did practice realpolitik: they were realists in 
terms of means, though utopians in terms of ends.”32 This assessment is consistent with 
the work of others who have argued that “in its willingness to modify the Marxist-
Leninist doctrine to suit a variety of circumstances,” the Soviet leadership “has been truly 
opportunistic” in its approach to the Third World.33 Although ideology was not “the 
source of Soviet actions,” Soviet objectives were nevertheless “expressed in ideological 
terms.”34 Francis Fukuyama has similarly argued that ideology and political organization 
were tools to achieve realpolitik ends.35 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, one of the most prolific 
scholars of Soviet foreign policy, has argued that Soviet leaders “respond pragmatically 
to events and opportunities,” and that state-to-state relations “are determined primarily by 
strategic and political calculations; ideological and economic considerations are 
secondary.”36 The role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy, according to Rubinstein, is as 
                                                
32 Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, preface ix. 
33 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), p. 170. 
34 Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, Soviet-Third World Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1985), preface xii. 
35 Fukuyama, “Soviet Strategy in the Third World,” in The Soviet Union and the Third World, p. 25. 
36 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global (Boston, MA: 
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), pp. 14-15. 
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a “legitimizing function” and as a “medium for communication and conflict within the 
world Communist movement.”37 Another scholar has similarly argued that while “Soviet 
ideology over the years has increasingly become less a guide to Soviet policy than a 
legitimization of Soviet behavior,” “ideology continues to retain its importance as a 
source of explanation and justification of Soviet behavior.”38  
Others have argued that ideology was a more important determinant of U.S. and 
Soviet Cold War policy. Odd Arne Westad has suggested that “the United States and the 
Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in 
their politics.”39 In his view, the Cold War in the Third World was ideologically 
predetermined. Geoffrey Roberts, a prominent scholar of Soviet foreign policy, has 
characterized it as “ideology driven to an important degree,” suggesting that “shifts in 
ideology have sometimes resulted in radical changes in foreign policy.” A major 
contribution of Mikhail Gorbachev, in this view, was his “de-ideologization” of foreign 
policy, “by detaching peaceful coexistence from the revolutionary ideology and politics 
that had given birth to it after the Russian Revolution.”40 Indeed, most scholars agree that 
during the Gorbachev years, whatever role ideology had continued to play in foreign 
policymaking was completely subordinated to Soviet domestic and national security 
concerns. Roberts’s analysis, however, gives short shrift to Soviet policy in the Third 
World, where policy shifts frequently preceded doctrinal innovations, in a pattern that 
suggests that ideology was not the primary driver of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 15. 
38 Vernon V. Aspaturian, “Gorbachev’s ‘New Political Thinking’ and Foreign Policy,” in Jiri Valenta and 
Frank Cibulka, eds., Gorbachev’s New Thinking and Third World Conflicts (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 7. 
39 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4. 
40 Geoffrey K. Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution, and Cold War, 1945-
1991 (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 86-87. 
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implemented a series of doctrinal modifications in order to improve their approach to the 
Third World. Recognizing that many Third World countries lacked communist parties, 
Soviet analysts recommended the creation of “vanguard” parties, which could substitute 
for communist parties and work to facilitate continuity in domestic and foreign policy in 
the event of regime change.41  
While ideology always conditioned Soviet relations with the Third World, the 
ideological predisposition of any given Third World regime was never a reliable indicator 
of Soviet support. Despite the USSR’s status as a “revolutionary regime,” its behavior 
during the Cold War was based more on the traditional concerns of great powers than it 
was on any sense of obligation to or solidarity with revolutionary Third World actors.42 
Thus, Moscow pursued a highly pragmatic policy toward Latin America, which aimed 
more at traditional power politics than idealistic objectives. In the words of two scholars 
of Soviet-Third World relations, “Marxist-Leninist ideology has provided the context and  
framework and for Soviet policy, but has not itself been a primary determinant of 
policy.”43 Overall, the pattern of Soviet relations with the Third World suggests that 
geopolitical considerations have been at the forefront of Soviet policy calculations.44 
Scholars have argued that Soviet intentions in Latin America were not aimed at extending 
Moscow’s control over the region, but rather sought to aggravate and capitalize on 
                                                
41 Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, Soviet-Third World Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1985), p. 13. 
42 S. Neil MacFarlane, “Successes and Failures in Soviet Policy toward Marxist Revolutions in the Third 
World, 1917-1985,” in Mark N. Katz, ed. The USSR and Marxist Revolutions in the Third World (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 47. 
43 W. Raymond Duncan and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Moscow and the Third World under Gorbachev 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 15. 
44 Saivetz and Woodby, p. 175. 
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hemispheric opposition to the United States.45 Moscow’s approach to the Western 
hemisphere was cautious and was driven less by an ideological mission to spread 
communism and more by pragmatic calculations of how to “neutralize” Latin America as 
a region and capitalize on anti-U.S. sentiment.  
While this dissertation will not attempt to unravel the complexities of Marxist-
Leninist ideology, nor parse the arcane doctrinal debates in which Soviet theoreticians 
and ideologists almost constantly engaged, it will argue that Soviet policy toward Latin 
America during the Cold War was largely pragmatic, and was based not so much on a 
messianic vision of worldwide socialism, but aimed more at exploiting anti-U.S. 
sentiment and encouraging non-alignment. Some have argued that “postwar Soviet 
interest in the Third World was spurred by weaknesses and failures in dealing with the 
United States and Western Europe.”46 While this holds true for the early Cold War 
period, when Soviet and U.S. rivalry in the Third World was based on the zero-sum 
perception that any loss of influence was an automatic gain for the other side, in the later 
years of the Cold War, the ideological rivalry with the Chinese communists and the 
extremism of some Third World movements and regimes were more significant factors in 
determining Soviet policy. This is especially true in Latin America after the missile crisis, 
when the Soviets were less concerned about striking a blow to the United States and 
sought instead to maintain credibility and relevance in a region that had been radicalized 
by the Cuban revolution. The Soviets frequently found themselves pushed into providing 
more support for national liberation movements and revolutionary regimes than they 
                                                
45 Leon Gouré and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America (Florida: Center for Advanced 
International Studies, University of Miami, 1975), p. 5. 
46 Stephen Sestanovich, “The Third World in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1955-1985,” in Korbonski and 
Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and the Third World, p. 3. 
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otherwise would have in the absence of the challenges posed by the more radical Chinese 
communists and by the extremist nature of the Cuban revolution and the Latin American 
fidelista movements that it inspired. This supports a growing body of scholarship that 
demonstrates the sometimes willful independence of Soviet client regimes and their 
determination to pursue foreign policies bolder than Moscow deemed prudent.47 
ARBENZ’S GUATEMALA 
The 1954 coup in Guatemala that deposed democratically elected leader Jacobo 
Arbenz has been the subject of intense scrutiny among scholars of U.S. foreign policy. 
These scholars have tended to focus on the combination of economic interests and 
national security concerns that animated U.S. officials and to argue that the Soviet threat 
in Guatemala was minimal or non-existent. The CIA-backed coup that overthrew Arbenz 
is generally understood as the opening shot of the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere, 
when the United States abandoned the Good Neighbor policy in favor of a repressive, 
anti-communist approach. When viewed from the Soviet perspective, heretofore hidden 
dimensions of the coup’s significance emerge. Latin American communists and Soviet 
sympathizers were at the forefront of efforts to draw Moscow’s attention to Arbenz’s 
Guatemala, and more broadly, to the possibilities for an expansion of Soviet influence in 
the region. 
The Soviet leadership was, however, engaged in a power struggle and unwilling 
to provide the Guatemalans with anything more tangible than a shipment of outdated 
Nazi weaponry that had been captured by the Czechs. Even this token amount of support, 
                                                
47 See, for example, Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions; Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for 
Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); and Hope Harrison, 
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University Press, 2005). 
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however, signaled a shift in Moscow’s waging of the Cold War. As José Manuel Fortuny, 
the general secretary of the Guatemalan communist party (PGT), noted, “If Stalin had 
been alive, they wouldn’t have sold them to us.”48 Despite the fact that the PGT’s 
attempts to cozy up to the Soviet Communist Party elicited a cool response, Moscow 
wasted no time attempting to capitalize on the results of the coup.  The Soviets lodged a 
formal protest at the United Nations, requesting that a full investigation be launched into 
the U.S. role in Arbenz’s overthrow.49   
Thus, although the Soviets were unwilling to provide meaningful support to 
Arbenz in order to prop up his government in the face of U.S. aggression, they clearly 
recognized that the anti-U.S. nationalism that swept Latin America in the wake of the 
coup could be a boon to the communist bloc, and they were quick to use the United 
Nations as a forum for appealing to the sympathies of underdeveloped nations and to 
strike a blow at U.S. conceptions of “hemispheric solidarity.” The case of Arbenz’s 
Guatemala shows that Latin American communists and Soviet sympathizers were hugely 
influential in shaping Moscow’s perceptions of the region and its relationship to the 
United States.  Moreover, the coup occurred during a period in which Soviet foreign 
policy was in flux and the Cold War was becoming globalized; Moscow soon began 
laying the groundwork for an expansion of Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere. 
This involved efforts to establish and expand trade ties with Latin American countries 
(also known as the Soviet Economic Offensive) and the strengthening of Moscow’s 
propaganda apparatus in the region. 
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1954 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 188. 
49 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 126. 
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CASTRO’S CUBA 
The impact of the Cuban revolution on U.S. foreign policy, Latin American 
politics and society, and the Cold War in general has been examined extensively by 
numerous scholars. Historians have also debated the factors most salient in the 
development of the Soviet-Cuban alliance. Although some myths about Castro still find 
an audience – particularly the canard that he was a puppet of the Soviet Union – for the 
most part, historians have done an excellent job uncovering the extent of Soviet support 
for Castro’s regime and the nature of their alliance. Cuba convinced many in the Kremlin 
of the revolutionary potential of Latin America while exemplifying the difficulties 
involved in sustaining a client regime in the heart of the U.S. sphere of influence. The 
Cuban revolution and the establishment of an alliance with the Soviet Union 
fundamentally altered the strategic balance in the Cold War and shattered the myth of 
“geographical fatalism,” which had dominated the Soviet view of Latin America and held 
that because of the region’s proximity to, and economic dependence on, the United 
States, it was destined to be stuck in a subservient, neocolonial relationship with the 
hegemon of the North. That Fidel Castro had rebuffed the United States while remaining 
in power, despite a ferocious U.S. campaign to at first discredit and isolate his regime, 
and then to physically remove him from power through a covert intervention and 
repeated assassination attempts, put to rest the concept of geographical fatalism and 
sparked Soviet optimism regarding its relations with the other countries of Latin 
America. At the same time, Castro’s promotion of the armed struggle complicated the 
Soviet position in Latin America by unleashing factionalism on the radical left and 
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jeopardizing Moscow’s efforts to establish and strengthen diplomatic and political 
relations with Latin American states. 
The decision to station nuclear missiles in Cuba, while certainly not attributable 
merely to Khrushchev’s stated desire to protect the Cuban revolution, can neither be 
explained by reference to Soviet security needs alone.  The timing in fact resulted from 
the convergence of two developments, one in U.S. Cold War policy and the other in 
Castro’s domestic political struggles.  Kennedy’s decision to resume nuclear testing 
coincided with a lack of progress on Berlin and an escalation of the U.S. military 
presence in Southeast Asia, while Castro moved against the Cuban Communist Party in 
response to a misguided attempt on the part of its leader Aníbal Escalante to marginalize 
Castro’s position.  Castro thus seemed to be moving away from Moscow at the very time 
that Kennedy’s increasingly belligerent stance toward the Cold War seemed to portend an 
imminent attack on Cuba.  Khrushchev sought to demonstrate the Soviet commitment to 
the Cuban revolution and to elicit from Kennedy the respect he felt he deserved; the 
stationing of nuclear missiles in Cuba seemed to fulfill both objectives.50 The missile 
crisis is the one significant exception to the general trend of Moscow’s cautious approach 
to Latin America during the Cold War. 
Despite Khrushchev’s best efforts to convince the Cubans, the Chinese, the rest of 
the Soviet leadership, and probably himself as well, of the triumphant outcome of the 
missile crisis, it was in fact an unmitigated disaster.  Castro became increasingly bitter 
and intransigent toward his patrons in the Kremlin, and Kennedy’s popularity was 
temporarily bolstered while Khrushchev’s suffered.  Indeed, the coup-plotters that 
                                                
50 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of A Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 
1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1998), p. 183. 
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unseated Khrushchev cited the Cuban misadventure as a sterling example of his reckless 
leadership.  The Brezhnev years witnessed a fundamental reevaluation of Soviet security 
interests. Brezhnev himself was much less tolerant of Castro’s support for violent 
revolutionary groups in the Western Hemisphere, and pursued a policy of establishing 
formal diplomatic relations with moderate Latin American regimes.51 As the Cuban 
economy became ever more dependent on its Soviet patrons, Castro was brought to heel, 
and in the 1970s and early 1980s, was a loyal supporter of Moscow’s foreign policy line 
and a consistent defender of the USSR in the Non-Aligned Movement. 
ALLENDE’S CHILE 
The role of the United States in subverting the regime of Chile’s Salvador Allende 
has also attracted the attention of U.S. foreign policy specialists.  Like the case of 
Arbenz’s Guatemala, some of the literature emphasizes the culpability of U.S. covert 
operations while only inadequately examining Chilean social and political dynamics, 
Allende’s relationship to Moscow, and Latin American regional developments. Allende 
was not a social democrat, as those on the left have argued, but a committed Marxist, 
who sought to transform Chilean society in a manner totally incompatible with liberal 
democracy.  Moreover, though he himself rejected violence, he seemed hardly able to 
restrain the more radical elements surrounding him. Allende had alienated large segments 
of Chilean society with his disastrous economic policies and the military coup enjoyed 
the support of both the political right and the political center. And unlike Arbenz in 
                                                
51 Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959-1991 (Florida: University of Miami North-South Center 
Press, 1994), p. 86. 
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Guatemala, who was merely vulnerable to the influence of his communist advisers, 
Allende himself was a committed Marxist with ties to the KGB.52 
Nevertheless, the Soviets had learned important lessons from the alliance with 
Cuba and like their U.S. counterparts, sought to prevent a “second Cuba.” While U.S. 
officials viewed this goal in terms of preventing another radical movement from coming 
to power in the Western Hemisphere, for the Soviets the lesson was to avoid becoming 
embroiled in ideological and economic commitments that would further drain Soviet 
resources. As in Guatemala, though the Soviets had refused to provide the level of 
material support necessary to keep Allende in power, they were quick to capitalize on the 
coup, and became active participants in the transnational solidarity campaign that 
emerged to pressure the military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet into ceasing its 
human rights violations. Soviet participation in this endeavor was not driven by a genuine 
concern for human rights, but sought to enhance Moscow’s standing in the Third World 
and to appease the Chilean communists, many of whom spent years of exile in the 
communist bloc and pushed for a more radical approach to the struggle for socialist and 
progressive development in Latin America. 
THE SANDINISTAS’ NICARAGUA 
The final case study will focus on Nicaragua. Much of the controversy over U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan’s Latin America policy revolves around support for the 
counter-revolutionary forces (contras) battling the Sandinista government.  The Iran-
Contra fiasco has also tended to dominate the attention of observers and detract from the 
study of other substantive historical developments.  Not surprisingly, this is a politically 
                                                
52 Andrew, The World Was Going Our Way, p. 69. 
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charged issue. Some on the left have charged the Reagan administration with 
intentionally aggravating the situation in Central America in order to justify an increased 
U.S. military presence in the region, while some on the right have argued that the 
administration’s support for the contras was totally justified by Soviet-Cuban 
interventionism.  
Despite the Reagan administration’s bruiting of the Soviet-Cuban threat to Central 
America, the Soviets were in fact less interested in expanding their influence and control 
over the region, and merely sought to provide their Nicaraguan allies with support 
sufficient for guaranteeing the viability of the revolution. Moscow’s support of the 
Sandinista government developed in direct proportion to U.S. support for the counter-
revolutionary forces seeking to topple the Sandinistas from power. Moreover, as U.S.-
Soviet relations improved, Moscow scaled back its support to the Sandinistas, and 
supported regional peace efforts. As Cold War tensions dissipated, Latin American 
leaders sought regional solutions to regional problems, and the Soviets were more than 
happy to scale back their presence in the Third World so they could redirect precious 
resources toward more pressing domestic concerns. 
A NOTE ON SOURCES 
The major archival sources contained here are from the Foreign Policy Archive of 
the Russian Federation, the State Archive of the Russian Federation, and the Russian 
State Archive of Contemporary History. Soviet foreign policy has always operated on 
two tracks – party relations and more traditional state-to-state ties. The former have 
tended to be guided more by ideological considerations, while the latter have tended to be 
driven by more pragmatic calculations. One scholar has observed that the non-
 20 
ideological, pragmatic aims of Soviet foreign policy tended to have their biggest 
proponents in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, while the International Department of the 
CPSU was the “operational arm” of the pursuit of more ideological goals.53 Christopher 
Andrew, in an in-depth exposé of KGB active measures in the Third World, has argued 
that it was the KGB, rather than the Soviet Foreign Ministry, that initiated the “global 
struggle” in the Third World, and that therefore exercised a much greater influence over 
Soviet Third World policy.54 Due to his reliance on one particular source of 
documentation, Andrew’s view of the KGB’s influence in the Soviet foreign 
policymaking process may be somewhat exaggerated. Because the majority of the 
documents presented here are from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, there is the risk of over-
emphasizing the more cautious and pragmatic nature of Soviet policy toward Latin 
America.  
Nevertheless, there are substantial grounds for this perspective. After the Cuban 
revolution, the Soviets recognized that vanguard revolutionary movements in Latin 
America tended not to be the region’s communist parties, and thus state-to-state relations 
became more significant than party relations. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, Soviet 
foreign policy in the Third World and especially in Latin America was aimed more at 
cultivating traditional diplomatic relations than at encouraging national liberation 
movements. Thus, the shift of focus here to the activities and perspectives of the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry and diplomatic corps is consistent with the trajectory of Soviet foreign 
policy. The weight of the evidence available tends to show that, with the (admittedly 
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significant) exception of the early Soviet-Cuban “honeymoon” period and the missile 
crisis, Soviet policy toward Latin America was largely cautious, pragmatic, and aimed 
more at cashing in on the policy blunders of successive U.S. administrations. To this end, 
the Soviets actively used international organizations, particularly the United Nations and 
the Non-Aligned Movement, to cultivate Third World support for the USSR’s 
international policy agenda and to influence world public opinion. 
However, because of the inconsistency of source availability, the study of Soviet 
foreign policy necessarily involves a significant degree of speculation. Yet it is also true 
that in a top-down totalitarian society like that of the Soviet Union, the public 
pronouncements of high-ranking officials can often be relied upon as indicative of 
important shifts in foreign policy. Thus, the vast majority of published work on Soviet 
foreign policy relies to a great extent on public sources. It is my hope that the archival 
sources and the interpretation presented here will contribute to a more complete 
understanding of Soviet foreign policy toward Latin America during the Cold War, and 
that this work will serve as a springboard for further research. 
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Chapter One: Guatemala, the USSR, and the United Nations 
 
  
 On June 20, 1954, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 
S/3237, calling for the “immediate termination of any action likely to cause further 
bloodshed” in Guatemala. The original resolution, introduced by Brazil and Colombia, 
would have referred Guatemala’s complaint to the Organization of American States 
(OAS), but the Soviets vetoed it, preferring that the issue remain in the Security Council, 
where they had a presence and could thus stay involved.55 In January, the International 
Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) had 
circulated a communiqué from Guatemala’s president, Jacobo Arbenz, detailing the 
plight of his government in the face of U.S. “scaremongering, slander, and 
intimidation.”56 Although Latin American communists and Soviet sympathizers actively 
petitioned the USSR for military and political support to strengthen the Arbenz 
government in the face of U.S. aggression, the Soviets were cautious about interfering in 
the U.S. “backyard.” Despite the pleas of regional communists, the Soviets were 
unwilling to provide material support beyond a single shipment of outdated Czech 
weaponry. This refusal to provide meaningful support to Arbenz did not, however, 
prevent Moscow from seeking to capitalize on the anti-U.S. sentiment that flooded Latin 
America in the wake of his overthrow, and to use the United Nations as a forum for 
challenging U.S. interventionism in the Western Hemisphere.  
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Though the United Nations had originally been envisioned as a mechanism for the 
peaceful resolution of international conflicts, by the early 1950s, the United States and 
the Soviet Union had effectively transformed the international organization into a 
propaganda platform upon which the Cold War could be waged. Like no other 
organization that had come before, the United Nations provided a venue for national 
leaders to appeal to the court of world opinion. The propaganda value of the U.N., 
however, inhibited its efficacy as a tool for conflict resolution.57 In the Guatemala case, 
this involved a protracted dispute over the sovereignty of regional bodies like the 
Organization of American States. During the drafting of the U.N. charter, several Latin 
American states had expressed anxieties about the dissolution of regional authority and 
had managed to insert a clause guaranteeing the sovereignty of organizations like the 
OAS. The joint Guatemalan/Soviet action at the United Nations represented a challenge 
to the U.S. conception of hemispheric solidarity, which sought to close ranks against the 
Soviets by uniting the countries of the Western Hemisphere around U.S. international 
policy goals.  
Exactly one week after the passage of Resolution S/3237, Arbenz resigned his 
post and fled the country. Operation PBSUCCESS, the CIA’s secret plot to overthrow 
Arbenz, had lived up to its name. Colonel Castillo Armas, who led the coup, immediately 
proceeded to dismantle his predecessor’s progressive reforms and bring Guatemala 
squarely back into the U.S. orbit. The CIA operation was motivated by a powerful 
combination of national security concerns, economic interests, and domestic pressures. 
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The Arbenz regime had implemented a transformative agrarian program that threatened 
the power and profits of the United Fruit Company, a multinational corporation with so 
many arms that it was known in Central America as “El Pulpo” – the octopus. During a 
period of U.S. domestic anti-communist hysteria, Arbenz had legalized Guatemala’s 
communist party, the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores (PGT), and adopted an 
independent foreign policy that challenged the assumptions of U.S. cold warriors. 
While the Guatemalan coup has been explored from several angles, to date there 
has been no attempt to use the archives of the former Soviet Union to examine Moscow’s 
role. Though the Soviets were not directly involved in the events that led up to the coup, 
they were kept apprised of those events, and they sought to capitalize on Arbenz’s 
overthrow to score propaganda points with the emerging Third World. The Soviets used 
their position on the U.N. Security Council to register sympathy with the small Central 
American country struggling against U.S. hegemony. Some have argued that the CIA-
backed coup “served to confirm the Soviet perception” of “geographic fatalism,” which 
emphasized the obstacles to revolution in Latin America posed by the region’s 
geographical proximity to, and economic dependence on, the United States.58 However, 
the strength of the anti-U.S. nationalism in Latin America that was unleashed by the 
overthrow of Arbenz had the opposite effect on the Soviet leadership. Rather than 
confirming the theory of “geographic fatalism,” the coup in fact raised hopes that Latin 
America could be pried away from its dependence on the United States. Thus, in the 
wake of the coup, the Soviets sought to strengthen their presence in the region, not only 
by expanding its propaganda apparatus, but by launching an effort to develop trade 
                                                
58 Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 216. 
 25 
relations with Latin American countries so as to mitigate their economic dependence on 
the United States and thereby enhance their prospects for achieving political and foreign 
policy independence. 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: NATIONAL SECURITY OR ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM? 
 The English-language scholarship has tended to focus on U.S. foreign policy, and 
the debates have thus revolved around the causes and consequences of the U.S. 
intervention in Guatemala. Most historians agree that the Eisenhower administration 
exaggerated the threat posed by the Arbenz government. Some scholars argue that 
communist influence in Guatemala was minimal, and that the Eisenhower administration 
mistook Arbenz’s nationalism for communism. These scholars point to the small size of 
the Guatemalan communist party and the strongly conservative nature of many sectors of 
Guatemalan society (e.g. the army and the Catholic church) as evidence that 
contemporary U.S. policymakers gravely overestimated the communist threat emanating 
from the small Central American country.59  
Historian Piero Gleijeses, whose work draws extensively upon Guatemalan 
archives and in-depth interviews with previously inaccessible subjects who were close to 
Arbenz, has reached a different conclusion. He argues that communist influence in 
Guatemala was more widespread than previously acknowledged, but that Moscow did not 
exert control over the Guatemalan communist party. Gleijeses is among the group of 
scholars who argue that the Guatemalan communists exerted an influence out of all 
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proportion to their negligible numerical strength.60 Though there were not many card-
carrying members of the PGT, Gleijeses asserts that, “in the last two years of his 
administration, [Arbenz] considered himself a communist.”61 Some of Guatemala’s 
communists, moreover, enjoyed close personal relationships with Arbenz. His wife, 
though not a member of the PGT, confessed in an interview with Gleijeses that she and 
her husband were both convinced that socialism was the wave of the future, and that 
“communism was inevitable.”62 During the late 1940s, Arbenz became friends with a 
number of Guatemalan communists who would later become the leaders of the PGT; the 
future General Secretary of the party, Manuel Fortuny, was his “closest friend.”63 Arbenz 
had delegated to Fortuny the lead role in drafting Decree 900, the agrarian reform bill that 
had so antagonized the United Fruit Company.64 Thus, even though Arbenz himself was 
not a member of the communist party, Gleijeses argues, he was strongly influenced by 
the ideas and reformist agenda of the PGT.  
An issue closely connected to the degree of communist influence in Guatemala is 
the precise calculus of political, economic, and strategic concerns that informed the U.S. 
decision to intervene.65 Scholars have traditionally emphasized either U.S. economic 
imperialism or Cold War strategic imperatives, depending to some degree on their 
appraisal of the role and influence of the United Fruit Company in the formulation of 
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U.S. foreign policy.66 Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger have been the most 
popular purveyors of the economic imperialism theory. They argue that in the case of 
Guatemala, “American national security considerations were never compelling.”67 Lars 
Schoultz has suggested that the Guatemalan coup was perhaps the clearest example of 
corporate influence over U.S. foreign policy, even insinuating that the United Fruit 
Company “fooled [John Foster Dulles]…and others into believing that Guatemala’s 
government was communist.”68  Most scholars, however, have argued that the strategic 
and security imperatives of the Cold War were more significant than the role of the 
United Fruit Company in shaping U.S. policy.69 Ultimately, perhaps historian Stephen 
Rabe is correct to suggest that because “Guatemalan leaders violated both the national 
security decisions and the foreign economic policies of the United States,” “to emphasize 
either strategic or economic motives…is perhaps to draw distinctions without 
differences.”70 
More recently, scholars have advanced the debate by considering such previously 
under-examined factors as the domestic political interests of U.S. presidents, the lobbying 
efforts of prominent Latin American political actors, and anxieties about U.S. 
international credibility. One historian has persuasively argued that these factors 
underwrote the decisions of U.S. policymakers to intervene repeatedly in Latin America 
                                                
66 For an example of the former, see James Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism, and Inter-American Relations: 
Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United States, 1945-1961 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999). For an 
example of the latter, see Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in 
Latin America, 1910-1985 (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976). 
67 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, p. 107. 
68 Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 338. 
69 See, for instance, Cullather, Secret History; Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala; and Gleijeses, Shattered 
Hope. 
70 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 58-59. 
 28 
during the Cold War.71 Another scholar has assigned equal responsibility for the coup to 
Latin American political actors, who for years had been lobbying the U.S. government to 
support regime change in Guatemala, and, faced with U.S. resistance, had embarked upon 
their own invasion plans.72 
Scholars of U.S. policy toward Guatemala have drawn a straight line from the 
coup to the vicious civil war and rightist repression that rocked the country in later 
decades.73 While historians tend to agree that the consequences of the coup for U.S.-Latin 
American relations were disastrous, not enough scholarship has explicitly examined the 
issue. Stephen Streeter has thoroughly chronicled U.S. efforts to manage the politics of 
post-Arbenz Guatemala, and State Department historian Mark Hove has recently shown 
that Salvador Allende reaped tremendous political benefits from his strident opposition to 
U.S. meddling in the internal affairs of Latin American nations.74 The Eisenhower 
administration failed to account for Latin American opposition to its actions in 
Guatemala and only belatedly discovered the wellspring of anti-American animosity that 
the coup uncovered. Ironically, in seeking to eliminate the threat of communism in the 
Western Hemisphere, the Eisenhower administration unintentionally contributed to the 
creation of a public opinion climate more receptive to it.75 Historian Robert McMahon 
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has also argued that while Eisenhower was an able statesman in the European context, his 
administration’s failure to perceive “the force of Third World nationalism” constituted “a 
major setback for American diplomacy.” “Rather than promoting long-term stability in 
the Third World,” McMahon concludes, “the foreign policy of the Eisenhower 
administration contributed to its instability, thus undermining a basic American policy 
goal.”76 
One of the ways that the U.S. intervention proved counter-productive to the long-
term interests of the United States was by drawing the attention of the Soviet leadership 
to the possibilities inherent in Latin America. Although the tendency among scholars is to 
assume that it was the Cuban Revolution that set Moscow’s sights on Latin America, in 
fact it was the overthrow of Arbenz that convinced the Kremlin to begin laying the 
groundwork for an expansion of Soviet influence in the region.77 And while it is certainly 
true that the Western Hemisphere ranked lowest on Moscow’s list of strategically vital 
areas, the aftermath of Arbenz’s overthrow revealed the force of anti-U.S. nationalism in 
Latin America and contributed to a re-evaluation of the Kremlin’s strategic priorities. 
Latin American communists were at the forefront of efforts to enlighten Moscow about 
U.S. economic imperialism in the region and actively petitioned the Soviets to provide 
material support for Arbenz as his regime was threatened by U.S. interventionism.   
During the invasion of Guatemala, however, the Soviet leadership was unprepared 
to take any decisive action to stabilize the Arbenz regime. Stalin had died in 1953 and the 
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provisional leadership was still in the throes of a post-succession power struggle. Soviet 
Premier Georgi Malenkov delivered a speech in March 1954, in which he partially 
enunciated the concept of “peaceful coexistence.” He called for a “durable strengthening 
of peace,” and a “further weakening of international tension.”78 With this tentative hope 
for détente with the West, the Soviet leadership was unwilling to provoke U.S. wrath by 
providing decisive support to Arbenz. Some of the highest-ranking Soviet leaders, 
moreover, were hamstrung by a dogmatic approach that viewed the communist parties as 
the only true revolutionaries and failed to recognize “bourgeois nationalists” as potential 
allies. Latin American communists, lower-level Soviet diplomatic and party personnel, 
and trade union activists were ahead of the curve on this issue and played a major role in 
facilitating greater attention to the opportunities that Latin America presented.  
Regional communist parties, communist front groups, and trade unions 
sympathetic to Moscow provided the Soviets with ideologically tendentious analyses of 
events in the Western Hemisphere. These reports helped to shape the Kremlin’s view of 
the imperialist nature of the United States and to authenticate that view by locating it in 
the context of Latin America, where discontent with U.S. policy ran deep and was rooted 
in a decades-long history of economic exploitation and big-stick diplomacy. These 
reports frequently exhorted Moscow to take meaningful steps to support the Arbenz 
government, but with the Soviet leadership embroiled in a power struggle, and most 
Soviet theoreticians convinced that the United States would not tolerate any foreign 
meddling in its “backyard,” but these exhortations were mostly ignored. Although a 
shipment to Guatemala of Czech weapons was eventually arranged (ostensibly with the 
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assistance of the Cuban communist party), the Soviet approach to the Arbenz government 
remained cautious. During Operation PBSUCCESS, the Guatemalans requested 
Moscow’s help, including the use of the United Nations Security Council to demand an 
end to the invasion. Guatemalan Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello dispatched an 
urgent request for support to the Kremlin, which was distributed in the Presidium. The 
message was published and the Soviet delegation to the U.N. fiercely condemned the 
invasion, but no material support for the Arbenz regime was proffered.79  
The Soviets were, however, conscious of the propaganda potential of international 
forums and instinctively understood the value the Eisenhower administration accorded to 
achieving a hemispheric consensus around its international policy objectives. During the 
Guatemalan crisis, despite the Kremlin’s refusal to come to the material aid of the Arbenz 
government, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations availed itself of the opportunity 
to land a propaganda triumph against the forces of “American imperialism.” The United 
Nations, as a forum for both appealing to international opinion and pursuing an 
international policy agenda, provided the USSR with a powerful tool to challenge their 
Cold War competitors. 
Through the employment of anti-imperialist rhetoric, moreover, the Soviets 
sought to cultivate the goodwill of the emerging Third World and to deepen the divisions 
between the United States and the countries of Latin America. This rhetoric resonated 
with the deeply held convictions of many Latin Americans regarding the inherently 
exploitative nature of U.S. economic policies  – a set of assumptions that would later be 
codified as “dependency theory.” As historian Michael Grow has pointed out, Latin 
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American leftists ranging “across a remarkably diverse spectrum” shared “a common 
perception that the cause of Latin America’s underdevelopment was…an exploitative 
transnational alliance between their traditional neo-feudal elites and U.S. imperialism.”80 
This perception was grounded in the U.S. tendency to support the extant power structure 
while turning a blind eye to the impoverishment of Latin America’s workers and 
peasants. The U.S. Achilles’ heel in the region was the fundamental disconnect between 
the security objectives of the United States and the economic demands of the Latin 
American countries. The Soviets recognized that this divergence of interests represented 
a major liability for the United States, and they sought to capitalize on the deeply rooted 
grievances of Guatemalans without incurring the risks involved in directly supporting 
Arbenz. 
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND “HEMISPHERIC SOLIDARITY” 
Though the inter-American system had been in operation since the nineteenth 
century and was the brainchild of Simon Bolivar, it underwent a transformation in the 
postwar period.81 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) of 
1947 and the charter of the Organization of American States, concluded the following 
year, provided the framework for coordinating collective action to repel external 
aggression and a consultative mechanism for resolving intra-American disputes. The 
drafting of the U.N. charter, which occurred alongside the reconfiguration of the inter-
American system, raised thorny questions about the appropriate balance between national 
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sovereignty and collective defense. The language of the charter ultimately reflected the 
concerns of Latin American states to keep the inter-American system intact and elevate 
the principle of regionalism over the universalism represented by the United Nations.82 
At the San Francisco conference in 1945, the Latin American delegations had determined 
to prevent the intervention of extra-hemispheric powers in the maintenance of peace and 
security in the region.83 The inter-American system was thus strengthened largely at the 
behest of Latin American leaders who desired to preserve the Monroe Doctrine and 
protect the Western Hemisphere from Soviet-bloc meddling.84 
The Tenth Inter-American Conference was a turning point, both in terms of U.S. 
efforts to cultivate hemispheric support for anti-communism and the way that it revealed 
the fault line separating U.S. interests from those of the Latin American nations. While 
the paramount U.S. goal at the conference was to achieve a strongly worded anti-
communist resolution, the countries of Latin America were far more interested in 
economic issues, especially the negotiation of better trade terms. This disconnect between 
the security imperatives of the United States and the economic concerns of Latin America 
has been a running theme in hemispheric relations and a deep wellspring of anti-U.S. 
sentiment.  
Key U.S. objectives at the conference were to raise awareness of the communist 
menace in the Western Hemisphere, to obtain Latin American support for U.S. anti-
communist policies, and to convince the Latin American countries to isolate Guatemala, 
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both politically and economically.85 The primary obstacle to the achievement of U.S. 
objectives was a dispute over the definition of intervention.86 The U.S. delegation sought 
to “call attention to the international character of the Communist movement and the 
control from Moscow of its activities everywhere” and “declare the activities of 
international Communism to constitute intervention in American affairs.”87 Such a 
declaration would invoke the consultation procedure under Article 6 of the Treaty of Rio 
de Janeiro, which sought to protect the hemisphere from “extra-continental” aggression.88 
Had U.S. officials acknowledged that communism in Guatemala was a home-grown 
affair, there would be no legitimate basis for intervention. Secretary of State Dulles 
acknowledged that the purpose of the anti-communist resolution was to “recognize 
Communism as an international conspiracy instead of regarding it merely as an 
indigenous movement.”89 Months earlier, the CIA and State Department had been 
instructed to gather and if necessary, fabricate evidence for use in the OAS that 
“Guatemala constitutes a menace to Hemispheric solidarity and the internal security of 
friendly nations through aggressive Communist subversion.”90 It was essential that the 
nature of the communist threat emanating from Guatemala be established as international 
in scope and directed by Moscow; otherwise, charges of foreign intervention would seem 
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incredible. If, however, communist subversion “was tantamount to external aggression,” 
then “efforts…to counter such Communist subversion could not rightfully be described 
as American intervention.”91 
After two weeks of preparations by the U.S. delegation, a resolution affirming 
that the international communist movement constituted “intervention” in the affairs of 
American nations was adopted. Mexico and Argentina abstained from voting on the 
resolution, while the Guatemalan delegation was the sole dissenter. Not only did the 
Guatemalan delegation vote against the resolution, but it also renounced the country’s 
adherence to the anti-communist resolutions adopted at prior conferences (Bogota, 1948 
and Washington, 1951). Although the United States succeeded in passing the resolution, 
many anti-communist Latin American regimes did not perceive Guatemala as a threat to 
hemispheric security.92  
During a meeting of the National Security Council shortly after the conference, 
Secretary Dulles described the difficulties he had faced in securing the passage of the 
anti-communist resolution. The thorniest issue, as always, concerned U.S. “commercial 
and financial policies.” Dulles also had to contend with “those who insisted that the anti-
Communist resolution was nothing but a pretext to permit American intervention in the 
internal affairs of the other republics of the hemisphere.” Despite “two weeks of very 
intensive work…to change this atmosphere,” the resolution “was certainly not adopted 
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with genuine enthusiasm.”93 The Caracas conference not only demonstrated the U.S. 
effort to convert the OAS into an anti-communist alliance, but also revealed the utter 
failure of the United States to adequately address Latin American economic grievances. 
This was a failure on which the Soviets were keen to capitalize. 
COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA 
Though in 1954 the Soviets maintained diplomatic relations with a mere three 
Latin American countries (Mexico, Argentina, and Uruguay), the USSR’s embassy in 
Mexico was an excellent source of information for Soviet leaders. Embassy officials 
carefully tracked developments in neighboring countries and reported back to the 
Kremlin about the growing potential for revolutionary change in Latin America. Soviet 
diplomats evaluated the proceedings of the Second Congress of the Guatemalan 
Communist Party (PGT) and concluded that the PGT was at the forefront of Guatemala’s 
struggle for national liberation. The PGT, moreover, was lauded for its leading role in 
opposing foreign monopolies, particularly United Fruit.94  
The General Secretary of the PGT, Manuel Fortuny, was a fierce critic of U.S. 
policy and an outspoken advocate of a pro-Stalinist foreign policy. His scathing polemics 
at the second congress of the PGT in December 1952 lambasted the United States for 
exploiting the Guatemalan people and pursuing an aggressive policy designed to expand 
its military presence in the country.95 In a report he prepared for the congress, Fortuny 
accused the United States of waging a propaganda campaign “under the same flag of 
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‘anti-communism’ that was used by Hitler in his day.”96 Characterizing the United States 
as a fascist police state, and accusing the “American imperialists” of carrying out 
“terrorist acts” against the workers and “democratic movements” of several different 
countries, Fortuny anticipated no end to U.S. meddling in the internal affairs of Latin 
American nations.97 The fundamental goal of aggressive U.S. policies, according to 
Fortuny, was to halt economic development in these countries and to thwart the struggle 
for national liberation. “Pan-Americanism,” “anti-communism,” and “continental 
security” were merely empty slogans used as a pretext for overthrowing progressive 
leaders and replacing them with obedient and repressive dictators.98 Fortuny exhorted 
party members to spread the truth about the superiority of the socialist economy and the 
“new society” being built in the Soviet Union.99 This professed loyalty to Soviet policy 
and to the Stalinist system is what distinguished the communists from the nationalists in 
the Latin American context.  
Perhaps most damaging to the U.S. vision of hemispheric solidarity was the 
PGT’s call for Guatemala to conduct a more independent foreign policy. Fortuny sought 
to “unmask” the “provocative” nature of the Organization of Central American States 
(ODECA) and to show that the Salvadoran delegation’s introduction of a resolution to 
combat the “subversive actions of International Communism in Central America” was 
designed to serve the interests of the “Yankee imperialists.”100 In Fortuny’s view, 
Guatemala should not only sever its dependence on the United States, but should 
establish ties with national liberation movements and identify itself with the aspirations 
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of newly decolonizing states.101 Arbenz’s attempts to dissociate his country from the 
regional pacts and policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations suggest that he 
was strongly influenced by the PGT’s stance. In February 1953, U.S. Ambassador to 
Guatemala Rudolf Schoenfeld warned that the ultimate objective of the PGT was the 
“neutralizing of Guatemala as a Western nation” and that communist infiltration of key 
government positions was not an accurate indicator of communist influence in the 
country.102 Two months later, Guatemala withdrew from ODECA.103  
The Soviet embassies in Latin America were not the only source of intelligence at 
the Kremlin’s disposal. The communist trade unions were an active presence in Latin 
America, and provided Moscow with continuous updates and policy recommendations. 
These labor groups were on the front lines of the struggle to win the hearts and minds of 
Latin America’s workers and peasants and played a major role in directing the attention 
of the Soviet leadership to the Third World in general and Latin America in particular. 
Although an in-depth examination of the Cold War politicization of labor is beyond the 
scope of this article, some brief background information is necessary to understand how 
these organizations functioned.  
The major communist-dominated labor confederation active in Guatemala was the 
Confederacion General de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG), which had affiliated with 
the Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL) and the World Federation 
of Trade Unions (WFTU).104 The Confederacion Nacional Campesina de Guatemala 
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(CNCG), a peasant organization formed in May 1950 under the leadership of non-
communists, allegedly “spouted pro-Soviet rhetoric” in a bid to secure financial support 
from Arbenz’s government.105 The CNCG also became affiliated with the World 
Federation of Trade Unions, which functioned essentially as an instrument of Soviet 
policy, if not always a perfectly reliable one.106 Under the leadership of Vicente 
Lombardo Toledano, one of Mexico’s most influential Marxists, the CTAL was folded 
into the WFTU in 1945, and together, they were among the most reliable sources of 
information for Soviet leaders and propagandists.107  
The WFTU was created in 1945 and from the outset, the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) refused to have anything to do with it, understanding that it was dominated 
by communists and would be subservient to the Soviet Union.108 Rank factionalism 
plagued the WFTU almost from inception, with sympathies broadly corresponding to 
either the Western democracies or the Soviet camp.109 The advent of the Marshall Plan 
proved fatal to the chimera of “labor unity,” with the pro-Western factions supporting the 
plan and the pro-Soviet factions vehemently opposing it. The non-communist groups 
were outnumbered, and when the WFTU implemented a series of labor strikes designed 
to disrupt the Marshall Plan, these groups jumped ship and joined the AFL in creating the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).110 The CTAL, being a 
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member of the pro-Soviet faction, remained in the WFTU, which from that point forward 
functioned essentially as a communist front, though it continued to be plagued by 
factionalism and rivalries between and among its national affiliates.  
At the WFTU’s second congress, convened in Milan in the summer of 1949, there 
was a pronounced emphasis on Latin America and the delegates sought to prevent ICFTU 
from dominating the trade union movement in the Western Hemisphere.111 CTAL was 
declared “the organism of liaison and coordination of the World Federation of Trade 
Unions with the National Centres of Latin America.”112 CTAL was a vital source of 
intelligence – “the studies and research” that the CTAL conducted “have shown that…the 
regime of foreign monopolies hinders their economic development and makes their 
complete independence impossible.”113 CTAL also reported that the trade union 
movement was “meeting serious difficulties” as a result of “the economic dependence of 
the majority of the Latin American nations on the United States.”114 In the postwar 
period, “a new and intense pressure has been applied by the great American monopolies 
on Latin America, with the aim of controlling the latter from the economic, military, and 
political point of view.”115 This view of the relationship between the United States and 
Latin America was given particular force by the history of U.S. economic exploitation, 
and political and military interventionism in the Western Hemisphere. That the ultimate 
destination for CTAL and WFTU analyses was the CPSU Central Committee suggests 
that these trade unions strongly influenced Soviet propagandists. Regional communists 
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and trade union representatives, who were in fairly close touch with the workers and 
peasants of Latin America, shaped the Soviet approach to the region. 
In May 1954, the WFTU sent its representatives on a tour of Latin America, and 
the assistant director of the department for national centers authored a report that was sent 
to the International Department. The WFTU tour included a stop in Guatemala for the 
second national congress of the CGTG. A few months earlier, the CGTG had organized a 
meeting to express the “solidarity” of Guatemala’s workers with the Vietnamese people 
and to “struggle for the termination of the colonial war in Vietnam,” which the French 
colonialists, “with the support of the American monopolists,” had for eight years been 
ruthlessly waging against the Vietnamese people.116 At their congress the following 
spring, a platform indistinguishable from that of the PGT was expounded. The main 
points of discussion were the struggle against United Fruit, the necessity of supporting 
Arbenz, and the defense of Guatemala's national independence, which was under direct 
threat from the United States and its “reactionary satellites in Central America – El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.”117 The WFTU report’s author predicted an 
intensification of U.S. “imperial pressure” on Guatemala and recommended 
“intervening” to provide support to Arbenz, because even though he was not a member of 
the communist party, he recognized the significance of the PGT’s activities in service of 
the country’s national interests.118 
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As early as 1953, the Soviets were receiving indications that the aggressive U.S. 
posture toward Guatemala could have serious implications for the future of U.S.-Latin 
American relations. Nikolai Leonov, a KGB officer whose later career would include 
multiple stints in various Latin American countries and who served as an information 
officer at the Soviet embassy in Mexico City in the early 1950s, provided the Foreign 
Ministry in Moscow with an assessment of the Pan-American Journalists Congress in 
December 1953. He characterized the organization as a tool of the U.S. State Department, 
and judged the primary goal of the congress to be the condemnation of leftist regimes in 
Guatemala, Bolivia, and Argentina. According to Leonov, the State Department, under 
the auspices of the congress, sought to accuse these regimes of liquidating freedom of the 
press and attempting to break hemispheric solidarity. It also hoped to achieve a 
declaration asserting that the Guatemalan regime was under the decisive influence of 
communists.119 The results of the congress showed, however, that within Latin America, 
opposition to dictators was growing, and this opposition could potentially spill over into a 
general protest against the “imperialistic policy” of the United States.120 
In May 1954, the General Secretary of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of 
Peace sent the CPSU Central Committee a report on the activities of the Latin American 
affiliates of the World Peace Council, the general secretary of which had toured Latin 
America in preparation for its upcoming international conference. He met with President 
Peron of Argentina, who confided that the Argentine people were exerting pressure on 
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him of a “clearly anti-imperial character” in relation to the situation in Guatemala.121 In 
February and March, the Argentine branch of the peace council had sent messages 
expressing solidarity with Guatemala to the Guatemalan and Argentine governments and 
to all of the delegates at the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas. These groups 
had petitioned to hold a demonstration in Buenos Aires in support of Guatemala but had 
not yet received permission from the authorities. Attempts were being made to create a 
Society for Friends of Guatemala, as had already been done in Chile. The Chilean society 
had sent telegrams signed by 67 deputies of varied political loyalties to the delegates at 
Caracas.122 The Costa Rican branch of the peace council claimed to have sent 10,000 
letters to the U.N. to request the “defense of peace in Central America.”123 The United 
States Information Agency (USIA) cited these efforts as evidence of the ''coordinated 
Communist thrust at the Americas.''124 The simultaneous creation in several different 
Latin American countries of “friendship societies” to express solidarity with the 
Guatemalan people, and the societies’ synchronous votes on identically worded 
resolutions, revealed the “mark of the experienced agent.”125 
In January, USIA and CIA had escalated their propaganda campaign to discredit 
Arbenz’s government as a dupe of Moscow and thereby lay the groundwork for the 
passage of an anti-communist resolution at the Caracas Conference scheduled for 
March.126 Amidst the scare campaign, Arbenz issued an official communiqué warning of 
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the Eisenhower administration’s intentions to overthrow his government. The 
communiqué, which was circulated in the International Department of the CPSU Central 
Committee, charged that high-ranking U.S. government personnel were lending both 
“moral and material” support to the invasion plans of “such powerful monopolies as 
United Fruit,” the interests of which were threatened by Arbenz’s economic policies.127 
In preparation for the invasion, the United States was waging a campaign of slander and 
lies, tarnishing Guatemala as a “threat to the security of the American continent” and a 
“bridgehead of international communism.” Not that this U.S. propaganda blitz was 
fooling anyone – “everyone knows” that the slander was merely a pretext for “open 
intervention” in Guatemala’s internal affairs, with the sinister ulterior motive of depriving 
the country of its sovereignty and independence.128 
During the invasion period, the Agitprop Department of the CPSU prepared a 
lengthy report about the situation in Guatemala. The report was based on the information 
provided by regional communists and trade union representatives, and warned that from 
the first failed attempt at covert subversion of the Arbenz government, the “American 
imperialists” were now crossing over to the “preparation of open armed intervention.”129 
Forces from Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador – all ruled by fascist dictators who 
were mere “marionettes” manipulated by their U.S. puppet masters – were invading 
Guatemala at the behest of the United States.130 All this was occurring in the midst of a 
raging class war that pitted the feudal land-owners and foreign monopolies against the 
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masses, who were being led by the PGT and the labor unions. The Guatemalan people 
were heroically struggling to implement the Arbenz regime’s agrarian reforms and more 
broadly, a genuine anti-feudal and anti-imperial revolution.  
Soviets propagandists, based on information supplied by the communist parties 
and trade unions, assumed that the U.S. intervention was designed to protect the 
monopoly status of United Fruit, and they discerned no difference between the interests 
of the Eisenhower administration and those of the company. So many high-ranking 
officials had investments in the company – former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
America John Cabot, head of the State Department section for dealing with issues of 
international security Thomas Cabot, presidential aide Robert Cutler, Trade Minister 
Sinclair Weeks, Defense Minister Charles Wilson, U.S. representative to the U.N. Henry 
Cabot Lodge – and to top it all off, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, former attorney 
for United Fruit, was one of its largest shareholders.131 Clearly no further evidence was 
needed to illustrate the “predatory plunder of dependent countries by American 
imperialism.”132 Reactionary forces inside the country and abroad used the pretext of 
“anti-communism” to mask their true intentions – they called the Arbenz regime 
“communist,” and yet there was never a single communist in his administration!133 
 The report also highlighted Arbenz’s attempts to assert Guatemala’s 
independence and sovereignty. Although U.S. opposition to his government was clearly 
predetermined by the agrarian reform, which had so antagonized United Fruit (and by 
extension, the Eisenhower administration), his regime’s pursuit of an independent foreign 
policy intensified U.S. hostility. From the very beginning, Arbenz’s government had 
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rejected the militaristic policies of the American imperialists and had spoken out for the 
peaceful resolution of international problems. Guatemala had refused to send troops to 
Korea and to subordinate its armed forces to the U.S. military brass. The subjugation of 
other Latin American countries’ armed forces was achieved through the “so-called 
‘agreement on defending the western hemisphere’ [Rio Treaty].”  Yet Arbenz had 
rebuffed U.S. militaristic designs; therefore the outcry about communism in Guatemala 
was raised long before he legalized the communist party.134 
 The Agitprop Department’s report on Guatemala characterized inter-American 
organizations, specifically the Organization of American States and the Organization of 
Central American States, as mere tools of U.S. imperialism. Owing to the servility of 
Central American dictators, ODECA had become an “obedient instrument of the U.S. 
Department of State.”135 Guatemala, to its credit, had withdrawn from the organization, 
having lodged a formal protest against the creation of a military bloc designed to 
legitimize intervention in the internal affairs of Central American nations. At the Tenth 
Inter-American Conference, moreover, Guatemala had voted against the anti-communist 
resolution, delivering an “ideological blow” to the United States.136  
 The Arbenz regime could have been a valuable ally to the Soviet Union – it was 
dedicated to democratic reform and progressive ideals, it pursued an independent foreign 
policy and openly criticized the United States in international forums, and to top it all off, 
it provided safe haven for communist exiles throughout the region. The report noted 
specifically that Guatemala had welcomed political refugees like the General Secretary of 
the Paraguayan communist party, Abdulio Barte. Guatemala also provided a valuable 
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service by publishing the news bulletins of the Dominican Republic’s communist 
party.137 The report on the situation in Guatemala tracked the proceedings of the PGT in 
detail, extensively quoting Fortuny and carefully describing the praiseworthy goals and 
actions of Guatemala’s communists, particularly their attempts to throw off the 
“imperialist yoke” of the United States and its “predatory” companies that were 
“strangling” Guatemala’s economy.138 Yet the efforts of Arbenz and the PGT to establish 
more tangible ties to the Soviets were destined to be in vain. Although they did manage, 
with the help of the Cuban communist party, to negotiate the sale of a shipment of 
captured Nazi weapons from the Czechs, substantive Soviet aid was not forthcoming.139 
Indeed, Manuel Fortuny, who traveled to Prague at Arbenz’s behest, was struck by the 
impression that “the Russians knew little of Guatemala…and had more pressing concerns 
than the plight of Jacobo Arbenz.”140 Though Latin American communists admired the 
Guatemalan revolution and petitioned the Soviets to aid the Arbenz government, the 
Soviet leadership was in no position to render meaningful support to a Central American 
regime tottering under the weight of a U.S.-backed invasion.  
THE POST-COUP PROPAGANDA BATTLE 
 During the invasion of Guatemala just a few months after the Caracas 
conference, the Cuban communist party sent Osvaldo Sanchez Cabrera to Guatemala on 
an investigatory mission to confer with the leadership of the PGT. Based on these 
meetings, Sanchez prepared and sent a report to the Soviet embassy in Mexico. The 
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report was a clear delineation of what had become the communist party line on the 
invasion of Guatemala: the forces of imperialism, led by United Fruit and International 
Railways of Central America (IRCA), and their lackeys in the U.S. government were 
directing the intervention against Arbenz.141 After the failed uprising at Salamá, the U.S. 
government hired an army of foreign mercenaries from the countries surrounding 
Guatemala. The Arbenz government had unmasked the dastardly plot, presenting the 
matter to the United Nations and thus revealing the machinations of American 
imperialism to the entire world. Two months later, the Guatemalan delegation’s 
performance at the Tenth Inter-American Conference was a “brilliant victory for the 
Guatemalan people and a defeat for American imperialism.”142 Sanchez emphasized that 
an important consequence of the invasion was the heightened solidarity of the peoples of 
the world, and particularly the peoples of other Latin American countries, with 
Guatemala.143 Moreover, the Soviet delegation’s “brilliant defense” of Guatemala at the 
U.N. on June 20 was warmly received, and the “acts of international solidarity directed 
against the American imperialists” were designed to deliver the following message: “that 
which is happening today in Guatemala can tomorrow happen in any other country.”144 
On June 20, the Soviet delegate to the U.N., Semyon Tsarapkin, had vetoed the 
Brazilian and Colombian resolution to transfer Guatemala’s complaint to the OAS. 
Instead, the French drafted a watered-down resolution appealing for the immediate 
cessation of hostilities and imploring the members of the United Nations to abstain from 
aiding such actions. When presenting the draft resolution, the French delegate stated that 
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it should in no way “be construed as casting doubt on, or weakening, the competence of 
the Inter-American Peace Committee or the legitimacy of its action in this matter.” In 
fact, the reverse was true – “the correctness of resort to…[the OAS]…only gains 
confirmation from the failure of the Security Council brought about by the Soviet veto.” 
The Arbenz government had also lodged a complaint with the Inter-American Peace 
Committee (IAPC), which met on June 24 and proposed the immediate departure of a 
fact-finding committee for Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Arbenz subsequently 
withdrew the complaint, preferring instead to pursue the issue under the auspices of the 
United Nations.145 
At the request of Guatemala and the Soviet Union, the Security Council convened 
again on June 25. During the session, the Brazilian delegate praised the OAS machinery 
and its “long record of achievement” as an “efficient instrument for the solution of 
conflicts.”146 He also noted that at the Chapultepec conference of the OAS in 1945, 
Guillermo Toriello had made an eloquent argument in favor of strengthening the inter-
American system and maintaining “principles of collaboration and continental 
solidarity.” Toriello’s viewpoint was incorporated into Article 2 of the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which entreated all parties to “settle any 
such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the Inter-
American System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of 
the United Nations.”147 The Brazilian delegate thus argued against the adoption of the 
agenda by the U.N. Security Council. 
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The Soviet delegate, Tsarapkin, interrupted the proceedings with a point of order 
concerning Article 32, which stipulated that parties to a dispute be invited to participate 
in Security Council discussions. Tsarapkin requested that, “since the substantive 
discussion of the question…has already begun, the Guatemalan representative should be 
invited to come to the Council table.”148 The council’s president noted that “it is not 
customary to invite non-members of the Security Council to come to the table until after 
the agenda has been adopted.”149 Tsarapkin then assumed a belligerent tone, chastising 
the president for referring to him as a “gentleman” and insisting that he be addressed as 
the “representative of the Soviet Union.”150 He openly challenged the president’s ruling, 
and demanded that the council not “be prevented from dealing with the Guatemalan 
question by a procedural ruse.”151 He then cautioned that if the president of the council 
“refuses to invite the victim of aggression to participate in the discussion of this question, 
he will be violating [Article 32].”152 The matter was put to a vote, with all Security 
Council members except Tsarapkin voting in favor of the president’s ruling.153 
Denouncing the U.S. “machinations…aimed at removing the question from the agenda,” 
Tsarapkin warned that “failure to include this question in the agenda will serve the 
aggressor’s purpose.”154 He was thus serving notice that the refusal to adopt the agenda 
would constitute clear evidence that the Security Council was a mere tool in the hands of 
the American imperialists.  
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Ultimately, Lebanon, Denmark, and New Zealand joined the USSR in voting to 
adopt the agenda, with the United States, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, and China voting 
against, and Britain and France abstaining. By the time the IAPC fact-finding committee 
arrived in Guatemala to investigate, Arbenz had resigned his post and fled the scene. The 
episode provoked U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold’s comment in the Ninth 
Annual Report that, “a policy giving full scope to the proper role of regional agencies can 
and should at the same time fully preserve the right of a Member nation to a hearing 
under the Charter.”155 It also prompted Hammarskjold to draft a memorandum 
concerning the proper relationship between the U.N. and regional organizations, in which 
he argued that “regional action within the framework of the Charter is a complement of 
universal action.”156 
The United Nations was just one venue for the post-coup propaganda battle, 
which involved each combatant seeking to portray the other as evil imperialists. The CIA 
was well aware of the need to deflect communist claims that U.S. policies were merely a 
smokescreen for economic imperialism. Defining imperialism as “the use of government 
power for the exploitation of foreign territories and people,” CIA psychological warfare 
specialist Tracy Barnes suggested asserting the line that Soviet imperialism was “the only 
imperialism operating today.”157 Barnes also recommended laying emphasis on Soviet 
“economic exploitation” of occupied territories and “atrocities committed by Soviet 
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troops” in annexed areas.158 Propaganda materials containing these themes should be 
distributed to Guatemala’s neighbors as well, in view of “the close interrelationship in 
public opinion between Guatemala and other Latin American, especially Central 
American, countries.”159  
With Latin American leftists popularizing the view that the U.S.-sponsored 
invasion of Guatemala was specifically designed to halt and reverse agrarian reforms, the 
CIA recommended that the U.S. delegate to the U.N. Security Council make absolutely 
clear that the United States favored agrarian reforms in underdeveloped countries and 
was “exclusively concerned with safeguarding Western Hemisphere against Communist 
conspiracy.”160 To prove the existence of such a conspiracy, USIA circulated a non-
attributed piece citing evidence that “top-flight agents of the Kremlin are guiding all acts 
both in the field and on the diplomatic front” in Guatemala. Among the evidence 
presented was Tsarapkin’s veto of the transfer to the OAS of Guatemala’s complaint.161  
USIA laid emphasis on the U.N. usurpation of the proper jurisdiction of the OAS; 
Article 52 of the U.N. charter specifically recognized the authority of regional 
organizations.162 USIA recommended heavy circulation of an OAS resolution signed by 
ten members, which indicated that “member OAS states are in exactly same frame of 
mind as US Senate” and should be interpreted as a Soviet failure to “pin rebellion of 
Guatemalans on US as act of aggression.” The Soviet veto on the transfer of the matter to 
the OAS, however, “revealed mailed fist under glove manipulating Guatemalan affairs” 
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and “rallied peoples of Western Hemisphere to repulse most sinister imperialism and 
most overt intervention in Western Hemisphere in recorded history.”163   
Meanwhile, the WFTU and CTAL stepped up their activities in Latin America, 
keeping the CPSU apprised of the growing potential for revolutionary change in the 
region. WFTU and CTAL sharply criticized the United States and the “Yankee 
monopolies” that dominated the economies of the Western Hemisphere, declaring the 
“North American imperialists” the common enemy, exhorting workers to the struggle for 
economic justice, and touting the “international solidarity” that had strengthened as a 
result of the “bloody terror” in Guatemala.164 The strikes that rocked Honduras were “a 
clear indicator” of the “militant spirit” of Central America’s plantation workers.165 
Characterizing Honduras as a colony of the United States, one CTAL affiliate crowed 
that the general strike of United Fruit workers had “shaken the foundations of domestic 
and international reactionary forces.”166 The U.S. invasion of Guatemala had “clarified” 
the situation of laborers throughout the region and definitively revealed United Fruit as 
the common enemy.167 Amid vows to “remain faithful to the slogan of proletarian 
internationalism,” the delegate promised to lead the workers of Honduras along the path 
“dictated to us by CTAL and WFTU – the sole organizations expressing the…genuine 
interests of the world’s workers.”168 
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In July, CTAL issued a manifesto condemning Castillo Armas and the “North 
American imperialists.”169 Calling on the workers of the world to save the “Guatemalan 
patriots” from oppression, the manifesto named “imperialism” as the main enemy of the 
Guatemalan people.170 Washington had acted against Arbenz not only because his 
agrarian program had threatened United Fruit’s monopoly status, but because the success 
of the Guatemalan revolution had inspired “the Latin American masses” to demand 
similar reforms.171 The Yankee imperialists, “thirsty for maximum profits,” would use 
any means necessary, including “blood and fire,” to exploit Latin America’s land and 
people.172 The manifesto expressed certainty that the workers of the world would support 
the demands of the Guatemalan people and facilitate a victory in the struggle with the 
American monopolists, whose actions in Guatemala had revealed the criminal essence of 
the U.S. policy of “world domination.”173 
Latin American communist parties joined WFTU and CTAL in condemning the 
imperialist intervention, expressing solidarity with the Guatemalan people, and calling for 
greater unity of purpose and action among the parties of the region. At the twelfth 
congress of the Mexican communist party in September, General Secretary Dionysio 
Encinas called for “working class unity” in the “struggle for Mexico’s national 
sovereignty” against “American imperialism.”174 He also lauded the party for its “leading 
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role” in “expressing solidarity with the people of Guatemala.”175 In December 1954, the 
first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Mexico met with one of Venezuela’s leading 
communists, Eduardo Machado, who emphasized that “the general direction of U.S. 
policy consists of the further subordination of the Latin American countries to the 
interests of the U.S. monopolies.”176  
The PGT leadership, in conversations with Soviet diplomats at the Mexican 
embassy and messages sent to the CPSU Central Committee, adopted a self-critical tone 
and acknowledged the grave errors they had made during the invasion. Guerra Borges 
admitted that the biggest mistake was in not arming the peasantry. He also noted that 
Arbenz’s Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, had become more stridently anti-
American since the fall of the regime. Apparently Toriello was convinced that the 
Democratic Party of the United States “does not adhere to an imperialist policy,” and that 
the intervention “would not have occurred” had the Democrats occupied the White 
House.177 The PGT leadership sent a note to Khrushchev, in which, “in the spirit of self-
criticism,” they acknowledged the primary lesson they had learned from the Guatemalan 
experience: “only the consistent, continual, and universal application of Marxist-Leninist 
teachings guarantees the correct leadership of the revolutionary struggle to achieve 
success.”178 
In the period following Arbenz’s resignation, the Soviet diplomatic and press 
corps in Latin America, partly in response to the initiatives of Latin American 
                                                
175 Ibid., p. 267. 
176 Conversation with member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Venezuela, Eduardo 
Machado, December 7, 1954. RGANI, Fond 5, opis’ 28, delo 321, p. 13. 
177 Conversation with representative of the Central Committee of the Guatemalan Labor Party in Mexico, 
Guerra Borges, June 29, 1955. RGANI, Fond 5, opis’ 28, delo 321, p. 82. 
178 Letter from Jose Luis Ramos, Mario Silva Jonama, and Alfredo Guerra Borges, October 22, 1955. 
RGANI, Fond 5, opis’ 28, delo 321, pp. 131-132. 
 56 
communists, began pushing for the improvement of Soviet propaganda capabilities in the 
region. The paucity of good translators, media outlets, and contacts on the ground in 
these countries were cited as the major obstacles to improving the quality and quantity of 
Soviet propaganda. In the fall of 1954, the Agitprop Department of the CPSU Central 
Committee re-evaluated its propaganda capabilities in the Western Hemisphere. The 
Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), which collected and distributed all 
official news, embarked on a concerted effort of reform and refinement of its 
information-gathering facilities in Latin America. Orlando Millas, editor of El Siglo, the 
official newspaper of the Chilean communist party, helped spur this initiative with his 
direct request for TASS to expedite and expand translations into Spanish of newsworthy 
developments in the Soviet bloc. Millas complained that because U.S. information 
distribution outlets were so much more effective, the majority of Latin Americans learned 
about the Soviet Union and its allies from news media that reflected the anti-communist 
and anti-Soviet biases of the United States. Although Millas’s letter was directed to the 
Central Committee, it was quickly passed onto the head of TASS, who adopted Millas’s 
recommendations and developed a series of measures to improve the agency’s work in 
Latin America.179 
 The Soviet Information Bureau, tasked with developing and disseminating 
propaganda in foreign countries, also emphasized the necessity of enhancing its 
capabilities in Latin America. Sovinformburo representatives in Argentina, who began 
work there in the beginning of September 1954, relayed to the Agitprop Department the 
wide scope of the “North American propaganda apparatus” and proposed a convention of 
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Sovinformburo leaders in Latin America to develop methods for increasing the quantity 
and veracity of information about the USSR in the “bourgeois press” in Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Argentina.180 The establishment of a more robust presence in Latin 
America meant that TASS and Sovinformburo could also track the rise of anti-American 
sentiment in the region. Sovinformburo noted the hostility of Uruguay’s neo-Batllists 
toward U.S. economic policies and the intervention in Guatemala. This opposition was 
especially significant considering the previously strong pro-U.S. tendencies of Jorge 
Batlle himself, who had refused to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. In the 
1955 electoral campaign, however, the neo-Batllists condemned U.S. foreign policy and 
pushed for trade relations with the USSR and other socialist bloc countries.181   
 In January 1956, Soviet Foreign Ministry analysts prepared a report for the 
International Department about “the U.S. economic and political enslavement of the 
countries of Latin America.”182 In order to bolster its “hegemonic position” in the 
Western Hemisphere, the United States would continue to “take all measures” to force 
the countries of Latin America into a state of “financial and economic dependence.”183 
This was achieved through the “onerous” terms of credits and loans and the “so-called 
‘technical assistance’” provided through the U.S. Export-Import Bank.184 The state of 
Latin American economic dependence on the United States allowed the U.S. “ruling 
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elite” to “exert aggressive pressure” if any of these countries showed signs of wanting to 
“embark upon the path of independent development.”185  
The United States also used the subservient economic position of the Latin 
American countries to foist its militaristic pacts and designs on the region. U.S. “politico-
military expansion” proceeded under the auspices of the OAS and the Inter-American 
Defense Board, which had been created at the 1942 Rio de Janeiro conference as the 
“basic military authority” of the OAS, and through which the United States sought to 
“implement its military designs” in Latin America.186 Slogans such as “the defense of the 
Western Hemisphere” and “pan-Americanism” functioned as a pretext for the 
“subjugation of the economic and military resources of Latin America to U.S. politico-
military designs.”187 The hemispheric defense treaty signed at the 1947 Rio conference 
was based on an expansive view of “armed aggression,” under which U.S. “ruling 
circles” implicated national liberation movements that threatened the “hegemonic 
imperialism” of the United States.188 The adoption of the anti-communist resolution at the 
Caracas conference in March 1954 had provided the Yankee imperialists with a “legal 
justification” for “any form of intervention” in “the internal affairs of Latin American 
countries.” Indeed, using the “struggle against communism” as a smokescreen, the United 
States had overthrown the “bourgeois-democratic” government of Arbenz, who had been 
a firm “advocate of national independence.”189 The goal of the U.S. intervention was not 
just to overthrow Arbenz, but to replace him with a “fascist military dictatorship” and to 
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“liquidate all democratic reforms” in the country.190 The irony of all this, of course, was 
that the inter-American system had been fortified at the request of Latin American 
leaders anxious to preserve regional sovereignty. The joint Guatemalan/Soviet action at 
the United Nations validated American fears of Soviet intrusion into hemispheric affairs.  
A mere week after the Foreign Ministry's report on the U.S. economic and 
political enslavement of Latin America was circulated in the International Department, 
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin announced the launch of the Soviet Economic 
Offensive.191 Declaring the Soviet intention to establish trade relations with the countries 
of Latin America “on the basis of mutual advantage,” Bulganin adumbrated a foreign 
policy shift that would be institutionalized at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union a month later.192 This shift involved the expansion of trade relations 
with both capitalist and decolonizing countries, and in the Latin American context, 
envisioned economic independence from the United States as a prerequisite for political 
independence. Indeed, two prominent scholars of Soviet foreign policy have noted 
“Khrushchev’s confident assertion that aid from the socialist bloc could allow the Third 
World countries to break away from the imperialist economic grip and launch their plans 
for…truly independent national economies.”193 
Bulganin’s report to the 20th Congress triumphantly announced that although “the 
United States…practiced discriminatory measures designed to restrict, and even stop 
trade with the Soviet Union,” trade with capitalist countries, “far from diminishing, 
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substantially increased.” Bulganin reported that the total value of foreign trade in 1955 
“was nearly double that of 1950.”194 “Of special significance,” Bulganin emphasized, was 
“the fact that we are witnessing the disintegration of the colonial system of 
imperialism.”195 Though it wasn't until the late 1960s and early 1970s that Moscow's 
power projection capabilities caught up with its Third World ambitions, the 20th Party 
Congress “signified the advent of the globalization of the Kremlin’s outlook.”196 
U.S. POLICY IN THE POST-COUP PERIOD 
The most pressing concern for the United States in the immediate post-coup 
period was to ensure the continued viability of the Organization of American States. 
Having successfully parried Soviet efforts to force the Guatemala issue onto the agenda 
of the U.N. Security Council, Dulles sought to keep the peace in the hemisphere, anxious 
that any further disorder would lead “usually cooperative states” to side with Soviet 
arguments that the OAS was incapable of “maintaining order in the hemisphere.”197 The 
State Department thus urged efforts to maintain peace in the region and recommended 
elimination of “controversial figures.”198 A “return to normalcy” was essential to 
maintaining the viability of the inter-American system, which had been thrown into doubt 
when the closest allies of the United States, including the United Kingdom, had come 
perilously close to joining the Soviet Union in pressing for U.N. jurisdiction over the 
investigation of Guatemala’s complaint. The crisis had been narrowly averted by U.S. 
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diplomatic intervention, as a result of which British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden told 
the U.K. delegate to the United Nations to abstain from voting on the matter. If, however, 
tensions in Central America did not subside, U.S. allies might revert to their previous 
position, thereby “damaging the prestige of the United States and weakening the 
OAS.”199  
In this case, it was fiercely anti-communist President Somoza of Nicaragua who 
was threatening the peace and stability of the region and thus jeopardizing the U.S. 
position. U.S. officials clearly recognized the dangers posed to the inter-American system 
not only by progressive reformist regimes, but from anti-communist dictators as well – a 
fact that caused “considerable concern” in the State Department, finding itself “in a 
position of opposition” to such a firm American ally.200 American Ambassador to 
Nicaragua Thomas Whelan and Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland discussed the 
importance of pressuring Somoza into taking concrete steps to eliminate tensions with 
Costa Rica, citing the “serious problems” posed by the regional conflict, “particularly in 
the UN.”201 
According to a National Intelligence Estimate prepared in August 1954, Somoza 
and Perez Jimenez of Venezuela constituted the “greatest present threat to stability and 
order in the region” because of their “animosity” toward Costa Rica’s Jose “Pepe” 
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Figueres.202 This animosity was due in part to Figueres’s support for the Caribbean 
Legion, a transnational band of leftist exiles that had staged an invasion of Nicaragua in 
April 1954.203 The estimate, moreover, acknowledged that social and political reform was 
much more important to the Caribbean republics than the communist issue, but that the 
United States had to tread carefully for fear of alienating the Caribbean “strong men.” 
Communist propaganda, the estimate continued, sought to identify U.S. support for 
regional dictators as the primary obstacle to “social and political progress” in Central 
America.204 U.S. officials realized that the only way to neutralize such propaganda was to 
associate the United States “with the aspirations of the peoples of Latin America.”205  
However, it was not until the last years of the Eisenhower administration that U.S. 
policy toward Latin America began to change course, and by then there were already 
indications that Latin American public opinion had hardened against the United States.206 
The Nixon trip to South America, during which the vice president was quite nearly 
lynched, was a dramatic sign that some sectors of the Latin American public had become 
radicalized.207 That Nixon faced the most virulent anti-U.S. demonstrations in Caracas, 
the site of the conference at which Dulles had laid the foundations for the invasion of 
Guatemala, was no small coincidence. The ouster of Arbenz had unleashed a torrent of 
hostility to the United States and brightened the prospects of regional pro-communist 
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politicians. Salvador Allende was one such beneficiary of the anti-U.S. backlash.208 In his 
July 1954 visit to Moscow, Allende declared that as president of the Popular Action 
Front, he considered the restoration of diplomatic relations between Chile and the Soviet 
Union to be one of his “main tasks.”209 He also expressed the desire to establish trade 
relations with the People’s Republic of China.210 In a report prepared for the International 
Department of the Central Committee, it was noted that the communist members of the 
Chilean delegation felt that the visit to the USSR would “play a major positive role in the 
evolution of Allende’s personal political views as well as in the activities of the Popular 
Front.”211  
Despite clear indications of Latin American dissatisfaction with the United States, 
U.S. officials positively assessed regional developments in the wake of the coup. The 
Operations Coordinating Board noted that Latin American governments seemed more 
convinced of the threat posed by international communism and that several regimes had 
“stepped up their efforts to control communist activity.” Even Mexico, a stolid supporter 
of the Arbenz government, had shown a “new awareness of the dangers of 
communism.”212 The Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America, moreover, was not an 
overly worrisome development. Noting that the Soviets used their trade missions as a 
Trojan horse for subversive activity and a prelude to establishing diplomatic relations, the 
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Operations Coordinating Board coolly observed that not a single Latin American country 
had re-established diplomatic relations with the USSR and that Latin American leaders 
were more interested in using “the threat of possible increased trade with the Soviet bloc 
as a bargaining point” in negotiating trade relations with the “Free World.”213 
Two years after the fall of Arbenz, the American ambassador to Guatemala, 
Edward J. Sparks, considered the coup a propaganda victory. Assuming that the 
“publicity” that had surrounded the rout of the communists in Guatemala “must be a 
constant source of irritation to the Soviets,” Sparks thought it “reasonable to believe that 
International Communism will be continually considering alternatives for cancelling out 
this loss to their general prestige.”214 Whether this represented willful self-deception or a 
sincerity born of naïveté, Sparks’ positive evaluation reflected a threat perception that got 
it exactly backward. Moscow had not been probing for an opening in Latin America, nor 
had it provided meaningful support to Arbenz, despite the pleas of regional communists. 
In fact, the Soviets only provided a modicum of moral and political support to Guatemala 
after the Arbenz regime was already teetering under the weight of a CIA-backed 
invasion. Sparks’ assessment, moreover, reveals an unwillingness in certain quarters of 
the Eisenhower administration to come to terms with the stunning propaganda defeat that 
accompanied the short-lived triumph of Castillo Armas. 
This propaganda defeat was the result of a U.S. response to Arbenz that was 
disproportionate to the threat that his government posed. There was never any danger of a 
Soviet military presence in Guatemala, yet the United States implemented a covert action 
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to dislodge Arbenz through the application of armed force. The U.S. intervention 
ultimately lent credence to what the communists had been saying all along. It was not the 
Kremlin that was actively seeking a role in Latin America, but regional communists who 
had petitioned the Soviets for aid and whose assessments of U.S.-Latin American 
relations shaped the Soviet approach. It was precisely because Latin America was the 
least strategically vital part of the world for the USSR that leading regional communists 
were allowed to exercise a relatively significant degree of influence. Latin American 
communist parties, moreover, while never straying too far from the Soviet party line, 
were comparatively free to take action on their own initiative. Though regional 
communists pled on Arbenz’s behalf, the decision to provide material aid to his 
government could only have been made at the highest echelon of authority in the Soviet 
Union. And although contemporary U.S. officials could not have been fully apprised of 
Soviet intentions in the Western Hemisphere, the Kremlin leadership was in no position 
to provide material support to a “bourgeois” revolution in the “American lake” chafing 
under U.S. paternalism.  
The regional backlash against the intervention in Guatemala and the overthrow of 
Arbenz revealed the force of anti-U.S. nationalism in Latin America during a period in 
which the Soviet leadership was re-evaluating the parameters of the Cold War. This re-
evaluation entailed a closer look at Latin America and a dawning realization of the U.N.’s 
utility as a forum in which to challenge the position of the United States within its own 
sphere of influence. Interestingly, communist trade confederations and diplomatic 
personnel were ahead of the curve in anticipating the significance of the Third World. 
Indeed, it seems that they were at the forefront of indentifying the shift in the 
 66 
international balance of power, or in the Russian version of the concept, “correlation of 
forces” (sootnoshenie sil), and urging a corresponding shift of focus in the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy orientation. As early as 1949, six years prior to the CPSU 20th Party 
Congress, WFTU and CTAL had already indentified the Third World as the upcoming 
venue of an epic battle for the hearts and minds of the world’s workers.  
U.S. insensitivity to the economic concerns of Latin American countries proved to 
be a boon to the Soviets, whose propaganda sought to aggravate and exploit anti-U.S. 
sentiment in the hemisphere. Though USIA attempted to counter communist propaganda 
by pointing to the harsh realities of Soviet imperial domination, Latin America was 
untouched by those realities. Even Daniel James, whose alarmist account of communism 
in Guatemala reinforced the Eisenhower administration’s threat perceptions, 
acknowledged that the efficacy of communist propaganda was due largely to the 
underlying socioeconomic and political conditions prevailing in Central America. He 
observed the fundamental difference between U.S. and Guatemalan perceptions of 
communism:  
To a North American, a Communist is someone who has been convicted 
of atomic espionage, who has killed GIs in Korea, who preaches the 
overthrow of U.S. democracy. To a Guatemalan nationalist, a Communist 
was a person who supported the October Revolution, who fought the big 
landowners and reactionaries, who wanted the worker to earn more wages 
and the peasant to get some land.215     
   
By the time the Eisenhower administration took steps to address the primary economic 
concerns of its southern neighbors, a new generation of Latin American radicals was 
coming of age and preparing to inaugurate what would become a turbulent new cycle of 
revolution and counterrevolution in the Western Hemisphere.   
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Chapter Two: “The Arms of the Soviets”: 
Revolutionary Cuba and the USSR 
On January 1, 1959, after almost six years of plotting in exile, Fidel Castro’s 26th 
of July movement, named after the date of the failed attack on the Moncada Barracks in 
Santiago in 1953, finally toppled Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Castro’s youth, 
charisma, and revolutionary zeal captivated the world, as politicians, journalists, and 
ordinary people waited and watched to see what shape Cuba’s revolution would take. 
Both the United States and the USSR initially took a cautious approach to the Cuban 
revolution, with the Eisenhower administration sensitive to the possibility of its 
destabilizing effect on hemispheric relations, and the Soviets seeking evidence that 
Cuban nationalism could be harnessed to Moscow’s advantage.  
Since 1956, the Soviets had pointed to Castro’s 26th of July movement as a 
powerful indication of anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America. As in Guatemala, the 
Kremlin had approved a shipment of Czech weapons to the Cuban rebels in 1958, but had 
taken care to ensure that Moscow’s hand remained hidden; thus, assistance was limited to 
weapons that were either captured from Germany or of Czech design. No Soviet-made 
weapons were included in the shipment.216 Up until the overthrow of Batista, the Soviets 
had found the movement useful primarily as a source of anti-U.S. propaganda.217 With 
the triumph of Castro’s guerrilla forces, the Soviets became interested in the future of the 
Cuban revolution. On January 3, Pravda announced that the overthrow of Batista 
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provided “evidence of the growing strength of the peoples of Latin America against the 
predominance of the Yankee imperialists.”218  
Indeed, Castro’s revolutionary mystique, and the David and Goliath nature of 
Cuban resistance to U.S. hegemony, has led to a tendency to romanticize Castro and his 
revolution. Among the earliest American authors to exhibit this tendency was Herbert 
Matthews of the New York Times, who reported glowingly on the 26th of July movement 
until even he was forced to admit that Fidel Castro was abandoning the ideals of the 
revolution.219 Richard Gott, a British journalist with decades of experience in Latin 
America, has also idealized Castro, claiming that he “created the Cuban nation” by 
“giving meaning to the struggles of the past.”220 Russian authors, particularly former 
Soviet officials, tend to be especially guilty of this tendency to romanticize Castro. 
Dmitry Yazov, who served as defense minister from 1987 to 1991, and who participated 
in a conference in Havana during the fortieth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, has 
written about the intense feelings that Cuba inspired in him and his colleagues. Not only 
did Cuba become “like a second homeland” to Yazov, but the slogans of the Cuban 
revolution – “Fatherland or death! We shall overcome!” – apparently still “resound in 
[his] heart.”221 Indeed, Yazov recounts that Cuba is known to his entire generation as “the 
island of freedom” because this “proud, independent country, located in such close 
proximity to the United States, dared to defy American domination and hegemony.”222  
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A popular view of the relationship between the Soviet Union and revolutionary 
Cuba is that U.S. hostility toward Castro pushed him into the arms of the Soviets. This 
interpretation suggests that had the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations adopted a 
more receptive approach to Castro, mutually acceptable terms could have been reached 
and Cuba would not have been “forced” to join the Soviet bloc. One historian has 
concluded that Castro turned to the Soviets “in the face of the U.S. economic embargo 
and unrelenting hostility.”223 Another has argued that Castro was “pushed towards the 
Soviet Union by the intransigence of Cold War U.S. administrations.”224 This scholar 
goes on to argue that “by pursuing the Cuban leader and seeking to topple his regime, the 
U.S. made it impossible for Castro to take any other course if he and his revolution were 
to survive.”225 Historians of Soviet-Cuban relations have made similar arguments, 
concluding that Soviet opportunities developed in proportion to the deterioration of U.S.-
Cuban relations. Dmitry Yazov blames the “typical imperial mentality” of the 
Eisenhower administration for its failure to realistically evaluate the impact of the Cuban 
revolution and argues that “the Americans themselves pushed him in the direction of the 
Soviet Union.”226 Svetlana Savranskaya, in her postscript to Sergo Mikoyan’s monograph 
on the Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis has argued that “early Soviet-Cuban relations 
developed almost in response to the United States’ negative reaction to the 
Revolution.”227  
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Other scholars have challenged the view that U.S. actions were the primary driver 
of the Cuban-Soviet relationship. Richard Welch has argued that although U.S. policy 
toward Castro’s regime was ill-conceived, it was not the “primary cause” of the 
radicalization of the Cuban revolution.228 Another historian has agreed that Cuba’s 
leaders “were not ‘pushed’ by the United States into the Soviet orbit, but went of their 
own volition.”229 Louis Perez, Jr., while arguing that the Cuban-U.S. confrontation 
“could not but accelerate the radicalization of the revolution,” acknowledges that that 
confrontation was determined just as much by the Cuban leadership’s desire to eliminate 
U.S. influence in Cuba as it was by U.S. efforts to remove the Cuban leadership.230 
Another historian has argued that although Raúl Castro and Che Guevara were not 
subject to communist party discipline or acting under orders from Moscow, they and 
other radical members of the 26th of July movement “were convinced that genuine social 
revolutionary change in Cuba must inevitably lead to open confrontation with the United 
States and that if the revolution was going to survive U.S. hostility it would need the 
support of strong allies, including the Cuban communist party and the Soviet Union.”231 
By the middle of 1959, “Fidel Castro evidently shared that view.”232  
Historian Hal Brands has argued that “the move toward Moscow began well 
before the breakdown of U.S.-Cuban relations in late 1959 and early 1960,” and that it 
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was “driven largely by ideological and political considerations.”233 Pointing to the 
influence on Castro of his brother Raúl and comrade-in-arms Che, both ardent 
communists (though notably not subject to CPSU party discipline), Brands presents 
evidence that the two “envisioned a partnership with the Soviet Union as a way of 
isolating non-Marxist members of the government and forcing them to the side.”234 In 
this view, the move toward the Soviets was partly a function of domestic politics and the 
desire to consolidate power. As early as December 1958, the CIA had suggested that Raúl 
and Che would likely prove more susceptible to Soviet influence than Castro.235 The head 
of the Cuba section at the CIA headquarters at Langley has been quoted as saying that his 
staff and he “were all Fidelistas,” during the early phase of the war, but that the “growing 
influence of Che Guevara” put a damper on CIA support for Castro.236 This suggests that 
U.S. foreign policy officials were not immediately and irrevocably opposed to the Cuban 
revolution. It was Castro’s uncompromising anti-U.S. attitude, argues Brands, that put 
him at loggerheads with the U.S. government. “The single dominant rhetorical trope of 
the Cuban revolution,” he writes, “was the mixture of anti-imperialism and anti-
Americanism that characterized Castro’s public discourse.”237 According to this 
interpretation, it was not U.S. hostility toward Castro that predetermined the forging of 
the Soviet-Cuban alliance, but Castro’s unrelenting hostility towards the United States 
that drove him to seek an alliance with the Soviets.  
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Historian Stephen Rabe has noted the politicization of the historiography 
surrounding the rupture of U.S.-Cuban relations, observing that opponents of Castro have 
considered him to be an agent of the Kremlin from the beginning, while those 
sympathetic to Castro have argued that the breakdown in relations was precipitated 
largely by U.S. opposition to his regime. However, Rabe observes, “through most of 
1959, the [Eisenhower] administration did not deliberately provoke Castro or try to 
undermine the revolution.”238 Wayne Smith, who served as a political analyst at the U.S. 
embassy in Havana until diplomatic ties were severed on January 3, 1961, has opined that 
“it is often forgotten that relations between the United States and Cuba were rather good 
during the first half of 1959.”239 Not until the end of 1959 did the administration conclude 
that it “could no longer abide Castro or Cuban nationalism,”240 and this was after a series 
of tit-for-tat reprisals had soured relations and several ominous developments in Cuba 
had boded ill for the future of U.S. investments and influence on the small island nation. 
Castro had nationalized key sectors of the Cuban economy, expropriated private land and 
property, loudly condemned every manifestation of U.S. imperialism, and launched a 
purge, not only of pro-Batista “war criminals,” but also of moderate members of his own 
revolutionary government. These purges involved show trials, lengthy imprisonments, 
and executions, and as one author has argued, the arrests of Castro’s former fellow 
revolutionaries – particularly the arrest of Huber Matos in October – demonstrated  that 
his regime was now “explicitly equating anticommunism with treason.”241 
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Although the debate surrounding the breakdown in U.S.-Cuban relations and the 
development of the Soviet-Cuban alliance is robust, the debate surrounding the calculus 
that informed Castro’s move toward the Soviets is decidedly less so. This is partly 
because Castro’s own motivations for pursuing an alliance with the USSR can be 
explored only by abandoning the over-simplified version of events that castigates the 
United States for “driving” Castro into the “arms of the Soviets.” The primary source 
documents that could shed light on this question, moreover, are presumably under lock 
and key in Havana, and it is doubtful that they will be declassified any time soon. 
Nevertheless, scholars have offered compelling explanations for Castro’s motivations. 
Wayne Smith has argued that Castro’s shift toward the Soviets was a function not so 
much of the breakdown in U.S.-Cuban relations but of Castro’s foreign policy goals and 
international ambitions. Castro’s “messianic vision” was always aimed at liberating all of 
Latin America, and his “charismatic style” played well in the Third World.242 Alan 
McPherson drawn attention to the ways in which unique political and social 
circumstances conditioned the expression of anti-Americanism and the caution with 
which Castro proceeded due to the fact that the Cuban people shared certain American 
values and aspirations.243 Almost from the beginning, Castro was probing for 
opportunities to enlighten the overwhelmingly anticommunist Cuban population about 
the benefits to be gained from an alliance with the Soviets.  U.S. attempts to undermine 
Castro’s regime only helped him to convince the Cuban people of a proposition that he 
himself was already convinced of – that Soviet protection would be the best safeguard of 
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the revolution, and more importantly, his own position as el jefe maximo.244 Hal Brands 
has shown that the more radical leaders of the 26th of July movement had compelling 
domestic political reasons for solidifying ties with the USSR; thus it seems that both 
domestic and foreign policy considerations prompted the turn toward the Soviet bloc. 
Another source of debate is the political calculus that underwrote the Soviet 
decision to take revolutionary Cuba under its wing, through the provision of ever-
increasing amounts of economic and military aid. Some have argued that the Soviet 
leadership was motivated solely by altruistic concerns for the fate of the revolution. 
Although Cuba’s turn toward socialism was frequently used by Soviet theorists and 
ideologists to prove the veracity of the Marxist-Leninist worldview, and there was clearly 
an ideological component to the Cuban-Soviet alliance, most scholars have 
acknowledged that Soviet actions were to a significant degree driven by geopolitical and 
strategic considerations. As one scholar has argued, “Cuba’s possible role in reducing 
U.S. superiority over the USSR in nuclear strike capability was also present in the minds 
of Soviet policy makers and military planners.”245 Nikolai Leonov suggests that strategic 
ambitions were at the forefront of the Soviet leadership’s interest in Cuba from the very 
beginning. The victory of the Cuban revolution, Leonov writes, created the opportunity 
for “a major military counter-weight to the United States in the Western Hemisphere 
itself.”246 The emergence of anti-U.S. nationalism in Latin America was seen as a 
potential “strategic gain” for the USSR, and Soviet support for Cuba was seen as “paying 
back the United States in its own coin,” as the Soviet Union had, “since the creation of 
NATO, been surrounded by U.S. allies and military bases.” Of course, in the early days 
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of the revolution, the Soviet leadership was not yet discussing the stationing of Soviet 
military bases on Cuban soil. Khrushchev, according to Leonov, merely sought to render 
military support to the Cuban army so that it could “independently withstand any 
attempts at aggression” from the United States.247 The provision of aid to revolutionary 
Cuba, moreover, was sincerely believed to be a selfless act of solidarity and the 
fulfillment of the USSR’s “internationalist duty.”248 It is clear, however, that Soviet 
support for Cuba was at least partly based on pragmatic strategic calculations of how best 
to neutralize U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. 
One of the main reasons that the burgeoning Soviet-Cuban alliance was pursued 
cautiously and with little fanfare is that both Castro and Khrushchev were far-sighted 
enough to know that the revolution needed to be consolidated before providing the 
United States with a convenient pretext to intervene. Both Castro and the Soviet press 
referred to the lessons of Guatemala. One of those lessons was that the United States 
would not abide an ideologically suspect regime in its “backyard,” and another was that 
the loyalty of the armed forces was a prerequisite for regime survival. Castro courted the 
Soviets cautiously, not wishing to goad the United States into invoking the Caracas 
declaration in an attempt to legitimize armed intervention.249 During Che’s 1959 summer 
trip abroad, he informed the Soviet ambassador to Japan that Cuba’s “rapprochement 
with socialist countries” had to be pursued cautiously and gradually, because “the 
enemies of the revolution will try to use every sign to obstruct domestic affairs on the 
pretext of a communist threat in Cuba.”250 As one prominent scholar of Cuban foreign 
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policy has argued, “the revolution was achieved, in part, because Castro successfully 
deceived his enemies, many of his supporters, and the U.S. government with regard to the 
intensity of his radicalism at home and his hostility to the United States.”251 The Soviets, 
moreover, were initially circumspect about providing full-throated support to a 
revolutionary regime that was headed not by the communist party, but by a charismatic 
leader with uncertain ideological proclivities. 
As the Cuban-Soviet relationship developed, it was the Cubans who led the way. 
Mere months after his triumph over Batista, Castro sent emissaries to inform the Soviets 
of the Cuban interest in establishing economic, political, and diplomatic relations. 
Though Moscow remained cautious in its approach to Havana, the Soviets availed 
themselves of the opportunities presented by the deterioration of the U.S.-Cuban 
relationship. Thus, those who have argued that U.S. hostility toward Castro drove him 
into an alliance with the Soviets have gotten the situation exactly backward: it was not 
the Cubans who were “pushed into the arms of the Soviets” by U.S. intransigence, but the 
Russians who were pushed into the arms of the Cubans by repeated U.S. policy blunders. 
Philip Bonsal, former U.S. ambassador to Cuba from the revolution until diplomatic ties 
were severed, has argued that rather than driving the Cubans into the arms of the Soviets, 
U.S. intransigence “forced” the “cautious Russians…into the Revolution’s own warmly 
welcoming arms.”252 It was in fact the Cubans who played the role of suitor in the 
relationship, and, with the important exception of the missile crisis, who frequently 
pushed Moscow into making commitments that it was hesitant to make. 
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APPEASING WASHINGTON, WOOING MOSCOW: THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REVOLUTION 
While it is certainly true that Castro himself was no communist, and that the 
revolution succeeded largely absent the support of the Cuban communist party – indeed, 
despite the party’s occasional active opposition to the 26th of July movement – evidence 
indicates that he intended to move toward the Soviet bloc from the earliest days of the 
revolution. On January 12, the Cuban communist party, the Partido Socialista Popular 
(PSP) was legalized and the following day, Castro delivered a speech in which he 
declared his lack of faith in the Organization of American States and his intention to steer 
a middle course between the two Cold War superpowers.253 The USSR formally 
recognized Castro’s government on January 10. On January 30, Revolución, the official 
newspaper of the 26th of July movement, published two editorials in which calls were 
made to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc. Then, in a speech on 
February 20, Castro explicitly advocated the establishment of relations with the 
Soviets.254  Relations between the 26th of July movement and the PSP were, however, 
quite tense. Che Guevara often disparaged the communists as bureaucrats and paper-
pushers, who hid under their bunks while the revolution was underway, only to emerge 
and lay claim to leadership status after the smoke had cleared. While PSP leaders like 
Blas Roca and Lazaro Peña adhered to the Soviet party line, which held that the existence 
of a large urban proletariat was prerequisite to socialist revolution, Che and Fidel were 
more influenced by Mao and the Chinese communists, who had proven that a rural-based 
peasant insurgency could work. Such a model was clearly more applicable to a Third 
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World setting. Despite the inherent mistrust that plagued relations between the 26th of 
July movement and the PSP, the latter was likely authorized to liaise with Moscow, and 
in March, a PSP representative met with Marshal Sokolovsky, the chief of the Soviet 
armed forces, to discuss military-to-military relations between Cuba and the USSR. A 
month later, PSP leader Lazaro Peña passed along a message from Blas Roca, the party’s 
general secretary, expressing the Cuban desire to open trade relations and develop 
economic cooperation between the two countries.255 Thus, in the earliest days of the 
revolution, Castro already seemed to be moving toward a closer relationship with 
Moscow.  
The Soviets, however, did not immediately embrace Castro. Though they had 
correctly identified the “anti-American character” of the revolutionary movement, Castro 
was not a member of the communist party, and he was therefore an unknown quantity. 
The Soviets adopted a wait-and-see approach. On January 9, 1959, the third secretary of 
the Soviet embassy in Washington, V. Andreev, sent a report about events in Cuba to the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry.256 He characterized the appointment of Manuel Urrutia to 
temporary president as a compromise in order to hold the various political factions 
together in solidarity until the revolution could be consolidated; Urrutia represented the 
interests of the petty bourgeoisie and was known to have a “pro-American orientation” 
and to be “strictly anti-communist.”257 Castro himself, moreover, had repeatedly assured 
the Americans that he would protect the interests of U.S. monopolies in Cuba and respect 
all international treaties and agreements that former Cuban leaders had signed with the 
                                                
255 Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, pp. 13-14. 
256 Soviet embassy in the USA, January 9, 1959, On Events in Cuba (summary), Arhiv Vneshnej Politiki 
Rossijskoj Federacij (Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; hereafter, AVPRF), Fond 104, 
opis’ 14, papka 5, delo 1, pp. 10-11. 
257 Ibid., p. 11. 
 79 
United States. Castro had also assured the Eisenhower administration that his movement 
“has nothing in common with communism.”258 
 Andreev accurately identified U.S. interests in Cuba, noting that “ruling circles” 
in the United States were particularly worried about the future of capital investment in 
Cuba and the lease on the naval base at Guantanamo.259 The Eisenhower administration 
was not, however, sitting back and twiddling its thumbs; active measures were being 
taken to preserve U.S. interests in the event of a “Fidelista victory.” Administration 
officials had started secret negotiations with Castro’s representatives and the State 
Department had made a series of announcements that the United States would adhere to a 
policy of “strict non-interference” in the internal affairs of Cuba. Despite promises not to 
render any aid to Batista’s forces, the Eisenhower administration had “clearly not lost 
hope” of “regulating” the situation on the island, with Batista’s help.260 To this end, the 
administration was funneling weapons to Batista’s partisans through Nicaragua and the 
Dominican Republic.261 From the earliest days of the Cuban revolution, long before the 
Soviet leadership had even met with Castro, the Soviets suspected that the United States 
was preparing to launch an armed intervention. 
Well before the Eisenhower administration had given clear indication of its 
opposition to the Cuban revolution, Castro had sent emissaries to sound out the Soviets 
and inform them of the regime’s desire to re-establish diplomatic relations. In March 
1959, the wife of Salvador Massip, the Cuban ambassador to Mexico, met with the Soviet 
ambassador to Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin. She informed Bazykin that the revolution 
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occurring in Cuba was “a real people’s revolution,” in which “the masses of working 
people are taking part.” Though the tasks facing the revolution were many and difficult, 
Massip expressed confidence that they would be accomplished. “That which is being 
done in the USSR,” she told Bazykin, “is what Cuba should strive for.” She informed the 
Soviet ambassador that the “gaze of the Cubans participating in the revolution is cast 
upon the USSR.” She also assured him that the restoration of formal diplomatic relations 
between the two countries was “only a matter of time.”262 
 In April, 1959, four months after Batista’s ignominious flight from Cuba, Fidel 
Castro visited the United States. By this time, U.S. public opinion of Castro was 
beginning to sour due to his refusal to set a date for elections. The regime’s show trials 
and executions of former Batista officials for war crimes also made a strong impression. 
Castro had already given indications of moving toward the Soviet bloc, and during his 
U.S. trip he was almost constantly plagued by questions about communist influence in 
the Cuban revolution. The Soviets, however, were still unsure of his intentions. This is 
due at least in part to the fact that Castro had internalized what for him and his comrades-
in-arms was among the most important lessons of the Guatemalan coup: to not give the 
United States a convenient pretext for mobilizing the Organization of American States in 
order to legitimize intervention.263 Castro was shrewd enough to know that he needed to 
deny or downplay evidence of communist influence in his regime if he wished to 
consolidate power in Cuba. Thus, in a speech to the National Press Club, he claimed to be 
“against communism,” and in a speech at the United Nations, he assured listeners that 
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there were “no communists” in his government. During an appearance on NBC’s Meet 
the Press he even denied that his brother Raúl was a communist.264  
Meanwhile, back in Havana, Raúl Castro was using the Cuban communist party, 
of which he was a clandestine member, to petition the Soviets for military assistance and 
training. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU approved the request on 
April 23. Precautions were taken to camouflage the origins of the assistance; the 
International Department of the Central Committee, the KGB, and the Ministry of 
Defense arranged to send members of the Spanish communist party, and later a small 
detachment of Soviet officers of Spanish ancestry. The Soviet role in providing military 
training was hidden from the Cuban treasury, the leadership of which was composed 
largely of anticommunists.265 Other high-ranking PSP leaders had been sent to Moscow 
to request economic aid and even to exhort the Soviets to propagandize more heavily in 
favor of the Cuban revolution. These requests were not honored, however, as the Soviets 
were still wary about Castro’s political loyalties, and none of the PSP representatives 
could credibly claim to speak on his behalf.266 
On April 20, Castro gave a press conference in Washington, D.C. Andreev 
attended and commented on the event in his personal diary. Noting that the press 
conference was heavily attended by Castro’s Cuban opposition, he described a question 
from one hostile reporter, about whether Castro believed that the Soviet Union was a 
dictatorship. Dismissing the question as a “provocation,” Castro drew a distinction 
between a “personal dictatorship” and a “class dictatorship,” and argued that in the Soviet 
Union, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” expressed the interests of the “entire Soviet 
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people.”267 In a private conversation with a cohort of pro-Castro Cuban correspondents, 
Andreev was invited to visit Cuba, in order to see “with [his] own eyes” what was 
happening there, and to make his own judgments. The Cuban correspondents told 
Andreev that in their country, the “doors are open to everyone.”268 
 On July 17, Cuban President Manuel Urrutia was forced to resign his post due to 
ill-judged comments he had made four days earlier during a television appearance in 
which he expressed his concern about the growing influence of communists in the Cuban 
revolution. For U.S. officials, Urrutia’s forced resignation constituted incontrovertible 
evidence that the Cuban revolution had taken an ominous turn.269 On July 22, Massip’s 
wife again met with Bazykin, both to report on the nature of the Cuban revolution and to 
warn of the potential threats to it. Because the Cuban revolution was more “profound” 
than other Latin American revolutions, the United States was engaged in a “furious 
propaganda campaign” against the Cuban government and against Castro in particular.270 
Labeling former president Manuel Urrutia a “traitor,” she assured Bazykin that his 
replacement, Osvaldo Dorticós, who had been a member of the PSP since 1953, was 
“loyal to Fidel Castro.” She also pledged the “great sympathy” of the Cuban people for 
the USSR, and reassured Bazykin that although the regime’s survival of “these dramatic 
times” necessitated a cautious approach so as not to give impetus to “global reactionary 
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forces,” the revolutionary government stood for the “renewal of relations with the 
USSR.”271  
 By August 1959, the Soviet embassy in Washington was becoming increasingly 
aware that the situation in the Caribbean, created by the Cuban revolution, was “fraught 
with more serious consequences than the well-known events in Guatemala.”272 The 
Soviets believed that the Cuban revolution could potentially be far more consequential 
than the Guatemalan revolution had been. The second secretary of the Soviet embassy in 
Washington, Polyakov, noted that the mainstream news media implicated Castro in the 
“destruction of democracy” and charged that the overthrow of Batista was “part of a plot” 
to “expel all anticommunists from Cuba.” The press, moreover, was “leading an 
extensive campaign of slander” against Castro himself.273 U.S. propaganda asserted that 
Castro was preparing to “export the revolution to other countries of Latin America,” that 
he was “instinctively opposed” to Americans and prejudiced against their “friendly 
advice,” and finally, that he was working to “turn the Cuban people against the 
U.S.A.”274 Polyakov warned that the Eisenhower administration was “actively preparing” 
for an upcoming OAS conference in Santiago de Chile, which the Americans were 
“intent on using” in order to prepare for “interference in Cuba’s internal affairs.” The 
U.S. press was emphasizing the “haste” with which the OAS conference was being 
convened, and observed that “never before” had the OAS reacted so expeditiously to 
events in the Western Hemisphere as it was now reacting to events in the Caribbean.275 In 
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essence, Polyakov was warning that U.S. hostility toward Castro would likely manifest at 
the upcoming OAS conference as intense pressure on the Latin American delegates to 
isolate Cuba. 
 At the same time, the Soviets worried that Cuba’s Latin American neighbors were 
adopting a more oppositional stance toward the revolutionary government. The hostility 
of the Caribbean dictatorships, compliant U.S. pawns in regional affairs and repressors of 
their own people, was to be expected. But the Soviets did not want Castro’s revolutionary 
adventurism in the Caribbean to alienate countries like Mexico, which conducted an 
independent foreign policy and maintained diplomatic ties with Moscow. On August 18, 
Bazykin met with Mexico’s Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Gorostiza, to 
express displeasure with the Mexican press’s treatment of Castro. He complained that 
some press accounts “present Fidel Castro as practically a dictator.” Gorostiza responded 
that the official position of his government was “that what the Cuban government does 
inside the country is the domestic business of Cuba and is justified.” “However,” 
Gorostiza continued, “the Mexican government cannot allow attempts to send Cuban 
expeditions to other countries to overthrow dictatorial regimes.” Bazykin countered that 
he had just been to Panama, and although he had read many announcements about the 
“landing of Cubans in Panama,” his visit to the country had convinced him that “this type 
of announcement is being exaggerated by U.S. circles with the goal of discrediting 
Castro’s government.” Gorostiza informed Bazykin that the Mexican government had 
“credible evidence of the existence of fanatic bands of young Cubans sent for the purpose 
of fomenting coups against other governments.”276 In fact, the Mexican government had 
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detained and deported “three groups of such Cubans” who had been found in Mexican 
territorial waters. To Bazykin’s pointed question about the role of the Cuban government 
in sending the young insurrectionists, Gorostiza admitted that “they were on their own 
initiative, possibly even in defiance of Castro’s wishes.”277 Regardless of whether Castro 
had sent them, the incident suggests that regional tensions during this period were fueled 
by Cuban revolutionary adventurism and that the Soviets worried about the impact of 
such adventurism on Moscow’s relations with other Latin American countries. 
 That same day, Bazykin met with Cuban ambassador Salvador Massip, who 
informed him that former president Manuel Urrutia, who had occupied a “negative 
position toward the USSR,” had ordered the Cuban embassy in Mexico to “withhold from 
issuing visas to Soviet representatives.” Urrutia had been replaced by Osvaldo Dorticós, 
who had been a member of the Cuban communist party since 1953. Massip apprised 
Bazykin of the fact that he was authorized to issue visas to Soviet representatives, and 
that if the USSR would send some to his country, they could discuss the establishment of 
“not just trade and consular relations, but also diplomatic relations.” “When your people 
go to Cuba,” Massip promised, “they will meet with Raúl Castro and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Raúl Roa, who have much sympathy with the USSR.”278 
 That September, while Khrushchev toured the United States at Eisenhower’s 
invitation, expressing awe at Iowa’s infinite rows of neatly cultivated corn and dismay at 
the sexualized performances of Hollywood starlets, the Presidium struggled to reach a 
decision about Cuba’s request for Polish weapons. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko, among others, opposed the provision of arms to Castro’s regime, arguing that 
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“the supply of arms to Cuba will drive the Americans toward active interference in the 
internal affairs” of Latin America.279 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Committee 
on Foreign Economic Relations of the Central Committee worried that to honor Cuba’s 
request would have damaging consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations, with Khrushchev’s 
U.S. visit underscoring just how important improving superpower relations was to him. 
On September 23, the Presidium determined that it was “inexpedient at the present time 
to provide weapons to Cuba.”280 Yet when Khrushchev returned to Moscow a few days 
later, he overturned the Presidium’s decision and approved the sale of Polish weapons to 
Cuba, thereby signaling his willingness to “take risks to pursue Soviet aims in Latin 
America.”281 The incident is revealing of the impact of Khrushchev’s personality and 
initiative on the development of the Soviet-Cuban alliance. 
 On October 1, KGB agent Aleksandr Alekseev arrived in Havana. Though he had 
requested in January to go, the Cuban government had refused to issue him a visa. When 
he arrived in October, he did so as the first Russian citizen to be granted a visa to Cuba. 
As part of the Kremlin’s post-Arbenz propaganda offensive, Alekseev had been sent to 
Latin America in 1954, tasked with recruiting agents and cultivating pro-Soviet 
politicians in the region. Though he had been based in Buenos Aires, his activities were 
not limited to Argentina, but encompassed the entire hemisphere. In 1958, Alekseev had 
been recalled to Moscow to help the Central Committee improve its knowledge of Latin 
America, and thereby increase the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in the region. 
Finally granted permission to enter Cuba, Alekseev was assigned by the KGB to establish 
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contacts with the highest ranking Cuban leaders.282 In the early days of the revolution, 
Moscow wanted mainly to confirm Castro’s anti-U.S. attitude and proclivities; whether 
he was a communist was not as important as whether he planned to adopt and maintain a 
confrontational attitude toward the hegemon of the north.283  
Alekseev’s first meeting with Prime Minister Castro revealed the latter to be a 
rather cynical manipulator of public opinion. “You suggest a slogan to the masses,” 
Castro confided, “and the masses should become possessed of it.” Now, Castro 
continued, “we will spread the slogan ‘Friendship with the Soviet Union!’ and when the 
public begins to feel that this is necessary, we will reestablish relations.”284 In an 
indication of which direction the revolution was headed, the following day Castro 
announced that his brother Raúl would henceforth head the Ministry of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces, which replaced the Ministry of National Defense. Raúl Castro, a 
committed communist, was now in charge of the entire armed forces and the intelligence 
and security services.285 The increasing communist control of Cuba’s army led the 
military chief of Camaguey province, Huber Matos, to resign his post in protest. Castro 
sought to make an example of him and sentenced him to twenty years in prison.286 
 During the fall of 1959, it seems as though the Soviets were prepared to take 
further steps to deepen cooperation with revolutionary Cuba, but Castro’s struggle to 
consolidate his domestic position resulted in a more cautious approach.287 On November 
17, the Soviet ambassador to Switzerland, Koryukin, discussed the situation in the 
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Caribbean with his Cuban counterpart, Salazar Sanchez. Having warned that the United 
States was now “activating its subversive activity” against Castro, Sanchez emphasized 
that the Cuban revolution was entering a “decisive period” and that the revolutionary 
forces were not yet “sufficiently strengthened.” Therefore, it “might be more 
advantageous to not force a confrontation with the United States,” but instead to embark 
along a “path of compromise” in order to “gain time to strengthen the situation” in the 
country. Sanchez even told Koryukin that he had studied the Russian Revolution, which 
had taught him that “a frontal attack is not always expedient.”288 The Cubans repeatedly 
indicated that though they admired and sought to emulate the Soviet Union, the 
consolidation of the revolutionary regime’s domestic legitimacy required prudence and 
caution. The religious fervor of many Cubans made them suspicious of communism, and 
the United States had proven that it would not hesitate to use armed force to overthrow an 
ideologically suspect government in its “backyard.”  
MIKOYAN IN HAVANA 
 In November 1959, the Soviet exhibition in Mexico City drew the attention of the 
Cuban leadership. The exhibition, which was scheduled for late November, was the 
subject of an editorial in Revolución, which recommended that Anastas Mikoyan be 
invited to visit Cuba.289 Apparently, Castro sent an emissary, Hector Rodríguez Llompart, 
to liaise with the Soviets, convince them to bring the exhibition to Havana, and extend a 
personal invitation to Mikoyan. Thus commenced the first high-level contacts between 
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Moscow and Havana.290 On January 30, 1960, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union 
(TASS) announced that Mikoyan would travel to Cuba in February to open the Soviet 
cultural and technical exhibition.291 The visit was seen as a “pretext” for establishing 
relations with Cuba and an opportunity to “identify the character and path” of the Cuban 
Revolution and of Cuban-Soviet relations.292 On February 4, Anastas Mikoyan arrived in 
Havana. The visit was heralded as an event both deeply symbolic and highly substantive 
– not only was Mikoyan the highest ranking Soviet official to visit any Latin American 
country, but he was tasked with achieving concrete results in the form of mutual aid and 
trade agreements. Khrushchev, moreover, sought to use the prospect of cooperative 
Soviet-Cuban relations to advertise Soviet benevolence toward the Third World, display 
solidarity with Latin America’s proletariat, and to coordinate joint action with the Cubans 
at the United Nations. From the beginning, the Kremlin sought Cuban support for its 
policy agenda in the international forum. 
  During his stay in Cuba, Mikoyan met with delegates of the Confederation of 
Cuban Workers (CTC). The delegates assured him that although recent events had shown 
the Cuban people that the situation in their country would remain acute, the workers 
“now know that they are not alone in their struggle.” Not only did they have on their side 
the socialist countries, “headed by the mighty USSR,” but they also enjoyed the support 
and sympathy of “all honest people in the world.” Mikoyan “affirmed the correctness” of 
this assessment, adding that the Cuban people would be strengthened not only because 
they “are receiving and will continue to receive support in their righteous struggle,” but 
also because they had “rallied together to defend the revolutionary gains of the…leader 
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of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro.” Mikoyan added that, in contrast to previous eras, 
these days it was “not so easy for imperialist circles to unleash aggressive action, let 
alone to implement their aggressive plans.”293 The USSR undoubtedly deserved the lion’s 
share of the credit for foiling the designs of the predatory imperialists. 
CTC representative De la Campa accused the imperialists “and their agents” of 
“brandishing the flag of anti-communism” and using Catholicism as a “smokescreen.” 
Fortunately, “to deceive” the Cuban people “is now impossible,” because they know 
“who their enemies are and who their friends are.” “The Cuban people are united,” 
continued De la Campa, and “will achieve the ultimate victory of the revolution.” 
Mikoyan confidently declared that the United States was afraid of the Cuban revolution, 
not because it “posed an actual threat,” but because it would “give a boost to the 
liberation movement in other countries of Latin America.” The triumph of the Cuban 
revolution, moreover, would signify the loss of the “tremendous profits” of the American 
imperialists in these countries. Mikoyan hailed Cuba as the “focus of the Latin American 
people’s struggle for independence,” and De la Campa agreed that the people of Latin 
America had “raised its voice in defense of Cuba.” The cry of “Cuba – yes! Yankee – 
no!” was heard all around.294 
 De la Campa also expressed his disappointment with the United Nations Security 
Council, which had recently transferred Cuba’s complaint about violations of Cuban 
airspace by counterrevolutionary exiles to the OAS. The council’s action was considered 
evidence that the United States was gearing up to commit “new atrocities against Cuba.” 
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Fidel Castro had already announced his intention to use the upcoming OAS meeting as a 
platform to “defend the Cuban Revolution” and to “unmask U.S. imperialism.” Mikoyan 
observed that because of the enthusiasm of Latin American peoples for the Cuban 
revolution, it was impossible for their leaders to directly oppose Cuba. “However,” 
warned Mikoyan, “this does not exclude the possibility that these governments might 
launch covert actions and intrigues against Cuba behind the backs of their own 
people.”295 
 During Mikoyan’s visit, in a meeting with both Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, an 
informal agreement was reached to pursue “active joint efforts” in the U.N.  Both sides 
agreed that “unequal economic development” was the “source of the instability and 
unrest prevailing today.” Because of this, it was deemed imperative that the two sides 
work together through the United Nations and its “regional and specialized organs” to 
formulate an “extensive plan of economic cooperation and technical aid providing for the 
systematic development of under-developed regions.” As a preliminary step toward this 
goal, the Soviets agreed to purchase 425,000 tons of sugar from Cuba, and to provide one 
hundred million dollars worth of credit for the purchase of Soviet-bloc goods.296 Nikolai 
Leonov has argued that if the Cubans had not found in Mikoyan such an “authoritative 
and influential patron,” the path of Soviet-Cuban relations “would have been 
different.”297 
Just days after Mikoyan's departure from Cuba, the Subcommittee on American 
Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate 
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released a report on Soviet-bloc activities in Latin America. The study had been 
commissioned and authorized in the summer of 1958 but researched and written during 
the summer and fall of 1959. The report provided a fairly accurate assessment of Soviet 
intentions and capabilities  in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than aiming for socialist 
revolution, the USSR in fact desired “the political neutralization of this region in the 
worldwide ideological power struggle.” Once the U.S. position had been undermined, the 
USSR would be able to “enhance its own position and prestige through the development 
and extension of political, trade, financial, and cultural relations with the countries of 
Latin America.”298  
The report was certainly clear-eyed about the fundamental nature of the 
continent’s difficulties. “The widespread poverty, the discontent, restlessness, aspirations, 
and frustrations, the political and social changes, the drive for economic development, 
and the touchy nationalism combine to create an environment with tensions which the 
Communists attempt to exploit.”299 Nationalism could be a particularly virile force in the 
Latin American context; “the Communists assiduously exploit this Latin American 
nationalism in order to intensify the anti-U.S. feeling and further the Soviet cold war 
objectives.”300 Through such “appeals to nationalism,” the Soviets sought to “drive a 
wedge into Western Hemisphere solidarity.”301 The report also highlighted a 
phenomenon to which administration officials ought to have paid closer attention. “To a 
certain extent,” the report noted, “the Communist parties in Latin America benefit from 
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U.S. opposition to Communist machinations in the hemisphere.” This was because “the 
sensitivity about U.S. dominance is so strong that in some cases Latin Americans are 
prone to tolerate Communist activity just because the United States is opposed to it.”302 
The committee recommended that “each of the Latin American governments…decide for 
itself” whether to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR.303 Neither the 
Eisenhower nor the Kennedy administrations would take this advice. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES VS. THE UNITED NATIONS 
Both Castro and Khrushchev displayed an eagerness to use the United Nations as 
a platform upon which to flaunt their camaraderie and cultivate the support of the Third 
World. To a great extent, this showmanship on the international stage was a function of 
their own charisma as leaders. The shift in Soviet policy toward the United Nations was 
in large part the result of a dramatic change in leadership style from Stalin to 
Khrushchev. Stalin had viewed the U.N. as a mere tool of the West, and had openly 
criticized the countries of Latin America for constituting an “obedient army” of the 
United States. Khrushchev, while still somewhat suspicious about Western influence in 
the organization, nevertheless recognized the United Nations as a powerful weapon to 
shape international opinion and to cultivate the sympathies of decolonizing states, 
including the countries of Latin America, which were considered victims of U.S. “neo-
imperialism.”  
An influx of members from the newly independent states of Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East were admitted to the U.N. in the late 1950s and early 1960s, irrevocably 
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altering the composition and functioning of the international body. As these states sought 
to redirect the energies of the organization toward easing the transition to independence, 
the Soviets amplified their efforts to use the U.N. as a platform to cultivate and 
strengthen relations with the Third World. In 1958, suspicious of U.N. Secretary General 
Dag Hammarskjold’s loyalties, the Soviet delegation had put forward a proposal to create 
three separate Secretaries-General – one representing the interests of the Western powers, 
one representing the socialist camp, and another representing the interests of the Third 
World. Hammarskjold opposed the so-called “troika” proposal, recognizing that it would 
taint the U.N. Secretariat with the politics and rivalries of the Cold War.304 During the 
Congo crisis, the Soviets had subjected Hammarskjold and the U.N. to fierce criticism, 
and had repeatedly questioned the Secretary General’s motives, asserting time and again 
that “there are no neutral men.”305 After the death of Hammarskjold in a plane crash in 
1961, the Soviets agreed to drop the troika proposal on the condition that the next 
Secretary-General be from a non-Western country.306 The tenure of Secretary-General U 
Thant witnessed the further transformation of the United Nations. Until the early 1960s, 
the United States and its Latin American allies had enjoyed a majority status in the 
General Assembly, but as the decade progressed, that majority power shifted to the non-
aligned countries.307 
The Cubans proved adept at using the United Nations as a forum for cultivating 
Third World support. At first, this entailed an effort to position Cuba as non-aligned. At 
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the fourteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly in September 1959, Cuban Foreign 
Minister Raúl Roa delivered a speech indicating that Cuba would henceforth follow an 
independent foreign policy that rejected the necessity of identifying as either communist 
or capitalist. He chastised both the Soviet Union and the United States for their great 
power interventions in the internal affairs of smaller states, and criticized both 
communism and capitalism, the former for withholding liberty and the latter for 
withholding bread.308 He condemned the Soviet intervention in Hungary alongside the 
U.S. intervention in Guatemala, and held up the Cuban revolution as a model for the 
peoples of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.309 However, for U.S. officials, the bottom 
line was not Cuba's claim to neutrality, but its voting record. Of the fifty-four votes taken 
during the fourteenth session, the Cuban delegation had voted in opposition to the United 
States thirty-nine times, and had abstained from voting on “Washington’s litmus test” – 
whether the People's Republic of China should be seated.310  
By the next year, the Cuban-Soviet relationship had deepened, with the 
establishment of formal diplomatic relations and the conclusion of aid, trade, and military 
agreements. On July 6, 1960, Khrushchev delivered a speech to the All-Russian 
Teachers’ Congress in Moscow, in which he condemned U.S. imperialist aggression 
against Cuba, and swore to “do everything to support Cuba and its courageous people in 
the struggle for the freedom and national independence they have won under the 
leadership of…Fidel Castro.” He then referenced the way the Cuban revolution had 
altered geostrategic realities, with a warning that “the United States is not so inaccessibly 
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distant from the Soviet Union as it used to be.” Khrushchev’s promise that Soviet 
artillerymen “can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if the aggressive forces 
in the Pentagon dare to launch an intervention against Cuba” set off alarm bells in the 
Eisenhower administration. Eisenhower responded with a statement later that day, in 
which he categorized Khrushchev’s statements as evidence of “the effort of an outside 
nation and of international communism to intervene in the affairs of the Western 
Hemisphere,” and pledged “in the most emphatic terms that the United States will not be 
deterred from its responsibility by the threats Mr. Khrushchev is making.”311 
 In an early indication of the resentment that Castro would later feel upon the utter 
failure of the Soviet leadership to consult with him regarding the removal of missiles 
from Cuba, U.S. ambassador to Cuba Philip Bonsal reported a rumor to the effect that 
“Castro was caught entirely off base by Khrushchev’s…statement about what Russia 
would do to us if we invaded Cuba.” Bonsal had apparently heard from “two or three 
sources” that Castro was “perfectly furious about a development which puts Cuba 
entirely under the Soviet wing.” Though Bonsal admitted that he had no means of 
verifying this rumor, he was convinced that “Fidel is now more or less a pawn in the 
hands of Che Guevara,” who had apparently prevailed upon Castro to accept 
Khrushchev’s statements.312  
 Secretary of State Christian Herter, in a circular sent to selected U.S. embassies in 
Latin America, characterized Khrushchev’s threats as the “most fundamental challenge to 
date to Inter-American system.” Characterizing the latest developments in the Soviet-
Cuban alliance as evidence “beyond reasonable doubt” that “danger now exists,” Herter 
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acknowledged that Latin American countries might not be convinced, or perhaps, due to 
“domestic political reasons,” would prove hesitant to take collective action to dispel the 
threat. The United States, in its commitment to the non-intervention principle, had 
repudiated unilateral action; nevertheless, the “failure of Latin Americans to live up to 
their share of responsibility for collective solution will not be occasion for United States 
to renounce its basic obligation to preserve security [in] this country and hemisphere.”313 
In August, 1960, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of 
American States convened in San José, Costa Rica. The resulting Declaration of San José 
“condemn[ed] energetically the intervention or the threat of intervention…by an 
extracontinental power in the affairs of the American republics,” and “reject[ed]…the 
attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or social 
situation of any American state, inasmuch as that attempt is capable of destroying 
hemispheric unity and endangering the peace and security of the hemisphere.”314 In a 
measure that was clearly aimed at Cuba, the declaration also “reaffirm[ed] the principle 
of nonintervention by any American state in internal or external affairs of the other 
American states,” and “proclaim[ed] that all member states of the regional organization 
are under obligation to submit to the discipline of the inter-American system.” The 
Mexican delegation to the conference appended a statement to the declaration, which 
emphasized its “general character” and denied that it was a “condemnation or a threat 
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against Cuba.” The delegation affirmed the Mexican government’s “fullest support” for 
Cuba’s “aspirations for economic improvement and social justice.”315   
Castro had come to power with a view of the OAS not as a hemispheric security 
organization, but as a mere cat's paw of the United States. Knowing that the United States 
would attempt to use the OAS to undermine the Cuban revolution, Castro sought to use 
the United Nations as a counter-weight to U.S. regional hegemony. This involved an 
effort to cultivate the support of Third World nations and to advertise the Soviet-Cuban 
alliance. The fifteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly provided an unparalleled 
opportunity to achieve these goals. For the Cubans, this was an opportunity to stick it to 
the Yankees in their own territory, and for Khrushchev, it was an occasion to publicize 
Soviet friendship toward the under-developed world. Complaining of ill treatment at their 
hotel in Manhattan, the Cuban delegates made a show of traveling to Harlem, where 
Khrushchev met them for a priceless photo-op. At the general assembly, Khrushchev and 
Castro cozied up for the cameras, fervently embracing and shouting exclamations of 
encouragement during the other's speeches.  
On September 2, Castro delivered a speech excoriating the United States, the 
Organization of American States, and the Declaration of San José. Accusing the Council 
of Foreign Ministers of “sharpening the dagger which the criminal hand of Yankee 
imperialism wants to drive into the heart of the Cuban fatherland,” Castro questioned the 
legitimacy of the declaration by clearly distinguishing between the aims of Latin 
American governing elites and the desires of the masses of ordinary Latin American 
peoples. “The validity of the Costa Rica Declaration,” he proclaimed, “depends not on 
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the foreign ministers but on the peoples.” In order to validate the declaration, “we 
respectfully ask the governments of America to call their peoples together in general 
assemblies and submit the Costa Rica Declaration to them.” Castro insisted that for the 
democratic governments of Latin America to be truly democratic, such declarations and 
agreements had to be adopted by the masses.316 Such statements were consistent with 
Vice President Richard Nixon’s initial assessment of Castro, which observed that “he 
appears to confuse the roar of mass audiences with the rule of the majority in his concept 
of democracy.”317 
But this was nothing compared to the vitriol he reserved for the United States, and 
its “imperialist penetration…in our fatherland.” U.S. imperialism was the “force which 
was always associated with everything negative, everything reactionary, and everything 
abusive in [Cuba].” Indeed, U.S. imperialism was the “main cause of [Cuba’s] evils.”318 
Mocking the San José declaration’s charge that the Sino-Soviet bloc posed a danger to 
hemispheric security, Castro contended that “the Yankee imperialists are solely to blame 
for the fact that this revolution is taking place in Cuba.” Castro posited the Cuban 
revolution as a model for other Latin American countries struggling against U.S. 
imperialism. “To our small fatherland,” he announced, “has fallen the task of serving as 
the torch which lights the way for millions and millions of men and women like us, who 
are suffering in America today, just as we suffered in the past! It is our glorious destiny to 
serve as a light which will never go out!” He then proceeded to enunciate the terms of his 
own declaration, the Declaration of Havana, which “energetically condemn[ed] the open 
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and criminal intervention in which the US imperialists have engaged for more than a 
century against all of the peoples of Latin America.” 
Characterizing Pan-Americanism as a smokescreen for “the domination of 
Yankee monopolies…and the Yankee maneuverings of governments pledged to 
Washington,” Castro went on to laud the Soviet Union for “the aid spontaneously 
offered,” which could “never be regarded as an act of intervention, but constitutes an 
obvious gesture of solidarity.” In the name of the “National General Assembly of the 
People,” Castro “accept[ed] and welcome[d] the support of the rockets of the Soviet 
Union in the event of a military attack on [Cuba’s] territory by the military forces of the 
United States.” Castro also lambasted the United States for opposing the entry of the 
People’s Republic of China into the United Nations, declaring that revolutionary Cuba 
was ready to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, and that “therefore, the 
relations which Cuba has maintained to date with the puppet regime maintained in 
Formosa by the ships of the Yankee Seventh Fleet no longer exist.” 
In a bid to align the goals and values of the Cuban revolution with the aspirations 
of newly decolonizing countries, Castro “condem[ed] the exploitation of the 
underdeveloped countries by imperialist financial capital.” He reaffirmed the 
international outlook of the revolution by articulating the “duty of each people to stand 
with all the oppressed, colonized, exploited or attacked peoples, wherever in the world 
they may be and whatever geographical distance may separate them. All the peoples of 
the world are brothers!” Castro ended the spectacle by tearing up a copy of the San José 
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Declaration, while the crowd cheered and sung the July 26 hymn and the Cuban national 
anthem.319 
A few weeks later, Castro delivered another speech at the U.N. General 
Assembly, in which he blamed U.S. hostility for the decision to strengthen relations with 
the Soviet bloc. Joking that at the time of the agrarian reform, “we were not 100 per cent 
communist yet,” but “were just becoming slightly pink,” Castro swore that before the 
United States launched its campaign of harassment, “we had not had the opportunity even 
to exchange letters with the distinguished Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Nikita 
Khrushchev.”320 Because of U.S. economic aggression, however, Cuba “went in search of 
new markets” and “signed a trade treaty with the Soviet Union.”321 Castro claimed that 
Cuba’s only defense was to appeal to the United Nations, the authority of which was 
“even above that of the OAS.” But the United Nations requested that the OAS investigate 
the situation, and “what was to be expected? That the OAS would…condemn the political 
aggression against Cuba, and, above all that it would condemn the economic aggression 
against our country.”322 But of course that was not the outcome. “In this hemisphere,” 
Castro proclaimed, “everyone knows that the Government of the United States has 
always imposed its own law – the law of the strongest.”323 The people of Cuba had 
learned that “their rights are not protected by either the OAS or the UN.”324  
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Castro also expounded upon the international significance of the Cuban 
revolution. Conceding that some of his “Latin American colleagues may feel it their duty 
to be discreet at the United Nations,” Castro argued that they should instead 
“welcome…the Cuban revolution,” because it had “forced the monopolists to return at 
least a small part of what they have been extracting from the natural resources and the 
sweat of the Latin American peoples.”325 Arguing that “the case of Cuba is the case of all 
underdeveloped, colonialized [sic] countries,” Castro declared that “the problems which 
we have been describing in relation to Cuba can be applied just as well to all of Latin 
America.”326 And “how long will Latin America wait for its development?” he pointedly 
inquired. “Since all imperialisms are alike,” he maintained, “a country that exploits the 
people of Latin America…is an ally of the exploiters of the rest of the world.”327 Clearly, 
Castro was describing a struggle that pitted Cuba and all the under-developed countries 
of the world against the old-school European colonialists and the U.S. neo-imperialists. 
Two weeks after Castro’s speech, James Wadsworth, the U.S. representative to 
the U.N., sent a written rebuttal for circulation to all members of the organization. The 
response claimed that Castro’s speech “contained many unfounded accusations, half-
truths, malicious innuendoes and distortions of history,” and accused the Cuban prime 
minister of being “anxious to destroy” the “historic friendship between Cuba and the 
United States.”328 Rebuffing Castro’s charge that the United States was uninterested in 
economic development, the report argued that the U.S. government “contributes more to 
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economic development of other countries than any other government in the world.” 
Regarding Castro’s portrayal of the United States as the ally of “gangsters, landowners, 
monopolists, militarists [and] fascists,” the report characterized it as “straight out of the 
mythology of Soviet communism.”329 The report also emphasized that “the United States 
regards the principle of non-intervention as one of the cornerstones of the inter-American 
system.”330 The report argued that the United States had traditionally paid for Cuban 
sugar in dollars and at prices above that of the world market, and questioned how such 
arrangements could be viewed as “slavery” while “barter arrangements at lower prices, 
agreements which tie the Cuban economy to the Sino-Soviet bloc and infringe on Cuba’s 
right to choose the origin, cost, and quality of its imports, can somehow be portrayed as 
‘economic freedom.’”331 Referring to the apparent Soviet attempt to link communism 
with the philosophy of José Martí, the report alleged that “Martí perceived correctly the 
dangers of communist imperialism under a pretense of defending and succoring the 
oppressed.”332  
Though much of the information in the U.S. rebuttal was factual, there was of 
course no mention of the covert plotting to remove Castro. As the Cuban government 
continued to issue complaints about repeated violations of Cuban airspace, and kept the 
Kremlin apprised of the latest attempts of the U.S. imperialists to overthrow the 
revolutionary regime, the Soviets responded with expressions of moral support and 
fraternal solidarity. In October, Khrushchev sent a message over Cuban airwaves, 
expressing the support of the Soviet people for Cuba's “struggle for political and 
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economic independence,” and claimed that he had read in a newspaper that the American 
imperialists were preparing mercenary troops for “subversive actions” against Cuba.333 
In November, Cuban representatives of various revolutionary organizations 
visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship 
and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The head of the delegation, Mario Puente 
Ferro, revealed his knowledge of Russian history by drawing a parallel between the 
current situation in Cuba and the early days of the Russian revolution, when the country 
was blockaded “and surrounded by hostile imperial powers.” Yet the revolutionary forces 
had repelled the invaders. Now Cuba found itself besieged by external enemies. Puente 
pointed out that, “You were alone. But we have, in addition to the heroism and courage 
of our people, the support and solidarity of the entire socialist camp, and especially the 
USSR.”334 Of course, when U.S.-backed exile forces invaded Cuba, such expressions of 
solidarity were not particularly useful, and the USSR came under fire for its inability to 
provide meaningful military support to the revolutionary regime.  
THE BAY OF PIGS 
 Much has been written about the Bay of Pigs, and while plenty of disagreements 
exist, no one would deny, as historian Theodore Draper commented at the time, that it 
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was “one of those rare events in history – a perfect failure.”335 At the time, most of 
Kennedy’s advisers supported the invasion; voices of dissent were few and apparently 
unconvincing. One such dissenter was Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who warned Kennedy that 
if the U.S. hand was revealed, “Cuba will become our Hungary.”336 Schlesinger also 
predicted “a wave of massive protest, agitation, and sabotage throughout Latin America, 
Europe, Asia, and Africa” and cautioned that the operation would “dissipate all the 
extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new Administration through the 
world.”337 Moreover, were the United States to admit involvement in the invasion plans, 
it would be tantamount to admitting “action taken in violation of the basic characters of 
the hemisphere and of the United Nations,” which would place the United States “on the 
same moral plane as the Soviet Union.”338 Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles, in a 
memo that apparently never reached Kennedy, made a similar argument from principle, 
stressing that “the differences which distinguish us from the Russians are of vital 
importance,” and expressing doubt “that means can be wholly divorced from ends.”339 
Senator J. William Fulbright opposed the operation, opining  that “the Castro regime is a 
thorn in the flesh; but it is not a dagger in the heart.” He told Kennedy that “to give this 
activity even covert support is of a piece with the hypocrisy and cynicism for which the 
United States is constantly denouncing the Soviet Union in the United Nations and 
elsewhere.”340 
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 Indeed, the covert operation was launched the same week that the U.N. had 
convened to investigate allegations of U.S. aggression against Cuba. On the morning of 
April 15, Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa demanded the floor to make an 
announcement about the invasion but was interrupted by the acting president of the 
General Assembly, Frederick Boland, on a point of order. Soviet ambassador to the U.N. 
Valerian Zorin immediately came to Roa’s defense with an exhortation to “discuss 
immediately the question of aggression against Cuba.”341 Later that afternoon, in the 
emergency meeting of the First Committee, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson 
responded to Roa’s accusations by presenting a CIA-fabricated cover story that was 
already in the process of unraveling.342 Two days later, Stevenson again rebuffed Roa’s 
charges that the mercenary force invading Cuba was “organized, financed, and armed by 
the government of the United States.”343 Among the detrimental consequences of the 
failed invasion for U.S. policy was “the diplomatic embarrassment of being caught baldly 
lying to the world community.”344 Stevenson reported back to the president and secretary 
of state about the atmosphere in the U.N., which he characterized as “extremely 
dangerous to U.S. position throughout [the] world.” The Soviets and the Cubans, he 
reported, had managed to “capture and so far hold moral initiative.” This was in some 
part due to the fact that “everyone…believes we have engineered this revolution,” and 
thus “we have received virtually no support in [the] speeches of others.”345 The incident 
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shattered U.S. credibility and strengthened domestic support for Castro’s regime, while 
burnishing his international image as a “David defeating Goliath.”346  
Moreover, although the operation was aimed at denying the USSR a foothold in 
the Western Hemisphere, it ultimately drove Castro to seek a defensive military alliance 
with Moscow.347 On April 16, Castro declared Cuba a Marxist-Leninist state. Most 
scholars agree that Castro’s decision to officially identify with socialism was prompted 
by the desire to protect Cuba from another U.S. invasion. Castro knew that Soviet 
military protection was guaranteed only to other countries of the socialist bloc. On April 
18, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a telegram in which he promised to “render the Cuban 
people and their government all necessary help to repel armed attack,” and warned that 
any further aggression would be answered “in full measure.”348 The next day, U.S. 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy sent his brother a memorandum presciently predicting 
that in one or two years’ time, “Castro will be more bombastic, will be more and more 
closely tied to Communism, will be better armed, and will be operating an even more 
tightly held state than if these events had not transpired.” His assessment of the longer 
term consequences of the Bay of Pigs invasion hit the bulls-eye. “If we don’t want Russia 
to set up missile bases in Cuba,” he concluded, “we had better decide now what we are 
willing to do to stop it.”349 
Despite Khrushchev’s nuclear blustering, the Soviets  understood the 
responsibility that a guarantee of military protection of the Cuban revolution would entail 
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and were circumspect in their response to Castro’s bid. According to Kiva Maidanik, a 
scholar of Latin America in the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO), though the Soviet leadership certainly reveled in the humiliation 
and loss of U.S. prestige that Castro’s announcement entailed, Castro’s claims to be not 
just a communist, but a leader of world communism, was highly troubling. “To us,” 
Maidanik confided in an interview with historians James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, 
“this is an impossible concept because we decide who is and is not a communist. And of 
course, there is no ‘leader’ other than ourselves.” Maidanik claims that the Soviet 
leadership viewed Castro with suspicion from the moment of his announcement, fearing 
that the Cubans would reveal themselves as “heretics” who had succumbed to the 
“Chinese virus.”350 Many in the Soviet leadership, moreover, feared that Castro’s 
statements would complicate his domestic political situation and openly invite U.S. 
hostility, heightening the prospect of U.S. military intervention and putting Khrushchev’s 
pledges to a very public test.351  
The Soviet press, rather than trumpeting the triumph of a Marxist-Leninist regime 
in the Western Hemisphere, remained uncharacteristically silent about this momentous 
development.352 In October 1961, Khrushchev proclaimed that, “our hearts are with you, 
heroes of Cuba, in defense of your independence and freedom from American 
imperialism.” At the 22nd CPSU Congress the same month, Anastas Mikoyan declared 
that Cuba had taken “the road of true liberation from the yoke of the monopolies…and is 
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building a socialist life.”353 However, it is notable that until April 11, 1962, over four 
months after Castro declared that he was a Marxist-Leninist and had been since his  
student days, Pravda refrained from referring to Cuba as “socialist” or Castro as a 
“communist.”354 Khrushchev’s decision to station missiles on Cuban territory was made 
shortly after the formal recognition of Cuba as a socialist state.355  
The Soviets interpreted the failed outcome of the invasion as further evidence of 
the changing correlation of forces – the imperialist bloc was in decline and socialism was 
on the rise. “The failure of the attempt to export counter-revolution to Cuba,” wrote one 
theorist, “shows that the possibilities of the revolutionary liberation movement are 
enormously greater than before.”356 At the same time, however, the timing of the invasion 
proved problematic for Khrushchev – he was forced to come to the defense of the Cuban 
revolution right in the middle of preparations for the historic Vienna summit scheduled 
for June. A strong defense of Cuba increased U.S.-Soviet tensions during a period in 
which “peaceful coexistence” dominated the Soviet party line and Khrushchev was 
seeking to improve relations with the United States.  
The Bay of Pigs strengthened the position of hardliners in the Kremlin and 
solidified an impression of U.S. President Kennedy as indecisive.357 That impression was 
reinforced at the Vienna summit, where Khrushchev had not planned to engage in 
concrete negotiations, but merely to take stock of the U.S. leader. Apparently, as a result 
of the Vienna summit, Khrushchev determined that Kennedy was a “mere ‘boy’ who 
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would be vulnerable to pressure,” and considered subjecting him to “a test of strength.”358  
Indeed, at the end of the first day of the summit, Kennedy complained to his aides that 
Khrushchev had treated him “like a little boy,” and admitted that “because of the Bay of 
Pigs,” Khrushchev “thinks…that I’m inexperienced.”359 This perception of Kennedy as 
weak and indecisive contributed to Khrushchev’s decision to station nuclear missiles in 
Cuba. 
The Bay of Pigs also provided the Soviets an opportunity to enhance their image 
in the Third World by linking the struggle of the Cuban people to the trials and 
tribulations of the decolonizing world. As soon as the fiasco hit the headlines and 
airwaves, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee adopted a resolution demanding of 
the imperialists, “Hands off Cuba!”360 Occurring on the Solidarity Committee’s 
designated “African Freedom Day,” the U.S. invasion was denounced as a “monstrous 
atrocity.” “The time has passed,” declared the committee, “when the imperialists could 
through force of arms subjugate an entire people to its will.” Now, the colonialists were 
opposed by the “powerful socialist camp,” as well as by the “many millions of peace-
loving peoples in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who have firmly 
committed to bringing a decisive and permanent end to colonialism.” The committee 
concluded with the resounding cry, “Long live the unity and solidarity of the people in 
the struggle against imperialism and colonialism!”361 
To a significant extent, such propagandizing reflected the anxieties of Khrushchev 
and other Soviet leaders about Castro’s potential turn toward the Chinese. Peking 
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castigated the Soviets as “revisionist” for their contention that peaceful coexistence 
between states with different social and economic systems did not preclude the triumph 
of socialist revolution.362 A collapse of Moscow’s position in the Caribbean would entail 
a major loss of Soviet prestige in the Third World. As early as March 1961, PSP leaders 
had complained to the Kremlin about Che’s support for armed revolutionary movements 
in the Western Hemisphere, and Castro’s launch of a rebel training program in Havana 
was worrying to Soviet leaders who feared another U.S. invasion of Cuba.363 Castro’s 
declaration in December 1961 that he was a Marxist-Leninist and sought to transform 
Cuba into a socialist country had complicated his domestic position, and Soviet 
intelligence analysts warned that such a course was imprudent.364 Moreover, in March 
1962, Aníbal Escalante, the executive secretary of the PSP, was removed from his post 
and exiled to the Soviet Union for over-stepping his authority. Moscow worried that the 
removal of such a staunchly pro-Soviet communist leader signaled a shift in Castro’s own 
loyalties, and that he was poised to embrace the Chinese party line, with its emphasis on 
armed struggle. The same month, Ramiro Valdés, the Minister of Internal Affairs, visited 
the Soviet Union and apparently suggested that the Soviets organize an intelligence 
center in Havana for the purpose of providing support to Latin American revolutionary 
movements. The request was denied.365 Khrushchev was stuck between a rock and a hard 
place – to get behind Castro’s revolutionary ambitions would inevitably invite U.S. 
action, but to deny those ambitions would validate Cuban and Chinese condemnations of 
Soviet “revisionism.”  
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The Cubans, despite successfully repelling the U.S.-backed invasion, were not 
convinced that the United States had ceased efforts to destroy the revolution. On April 
28, Castro and Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós penned a dire warning of impending 
U.S. aggression to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The revolutionary regime 
was now in danger of the “direct armed aggression” of the United States and its band of 
counter-revolutionaries and mercenary thugs. Kennedy himself had “cynically 
acknowledged” the role of the U.S. government in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, which 
“violated the most elementary norms of international law and the fundamental principles 
of the UN charter.”366 Castro and Dorticós absolved themselves of any responsibility for 
the breakdown in US-Cuban relations, insisting that the revolutionary government had 
repeatedly announced its willingness to discuss “contentious issues” with the U.S. 
government “on a basis of equality.” The United States had responded to these 
benevolent intentions with “threats of aggression and economic blockade, acts of 
sabotage and subversive activity, the bombardment of [Cuban] cities, and finally, the 
[Bay of Pigs] invasion.” The United States was now bringing to bear its considerable 
military might against Cuba, “such a small country…which could never, even in a minor 
way, pose a threat or danger to such as great power as the U.S.A.”367 
On October 11, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko received a telegram 
from his Cuban counterpart. Cuban Acting Foreign Minister Olivares described the 
Cuban people as “victims” of “aggressive policies” and warned that the U.S. government 
was launching a campaign to discredit the revolutionary government by convincing the 
world that Cuba was bent on “interfering in the domestic affairs” of sovereign nations 
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and was thereby “violating the fundamental principles of international law.”368 This was 
merely a transparent attempt to “isolate Cuba from other Latin American countries” by 
convincing the latter to “sever relations” with the former. The United States had already 
received the cooperation of the “anti-peoples” and “anti-democratic” regimes of the 
Americas. Though the U.S. government had tried to present the Cuban revolution as a 
“potential threat to the development and stability of Western Hemisphere countries,” 
“everyone knows” that Cuba had cleverly used the United Nations and the Organization 
of American States to “unmask” these provocations.369 Olivares launched into a detailed 
discussion of the fruits of the U.S. campaign. Several countries had already broken 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, the press had tarred the revolution with accusations of 
“subversion,” and military training camps in Central America were preparing for an 
armed overthrow of the Castro regime.370 The CIA, meanwhile, was busy preparing an 
invasion directed at the “physical destruction of the leaders of the revolution.”371 
Although the message included no direct appeal for military aid, the meticulous detailing 
of the existential threats facing the Cuban revolution suggests that such aid was exactly 
what the Cuban government was hoping for. 
CONCLUSION 
 Though the Soviets had initially adopted a cautious approach to the Cuban 
revolution, as Castro pursued a more radical course, and as the United States responded 
with covert acts of aggression, Khrushchev ultimately became convinced that he could 
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shore up Moscow’s position in the face of the challenges posed by the increasingly 
confrontational Chinese communists and ensure Castro’s loyalty with a dramatic display 
of Soviet military might. Judging Kennedy to be a weak and indecisive leader – a 
judgment that was largely based on the U.S. president’s unwillingness to use U.S. 
military power to achieve the objectives of the Bay of Pigs invasion – Khrushchev sought 
to present the United States with a fait accompli that would demonstrate the Soviet 
commitment to Cuba and irrevocably alter the strategic balance of the Cold War.  
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Chapter Three: Nuclear Fallout:  
The USSR and Cuba from the Missile Crisis to Rapprochement 
The Cuban missile crisis has been the subject of much spilled ink, and the 
intention here is not to recount the chronology of events, as others have done quite 
well.372 Nevertheless, a cursory examination of the consequences of the crisis is 
necessary to show that it was a watershed in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. It undermined 
Cuban trust in the Soviet leadership, led to a breach in the alliance that would not be 
repaired until the early 1970s, and ultimately contributed to the “palace coup” that ousted 
Nikita Khrushchev. Throughout the remainder of the 1960s, Cuban-Soviet relations 
would be constantly plagued by the contradiction between Castro’s obligations as Soviet 
ally and his aspirations for Third World leadership. This manifested most frequently as 
criticism of orthodox communist parties; sometimes this criticism was thinly veiled, and 
other times it was direct and harsh. While adhering to the view that Yankee imperialism 
was the ultimate enemy, Castro consistently chastised both the Soviets and their regional 
communist allies for their inadequate support of the armed revolutionaries battling the 
imperialists. At first, this resulted in Soviet attempts to cobble together doctrinal 
compromises, but as the Cuban economy became increasingly dependent on its Soviet 
patron, Castro was ultimately brought to heel. By the mid-1970s, Castro had moderated 
his fiery rhetoric and succeeded in breaking Cuba out of its political and diplomatic 
isolation, and back into the inter-American community.  
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THE FALLOUT FROM OPERATION ANADYR 
There is no doubt that Khrushchev spearheaded the proposal that became known 
as Operation Anadyr; absent his forceful personality and prodding, it is doubtful that the 
more cautious bureaucratic types in the Foreign Ministry would have approved large-
scale weapons transfers to any Latin American country, much less one situated a mere 
ninety miles off the coast of the continental United States. In fact, the Foreign Ministry 
had opposed such weapons sales when they were first requested in the autumn of 1959. 
During Khrushchev’s famed visit to the United States, the Presidium had resolved that it 
was “inexpedient at the present time to provide weapons to Cuba.”373 But when 
Khrushchev returned to Moscow, he pushed these chary naysayers aside and his decision 
to supply communist-bloc weapons to Cuba prevailed.374 Two prominent historians have 
argued that, “by approving the weapons sale, Khrushchev signaled to the top levels of the 
Soviet government that he would take risks to pursue Soviet aims in Latin America.”375 
 Much debate has surrounded Khrushchev’s motivations for stationing missiles in 
Cuba. The official Soviet propaganda line, which continued to be trumpeted well into the 
post-Cold War period, was that the decision resulted purely from a desire to safeguard 
revolutionary Cuba against U.S. machinations.376 Sergo Mikoyan adheres to this line, 
arguing that though the Soviet decision was “not a case of a superpower’s unusual 
altruism,” but that it was designed to prevent the United States from using its military 
power to “impede…the worldwide victorious march of socialism.”377 The Bay of Pigs 
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and the string of covert operations that succeeded it had proven that the United States 
posed an existential threat to the Cuban revolution; as one scholar put it, “before the Bay 
of Pigs, one might have reasonably dismissed Castro’s concerns about American 
aggression as paranoid; afterward, to deny them was absurd.” This scholar argues that 
“fear of American attack was the prime motive to both the Soviets and the Cubans for 
installing missiles in Cuba.”378 Historian Geoffrey Roberts writes that “there is still no 
real reason to doubt the veracity of Khrushchev’s own account,” namely that the Soviets 
and the Cubans anticipated a U.S. invasion and sought to bolster and protect the Castro 
regime.379   
Clearly, the desire to protect the revolution was at the forefront of both Soviet and 
Cuban thinking. Most scholars, however, recognize that strategic considerations played a 
major role in Khrushchev’s decision-making. In his memoirs, while claiming that “the 
main thing” was to “restrain the United States from precipitous military action against 
Castro’s government,” Khrushchev admits that “in addition to protecting Cuba, our 
missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call the ‘balance of power.’”380 
Castro himself chose to interpret the Soviet proposal as a bid to strengthen the 
international position of the socialist bloc.381 Soviet naval officials, moreover, envisioned 
the operation in terms of Soviet power projection capabilities.382 Ultimately, the goal of 
protecting the Cuban revolution dovetailed neatly with the desire of Soviet leaders to 
improve their geostrategic position, so any attempt to carefully distinguish between the 
two goals may be a futile exercise. 
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Some have argued that Castro “jumped at” the Soviet offer, accepting nuclear 
missiles “with enthusiasm.”383 Yuri Pavlov, for instance, claims that Castro was “quick to 
seize the opportunity of securing Soviet protection for his regime and apparently had no 
difficulty in accepting Khrushchev’s rash offer to put the USSR at risk of a nuclear 
conflict with the United States in order to guarantee the security of the Cuban 
Revolution.”384 However, there is ample grounds for skepticism of such claims. Though 
Castro obviously accepted the Soviet proposal, years later he maintained that he was not 
thrilled with the arrangement. Although the existence of a Soviet military base on Cuban 
territory would provide a powerful deterrent to U.S. interventionism, it would also 
endanger Cuban claims to non-aligned status. The opening summit of the Non-Aligned 
Movement at Belgrade in 1961 had set specific parameters for membership, among 
which was a condemnation of superpower military bases. Castro had long fulminated 
against the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo. He was well aware that the deployment of 
Soviet missiles on Cuban territory would “damage the image of the Revolution,” and he 
was “very zealous in protecting the image of the Revolution in the rest of Latin 
America.”385 Castro ultimately accepted the terms of Operation Anadyr, but he opposed 
the secrecy surrounding the project. He believed that because the agreement did not 
violate international law, and because it was the prerogative of the Cuban leadership to 
enter into any sort of military agreement or alliance it chose, “secrecy would give an 
advantage to the imperialists,” and therefore, the agreement should be made public.386 
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In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders, as 
well as pro-Soviet Latin American politicians, attempted to portray the outcome as a 
victory for the USSR. Mikoyan was dispatched to Havana on November 2 to assure the 
Cubans that the primary goal of stationing the missiles in the first place had been 
achieved – the Kennedy administration had pledged not to invade Cuba.387 In a 
conversation at the Soviet embassy in Syria, the Chilean chargé d’affaires, Carlos Dimer, 
assured his counterpart that the Caribbean crisis had “ended in a total victory for the 
USSR.” Although President Kennedy and his allies “mistakenly believe[d]” that the 
victory was in fact theirs, “the peoples of Latin America understood that now there are 
forces which will not allow the United States to subjugate Latin America as in the 
past.”388 
All of this, however, represented wishful thinking. Before the stationing of Soviet 
missiles on Cuban soil, U.S. bruiting about the “threat” Cuba posed to other countries of 
the hemisphere was not as credible as it was in the post-crisis atmosphere. The Cuban 
missile crisis revealed Cuban-Soviet machinations as an existential threat to the entire 
Western Hemisphere. On October 23, the Organization of American States issued a 
unanimous call for the withdrawal of all Soviet missiles from Cuban territory and 
recommended “all measures…including the use of armed force” in order to ensure that 
all offensive weapons were removed. Venezuela and Argentina deployed warships, and 
even staunch Cuban ally President Lopez Mateos of Mexico opposed the presence of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba. As one scholar of Cuban foreign policy has argued, the OAS 
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sanctions imparted a veneer of legitimacy to U.S. efforts to overthrow Castro and united 
the hemisphere in opposition to Cuba.389  
For the USSR, the outcome of the missile crisis was a veritable disaster. Not only 
did it contribute to Khrushchev’s ouster two years later, but Soviet credibility among its 
Third World allies was shaken, and the incident incurred the wrath of Fidel Castro,  
inaugurating a period of heightened tension in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. On October 
29, Aleksandr Alekseev cabled Moscow with the news that he had “never seen [Castro] 
so distraught and irate.”390 The Cuban people engaged in spontaneous anti-Soviet 
demonstrations throughout the country, ripping down pro-Soviet posters and billboards, 
and, at Castro’s urging, chanting slurs that called into question Khrushchev’s 
manhood.391 With the Sino-Soviet conflict in full force, Havana looked to Peking for 
ideological camaraderie and support to help balance its dependence on Moscow.392 
Indeed, the Chinese were quick to criticize Khrushchev, not only for the “venturesome 
blunder” of installing missiles in Cuba, but also because by removing the missiles, he had 
“capitulated to American imperialism.”393 The missile crisis was the first serious rupture 
in the Cuban-Soviet alliance; Castro felt that Khrushchev had “sold out” the Cuban 
revolution in order to gain Washington’s favor. Indeed, in negotiations with Kennedy, 
Khrushchev falsified information so as to place the blame squarely on the Cubans; he 
claimed that the missiles were sent “per request of the Cuban government.”394  
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The missile crisis was a major breach in the Soviet-Cuban relationship; the level 
of trust and understanding that existed before the crisis would never again be reached. 
The Cubans had viewed the Soviet proposal to station missiles on Cuban territory as a 
form of protection tantamount to that given to the socialist bloc; in other words, the 
Cubans thought they were safely located under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Moreover, 
the Cubans believed that in safeguarding the revolution, the Soviets had tacitly agreed to 
Cuban support of armed revolutionary movements in the Western Hemisphere. In a 
single stroke, the Soviet capitulation to U.S. demands disabused the Cuban leadership of 
these notions. What made the reality particularly disillusioning is that the Cubans had 
apparently been prepared to lay down their lives as martyrs to the revolutionary cause in 
the event of a nuclear war.395 Though the alliance soldiered on until the end of the Cold 
War and the collapse of the USSR, the Cubans would never again trust the Soviets 
completely. Lev Mendelevich, the former chief of the Latin American Directorate of the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry, has been quoted as saying that “after what happened in 1962, 
the Cubans will never be our real friends.”396  
Castro also expressed his disappointment that Khrushchev, while making 
voluntary concessions that had not been demanded by U.S. negotiators, had not pressed 
harder for concessions in Cuba’s favor. That the Soviets did not even deign to keep 
Castro apprised of the negotiations, much less take action to include the Cuban leadership 
in those negotiations, was a powerful demonstration that when push came to shove, the 
USSR clearly operated more as a Cold War superpower than as an anti-imperialist 
guarantor of Third World interests. In January 1968, Castro delivered his own “secret 
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speech” to the Central Committee of the Cuban communist party. He admitted that in the 
period prior to the missile crisis, the Cuban leadership had put “tremendous faith in the 
Soviet Union…perhaps too much.”397 Castro had been surprised to learn that Khrushchev 
had secured a secret deal with Kennedy to remove ballistic missiles from Italy and 
Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. In fact, Castro was 
never supposed to find about the quid pro quo, but Khrushchev accidentally allowed it to 
slip while reading a letter aloud to a translator in Castro’s presence.398 Khrushchev did 
not even broach the issue of terminating the U.S. lease on Guantanamo, nor did he 
request the cessation of U-2 flights over Cuban territory. Had Khrushchev at least 
obtained these concessions, Castro argued, the missile crisis “might even have been 
turned into a political victory.” Instead, Khrushchev gave away the store, got virtually 
nothing in return, and the outcome of the entire episode was “an evident defeat for the 
socialist community and for the revolutionary movement.”399 
 For the Cubans, ultimately, the missile crisis was “the moment when the dream 
that one of the superpowers might help to foster a global revolution disappeared.”400 The 
Soviets had proven that when push came to shove, they were clearly more comfortable 
operating as a great power than as a Third World ally. When the Soviet desire for détente 
with the United States conflicted with the obligation to provide support to small, 
struggling, socialist countries, the so-called “internationalist duty” to support revolution 
went by the wayside.401 The Soviets, for their part, walked away from the missile crisis 
with a view of the Cubans as reckless, hot-headed, and intransigent. They believed that 
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the Cubans had a martyr complex and that they had pushed the world to the brink of 
nuclear holocaust with their intemperance and unrealistic demands.402 Indeed, Soviet 
propaganda insisted that it was Castro who had requested the missiles, and portrayed the 
Cubans as driving the Soviets to the brink of nuclear war.403 These visions would never 
really go away, and the subsequent history of Cuban-Soviet relations would be plagued 
by Cuban distrust of Soviet “bureaucratism,” and Soviet wariness of Cuban 
impetuousness. After the end of the Cold War, Jorge Pollo, a staff member of the Central 
Committee of the Cuban communist party, remarked that “history has yet to record 
whether Cuba has suffered more from U.S. imperialism or Soviet friendship.”404 Pollo 
went on to discuss the great power mentality of the USSR, observing that in their 
relations with Cuba, “the Russians…were victims of their own imperialist 
psychology.”405 
Despite Soviet claims that the Cuban revolution had been safeguarded by 
Kennedy’s non-invasion pledge, the missile crisis did not provoke a major re-
conceptualization of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The Kennedy administration continued to 
pursue covert measures to destabilize the Castro regime. In March 1963, in a letter from 
Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to U.N. Secretary General U Thant, the Cuban 
government protested continued U.S. aggression. Citing the openly hostile statements of 
several U.S. administration officials and Congressmen, Roa maintained that “those 
directly and indirectly responsible for U.S. foreign policy do not conceal their violations 
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of the U.N. Charter or their desire to destroy a Member State.”406 Roa complained of 
repeated CIA attacks on Cuban fishing vessels and the intensified propaganda campaign 
against Cuba in the U.S. news media, which was characterized by its “animal fury.”407 He 
also lambasted the Organization of American States, particularly “the Guatemalan puppet 
regime, together with those of Venezuela and the Dominican Republic,” which had 
presented false information to the regional body about Cuban-sponsored hemispheric 
subversion. “Since the Punta del Este meeting,” he charged, those countries had 
coalesced into “an aggressive military block serving U.S. imperialism.”408 Roa also 
denounced Rómulo Betancourt, for his “repugnant arrogance,” and his leadership role in 
coordinating the attack on Cuba; Betancourt had clearly “joined the servile partisans of 
U.S. aggressive policy.”409 He served notice to U Thant that unlike the OAS, “the United 
Nations…cannot be converted into a blank check for U.S. interventionist policy without 
betraying its principles and aims.”410 Roa was in essence throwing down the gauntlet; if 
the United Nations failed to respond adequately, it too would be revealed as a tool of U.S. 
imperialism. Indeed, the outcome of the missile crisis showed that, for all the attempts by 
U.N. Secretary General U Thant to mediate the conflict, the superpowers would continue 
to act unilaterally to defend their perceived interests, even when such actions directly 
contravened both the spirit and the letter of the U.N. charter. U Thant, despite his humble 
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efforts at mediating the crisis, clearly understood this to be the case, declaring a few 
months later that “the United Nations cannot overawe the nuclear powers.”411 
The Kremlin plotters who masterminded the “palace coup” that took down 
Khrushchev cited the missile crisis as the most blatant example of the Soviet premier’s 
recklessness and adventurism. Dmitry Polyanski, who delivered a scathing indictment of 
Khrushchev’s leadership, invited the deposed premier to “ask any one of our marshals or 
generals, and they will tell you that plans for the military ‘penetration’ of South America 
were gibberish, fraught with the enormous danger of war.”412 One former Soviet diplomat 
recalls that “of all the international conflicts that erupted during the decade of 
Khrushchev’s rule, the Cuban missile crisis…damaged his authority the most.”413 
Khrushchev was chided for losing sight of Soviet security interests, which they argued 
must always be paramount in policy decisions. Though the KGB would continue support 
for Third World national liberation movements, Leonid Brezhnev, Khrushchev’s 
successor, took a much more cautious approach to foreign policy and reasserted Soviet 
security interests as the lodestar of that policy. Indeed, the Brezhnev era witnessed a 
reorientation of Soviet foreign policy, away from the revolutionary adventurism of the 
Khrushchev era and toward a more pragmatic calculus of Soviet security. This reflects 
the degree to which the Cuban adventure was the product of Khrushchev’s mercurial 
adventurism. The Cuban missile crisis was the one glaring exception to the general trend 
of Soviet relations in Latin America, and would not have occurred absent the leadership 
of one unpredictable man. The outcome of the crisis led to a humiliating public defeat for 
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the Soviets and a constituted a serious blow to Moscow’s international prestige and its 
image in the Third World. 
For Castro, meanwhile, the outcome of the missile crisis imparted an even greater 
urgency to the revolutionary struggle in the hemisphere. The cultivation of Third World 
allies became more important for Castro as he faced both U.S. hostility and the 
inadequacy of Soviet protection. Fomenting revolutionary movements in Latin American 
and Africa would also force the United States into the sort of imperial overstretch 
envisioned by Che Guevara when he called for “two, three, many Vietnams.” 
Additionally, the internationalism of the revolution would boost Cuban morale, which 
had suffered a grave defeat in the missile crisis.414 The Cuban leadership viewed its 
support for revolutionary movements in the Western Hemisphere as critical to Cuban 
national security, which was constantly threatened by real or imagined U.S. aggression. 
Though the Cubans had never toed the “peaceful coexistence” line, after the missile crisis 
they viewed it as a fundamental betrayal of Third World interests and shorthand for the 
imperialist collusion that had sold out the Cuban revolution.415 That the Soviets and the 
Cubans drew such conflicting lessons from the missile crisis inevitably put them on a 
collision course. 
PATHS TO POWER: THE SOURCES OF CUBAN-SOVIET ACRIMONY 
As the Soviet-Cuban relationship developed, a massive effort was undertaken to 
improve Soviet knowledge of Latin America and to bolster Soviet influence in the 
hemisphere. In April 1961, right after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the Latin America 
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Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences was created, though it was not until 1969 
that the institute began regular publication of a journal, Latinskaya Amerika, devoted to 
Latin American issues. Anastas Mikoyan’s son, Sergo Anastasovich, became the first 
chief editor of the journal.416 The Soviet Foreign Ministry created a new department for 
Latin American affairs, which reported to the Central Committee on developments in the 
Western Hemisphere, and the KGB also formed a separate department for Latin America. 
According to Nikolai Leonov, the Cuban Revolution “forced a re-evaluation of the entire 
continent, which had traditionally occupied the lowest position in the hierarchy of Soviet 
foreign policy.”417   
The Cuban revolution shattered the Soviet theory of “geographical fatalism,” 
which held that the proximity of Latin American countries to the United States, and their 
economic dependence on the United States, would prevent the region from turning to 
socialism. In the words of one Soviet scholar, the Cuban revolution heralded the entrance 
“of all Latin America into the arena of active struggle against imperialism.”418 
Throughout 1959, Soviet publications urged a greater role for the Cuban communist party 
in the revolution, and stressed that the interim government could not be considered 
revolutionary.419 However, with the radicalization of the revolution in 1960, the Soviets 
changed their tune. Satisfied with Castro’s domestic reforms, anti-U.S. foreign policy, 
and appointment of orthodox communists to leadership positions, the Soviets embarked 
upon a process of doctrinal modification that sought to reconcile Cuba’s experience with 
Marxist-Leninist dogma. At first, this entailed the creation of the “national democratic 
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state,” which was held to be superior to non-socialist states and undergoing a transition to 
socialism. Significantly, the national democratic state was not required to be under the 
leadership of the communist party.420 Later, this concept was modified to include 
“revolutionary democracies,” of which Cuba was the exemplar.  
According to one scholar, this new theoretical approach “nourished and supported 
a particularly dynamic phase of Soviet foreign policy.” This is because the Soviets tacitly 
recognized that the revolutionary vanguard in Third World countries was not always 
composed of orthodox communists, and therefore revolutionary allies should be 
supported regardless of their adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.421 Nikolai 
Leonov has suggested that the Cuban Revolution proved correct those Soviet officials 
who had argued that the growth of the movement for national liberation in the Third 
World could be interpreted as a “reserve of the international communist movement, 
headed by communist and workers’ parties.”422 The Cuban Revolution strengthened the 
influence of this faction, as was evidenced by the doctrinal modifications that emerged to 
buttress a more active Soviet approach to the Third World. In December 1963, an article 
in Pravda allowed that the previously denounced “petit-bourgeois” nationalists could 
play a “positive role.”423 The article was followed by a statement from Khrushchev 
himself, acknowledging that “there is no universal recipe suitable for all countries,” and 
applauding the actions of “revolutionary-democratic statesmen.”424 Thus, this shift in 
Soviet doctrine jettisoned the old orthodoxy in favor of a more flexible approach. It is 
important to note, moreover, that these theoretical shifts did not precede, but followed 
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Soviet policy toward Cuba, suggesting that ideological considerations were not the 
primary determinant of Soviet policy. 
Moreover, such doctrinal modifications were driven by a desire to maintain 
credibility and relevance in a region that had been radicalized by the Cuban revolution 
and the Chinese ideological “heresy.” Prior to the Cuban revolution, a vast array of leftist 
political parties enjoyed legal status in Latin America. In addition to the Moscow-
oriented parties, which were subject to CPSU discipline, there were a number of socialist 
parties that lacked international connections, as well as a variety of Trotskyite factions. 
The non-Marxist parties of the left included secular groups like Peru’s APRA, 
Venezuela’s Acción Democrática, and Mexico’s ruling PRI, as well as Christian 
Democratic parties, like that existing in Chile. In the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, 
some of these parties embraced fidelismo, a loyalty to Fidel Castro’s revolutionary goals 
and methods. Even those parties that did not elevate the Cuban revolution as a model 
stood to gain from its popularity by emulating Castro’s anti-Yankee posture.425 The 
advent of fidelismo as a model for Latin American progressives catalyzed a fierce 
competition between the various reformist parties for the loyalties of Latin America’s 
peasants and urban proletariat. At the same time, the Cuban revolution had an ambiguous 
impact on the region’s orthodox communist parties, which came to be identified with the 
status quo due to their fidelity to the Moscow party line emphasizing gradualism and 
rejecting violent insurrection. Some of Latin America’s communists became impatient 
with this emphasis on incremental change and abandoned the communist parties to found 
fidelista groups that championed guerrilla warfare. The Cuban revolution thus intensified 
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the ferment among the Latin American left and contributed to its splintering and 
factionalism. This fragmentation would intensify further with the emergence of the Sino-
Soviet split, which led to the creation of Chinese-oriented radical groups. Even in 
countries like Venezuela and Chile, where the democratic left held power, frustration 
mounted at the pace of reform efforts, which seemed glacial compared to the rapid and 
far-reaching transformations underway in Cuba.426  
Castro’s support for revolutionary movements in Latin America had been a source 
of tension in the Cuban-Soviet relationship even before the missile crisis. Such support 
directly contradicted the CPSU line, which asserted that peaceful coexistence did not 
preclude socialist revolution, and that the best way to achieve the latter was through the 
concerted efforts of regional communist parties. On May 23, 1963, Castro and 
Khrushchev worked out a theoretical compromise on the issue of armed struggle. A joint 
communiqué stated that “the question of the peaceful or non-peaceful road to socialism in 
one country or another will be definitely decided by the struggling peoples 
themselves.”427 This theoretical shift was interpreted by orthodox communist parties as a 
confirmation of their non-violent tactics, but Castro seems to have interpreted it as an 
endorsement of revolutionary violence, because the next year he was back to trumpeting 
the “inevitability” of the armed struggle.428  
In the fall of 1963, Che Guevara’s primer on guerrilla warfare was published. The 
piece was a slap in the face to the Soviet rejection of the violent path to communism, and 
argued for “the necessity of guerrilla action in Latin America as the central axis of the 
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struggle.”429 Alluding to the inevitability of the armed struggle, Che asserted that “all the 
immense territories this continent embraces are destined to be the scene of the struggle to 
the death against imperialist power.”430 Then, in a speech in November, Che called for 
the Cuban people to demonstrate solidarity with the people of Vietnam, not out of an 
altruistic sense of “proletarian internationalism,” but because Vietnam was “the great 
laboratory of Yankee imperialism,” where the troops “are being trained…that one day 
will be able to defeat our guerrillas – ours in all America.”431 The South Vietnamese were 
Cuba’s “brothers in battle…and even more, our allies, as front-line soldiers in the front 
trenches of the world proletariat against imperialism.”432 While Che’s view was clearly a 
Manichean one, pitting the forces of colonialism and imperialism against the righteous 
struggles of the mythical “people,” this speech can also be read as a tacit rebuke to the 
Soviet Union, which in the minds of the more radical Cuban leaders, was not doing 
enough to support its socialist brethren in the Third World. 
 By 1964, Cuban support for armed guerrilla movements in the hemisphere had 
become a major source of tension in the Soviet-Cuban alliance. The Soviets, for their 
part, were frustrated with Castro’s revolutionary ambitions, as they tended to complicate 
relations with other Latin American countries and to impede efforts at détente with the 
United States.433 Castro and other Cuban leaders did not shy away from harsh criticism of 
the Soviets, whom they deemed opportunistic and eager to pander to U.S. interests in the 
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desire to mitigate hostilities between the Cold War superpowers. The Cubans also 
criticized the Soviets for being too stingy in their aid to Third World countries and not 
doing enough to help their struggling Third World allies – not just Cuba, but North Korea 
and North Vietnam as well.434 
The November 1964 conference of Latin American communist parties was held in 
Havana, symbolizing Cuban leadership of the region’s communists. Moscow availed 
itself of the opportunity to assail the Chinese and to undermine their influence. Only 
doctrinaire communists loyal to the CPSU party line were invited; the Chinese 
communist party did not even bother to send observers.435 The final communiqué issued 
by the conference exhorted Latin American revolutionaries to strengthen the “unity of the 
international communist movement,” which can be read as a statement of support for the 
USSR in its dispute with the Chinese, who had been urging Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionaries to break away from the so-called “revisionists.”436 A compromise was 
reached on the issue of armed struggle, which was approved in the case of six countries. 
The communist parties would support the “freedom fighters” of Colombia, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Paraguay, and Venezuela, while the parties of the other countries would 
continue to support peaceful means.437 According to the German Democratic Republic’s 
embassy in Havana, Castro was subjected to criticism by the communist parties for his 
revolutionary adventurism in the hemisphere, which had created difficulties for what was 
considered the more legitimate work of the parties. Embassy analysts suggested that 
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Castro’s speech on January 2, 1965, which was focused on the liberation movements of 
Asia and Africa, heralded a new course for Cuban foreign policy. “This is the first time,” 
the embassy noted, “that in a speech of this importance Latin American problems were 
not accorded special treatment.” Embassy officials observed that since the conference, 
Castro had “kept some distance from the Latin American liberation struggle,” and 
predicted that he would “compensate for this through a strong focus on Africa.”438 
For Castro, revolutionary adventurism in Africa ultimately proved more feasible 
than in Latin America. In the U.S. “backyard,” the Cubans faced the awesome power of 
the United States, which had decisively demonstrated its intolerance of Cuba’s support 
for armed guerrilla movements in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, by the mid-1960s, 
many of the region’s dictators had fallen, and to support guerrilla movements struggling 
against legitimately elected governments was to transgress international legal 
conventions.439 In contrast, the revolutionary struggle in Africa was against colonial 
power structures reluctant to loosen their grip on fledgling independent states. Moreover, 
whereas many Latin American countries had well-organized communist parties, most 
countries of Africa did not. Although for years diplomats and scholars assumed that 
Castro was acting at the Kremlin’s behest in Africa, in fact it was the Cubans who 
spearheaded the initiative, sometimes in the face of Soviet opposition. Paradoxically, 
Moscow’s provision of military and economic aid to revolutionary Cuba helped create 
the circumstances under which Castro was able to act independently.440 Though Castro 
frequently told the Soviets what they wanted to hear, he was never a pawn of the 
Kremlin, nor were the Cubans ever particularly compliant with Moscow’s wishes when 
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those wishes were in direct conflict with their own. At least one author has pointed out 
the irony of Cuba competing with the Soviet Union in Africa, while relying on Soviet 
aid.441 Without Soviet military and economic assistance, the Cubans would not have been 
able to provide support to revolutionary groups in Africa. Cuba was thus simultaneously 
a vehicle for enhancing Soviet prestige in the Third World and a competitor for influence. 
Despite the emphasis on Africa, the Cubans had not given up on the Western 
Hemisphere, and Castro and Che Guevara amplified efforts to foment revolutions in 
South America. These efforts were bound to create tensions in the Cuban relationship 
with the USSR, which was attempting to establish and strengthen ties with the regimes 
the Cubans were attempting to overthrow.442 Such efforts, moreover, were bound to incur 
the wrath of the United States, which had shown through its support of the 1964 Brazilian 
coup and its invasion of the Dominican Republic the following year that it would not 
tolerate the rise to power of leftist revolutionary governments in the hemisphere. The 
Pentagon had also adopted a counterinsurgency program designed to stamp out the 
spreading influence of fidelista and other Marxist-inspired guerrilla groups. Che’s call for 
“two, three…many Vietnams” reflected his conviction that U.S. imperialism could be 
stretched to a breaking point.443 Arrayed against Che’s ambitions, however, was not just 
the might of the juggernaut of the North, but the rancor and acrimony that characterized 
relations between the panoply of leftist-oriented groups. The ideological and theoretical 
hair-splitting that distinguished the fidelistas from the Maoists from the pro-Soviet 
factions prevented the level of unity and cooperation that would have been necessary for 
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effective action. Che’s attempts to establish a rural foco in Bolivia were hindered by the 
complete lack of peasant support for his operation and by the squabbling among the 
Bolivian leftist groups.444 Mario Monje, the leader of Bolivia’s communist party, waxed 
and waned in his support of the foco, but the tensions between the two leaders were such 
that some still believe that it was Monje who sold out Guevara to the Bolivian military.445  
By 1965, Castro was generally disappointed with Soviet foreign policy, but he 
was especially unhappy about the weak Soviet response to the U.S. invasion and 
occupation of the Dominican Republic. The United States had also intensified its 
bombing campaign in North Vietnam, and Castro was distressed by the Soviet inability or 
unwillingness to respond proportionately to this aggression.446  
 In February 1966, the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples’ Solidarity 
Organization (OSPAAAL) convened its first summit, also known as the Tricontinental 
Conference, in Havana. The idea for the conference had germinated at prior meetings of 
the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), which had held its third 
meeting in Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963. Approximately four hundred delegates 
from Africa and Asia, as well as several Latin American observers, had attended the 
conference, where a resolution was reached to “firmly support the struggle of the Latin 
American peoples against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.” The Cubans 
were singled out for special attention, as they were “fighting against the military 
aggressions and the economic blockade of the imperialists.” The fourth AAPSO 
conference was held in Accra, Ghana in May 1965, where the delegates devoted special 
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attention to Latin America and determined to convene the first Afro-Asian-Latin 
American Peoples’ Solidarity Conference in Havana the following year.447 
The introduction to the conference proceedings clearly stated that the historic 
contribution of the conference was to unite “the two great contemporary currents of the 
World Revolution” – the socialist revolution spearheaded by the USSR and the “parallel 
current of the revolution for national liberation.” It was noted as especially appropriate 
that the meeting place was in Havana, because the Cuban Revolution was “in effect the 
concretisation [sic] of the union of these two historic currents.”448 Cuba was thus 
recognized as the tangible link between the socialist bloc and the Third World. The text 
of the conference reflected the strong influence of the Cuban delegation, with repeated 
references to the machinations of Yankee imperialism and a description of the 
Organization of American States as the “Yankee Ministry of the Colonies.”449 “Yankee 
imperialism,” as the “fortress of colonialism and neo-colonialism,” represented the 
“greatest enemy of world peace” and constituted “public enemy number one of all the 
peoples of the world.”450 The only references to the Soviet Union in the conference 
proceedings and declarations were laudatory, praising the Russian Revolution and 
crediting the socialist bloc with providing crucial support to Third World national 
liberation movements. 
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The Tricontinental Conference took place during a period of heightened Sino-
Cuban conflict, and Castro’s opening remarks were explicit criticisms of the Chinese 
leadership.451 Soviet aims for the conference were to enhance Cuba’s prestige in the 
Third World while undermining China’s.452 Yet the Cubans continued to promote armed 
struggle as the only viable path to socialism and to make statements that were implicitly 
critical of the Soviets. Che Guevara sent a message to the conference, which was 
published as a pamphlet by the Executive Secretariat of the OSPAAAL. His message 
focused on the plight of the Vietnamese people, whom he characterized as “forgotten” 
and “tragically alone.” This can be read as a tacit rebuke of the USSR, which Che had 
criticized sharply for not providing enough aid to the struggling Vietnamese “brothers.” 
Indeed, in a more direct critique, Che blamed not only “U.S. imperialism,” but “those 
who…hesitated to make Vietnam an inviolable part of the socialist world.”453 In another 
dig at the Soviets, Che argued that “we cannot harbor any illusions…that freedom can be 
obtained without fighting.”454 Che also blasted the Organization of American States, 
which he described as a “suitable mask” for U.S. aggression, and lamented the U.N. as 
“ridiculous as well as tragic.”455 He characterized the Cuban revolution as the “voice of 
the vanguard,” and argued that its role was now “creating a Second or a Third Vietnam, 
or the Second and Third Vietnam of the world.”456 The text of the conference, moreover, 
made repeated assertions of the necessity of the armed struggle. Insisting that the peoples 
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America “must answer imperialist violence with revolutionary 
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violence,” the conference asserted that “the effective channel to reach victory is armed 
insurrection.”457 
The Special Consultative Committee of the Organization of American States 
prepared a report on the conference, which was characterized as “another threat to the 
security of the inter-American system.” The report reprimanded “the reluctance of many 
governments to adopt coordinated and joint measures to counteract subversion,” and 
bemoaned the lack of solidarity among democratic and reformist governments of the 
hemisphere.458 The “true and alarming significance” of the conference, concluded the 
committee, was the “scope and nature of the participation of official or nonofficial groups 
representing Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which for the first time met openly and 
ostentatiously to discuss their experiences with subversion and to establish coordinated 
and joint plans for carrying it out.”459 That the committee described the danger in terms 
of “Russo-Chinese communism” and averred that the conference sought to “display…to 
observers…the result of a true doctrinal unity,” suggests an inadequate awareness of the 
ideological disputes that had riven the communist bloc.460 
Though the Soviet delegation to the conference was one of the largest, the aims of 
the conference – “to incite the revolutionary struggle” and “to encourage a program of 
support for the…‘national liberation movements’” – flew in the face of Moscow’s 
continued adherence to the “peaceful path.”461 And although the head of the Soviet 
delegation, Sharaf P. Rashidov, delivered an address claiming that “the Soviet people 
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have always supported…the armed struggle of the oppressed peoples,” such claims were 
clearly aimed at masking the doctrinal disagreements between the Soviets, Cubans, and 
Chinese.462 Rashidov’s contention that “the Soviet Union is supplying the fraternal 
people of Viet Nam with the most modern weapons for meeting U.S. aggression,” had an 
air of defensiveness about it, considering the criticisms that the Cubans and Chinese had 
lobbed at the Russians concerning the latter’s deficiency of support to the Vietnamese.463 
Rashidov’s declaration that “by its might the Soviet Union is keeping in check the main 
forces of the imperialist powers,” and that “the Soviet people highly value the 
revolutionary support that the progressive forces in…Asia and in the countries of Africa 
and Latin America have been rendering them for many decades,” suggests that the 
Soviets saw no contradiction between the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and support 
for Third World revolutionary movements.464 
Osmany Cienfuegos, a member of the Cuban delegation, gave a speech in which 
he declared the “the duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution.” In the face of 
calls for Third World and Latin American solidarity, Cienfuegos argued that it was 
necessary to “give solidarity…a militant content.”465 Cienfuegos was implicitly arguing 
that in the absence of armed insurrection, rhetorical calls for revolutionary solidarity were 
meaningless. Castro repeated this theme, pointing out that “in many other nations of 
America there are ample conditions for armed revolutionary struggle,” and arguing that 
“the duty of every revolutionary is to carry out the revolution…not with words but with 
deeds.” “Sooner or later,” Castro averred, “the peoples will have to fight, arms in hand, 
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for their liberation.”466 He went on assert his belief that “on this continent…the struggle 
will assume more violent forms.”467 This can be read an implicit rebuke of the Soviets, 
whose “bureaucratism” and paper-pushing were seen as a failure of revolutionary vision. 
Despite ample evidence of the tension that continued to plague the communist 
bloc over the appropriate means of waging socialist revolution, the special consultative 
committee of the OAS read the delegates’ statements as “evidence of a true doctrinal 
unity” and “conformity” within the movement.468 The committee also viewed the 
proceedings of the conference as “solidifying…Soviet support for the Cuban revolution, 
and, by extension, firm support to any other American country that follows Cuba’s 
example.”469 Though the committee clearly recognized the disagreement between the 
USSR and the PRC regarding the appropriate path to revolution, it did not detect in the 
statements of the various delegates any evidence of this disagreement, but interpreted the 
proceedings as a triumph for both the Soviet Union, “because it was held in Cuba and 
with substantial participation by affiliated Latin American delegations,” and “Communist 
China, since its violent method for implanting communism…was adopted.”470 Despite 
recognizing the existence of the Sino-Soviet split, the consultative committee observed 
that at the Tricontinental Conference, “the Russians and the Chinese coincided in their 
general points of view, and there were no reports of any great friction between the two 
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delegations.”471 This may be true but it represented Russian efforts to disguise hostilities 
between the two camps rather than a genuine coincidence of views. The committee 
concluded that the Soviets, “in order to continue to exercise the leadership that was 
disputed by the Chinese…is accepting the Chinese policy of violent revolution along with 
its own theory of ‘coexistence.’” Moreover, the committee recognized that the two 
tendencies were in conflict, and that “in order to exercise its [Soviet] hegemony over the 
American communist parties, it will use Fidel Castro as an instrument to apply the 
revolutionary technique in the Americas.”472 
The conference also adopted a resolution condemning the Organization of 
American States, averring that the OAS “has no juridical or moral authority whatsoever 
to represent the Latin American continent,” and that the “only Organization able to 
represent Latin America will be the one created by the democratic and anti-imperialist 
governments born from the free will of the peoples of Latin America.”473 This can be 
read as a tacit challenge to the democratic and reformist regimes of the hemisphere, 
including that of Raúl Leoni, who had succeeded Rómulo Betancourt, the “Father of 
Venezuelan Democracy.” In case the message was insufficiently clear, it was further 
resolved “to lend the most determined assistance to the revolutionary movements in 
Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Ecuador and other Caribbean and South American 
countries.”474 According to Castro, any Latin American government that adhered to the 
principles of the inter-American system – principles that were designed as a mere 
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smokescreen for Yankee imperialism – was by definition a puppet government serving 
the ends of U.S. monopolies and local oligarchs. Such a view did not reject the concept of 
hemispheric solidarity, but rather advanced a countervailing version of it. 
Another significant outcome of the Tricontinental Conference was the 
establishment of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), which was to be 
permanently headquartered in Havana. The special consultative committee of the OAS 
located “the tremendous significance of the event” in “the fact that it is no longer Cuba 
on its own initiative that proposes to export its ‘revolution’…but Russia that makes 
common cause with the ‘revolutionary movements’ and promises determined support to 
the ‘popular liberation movements’ that follow the example of Cuba.”475 Despite the 
statements of the Russian delegate, which sought to paper over differences between the 
CPSU line and those of the Cubans and Chinese, the Soviets were not ready to abandon 
the doctrinal emphasis on the peaceful path. 
The special consultative committee concluded that the Tricontinental Conference 
represented “the most direct and open threat to the inter-American system that has so far 
been presented,” and recommended the immediate launch of “an intensive, coordinated, 
constant, and organized propaganda campaign in favor of democracy.” In order to “put a 
stop to the dangers of communist subversion while there is time,” the committee urged 
the coordination of the security and intelligence activities of the American 
governments.476 Eighteen permanent Latin American representatives to the United 
Nations set forth their complaints in a letter to U.N. Secretary General U Thant, to which 
the Soviets made an immediate formal reply. The Latin American reaction to the 
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conference may have been a factor in the subsequent shift in the Soviet approach to the 
region, which would focus on expanding and strengthening traditional state-to-state 
ties.477 
The Soviet foreign policy shift away from an emphasis on communist party ties 
and towards a more traditional diplomatic approach may have been a response to Fidel 
Castro’s personal opposition to much of the Western Hemisphere’s orthodox communist 
leadership. On July 26, 1966, Castro delivered a speech excoriating Latin American 
communist parties as the “most important allies of imperialism in Latin America.” Then, 
in a speech on August 29, he unequivocally declared that “the revolutionaries” would 
wage revolution in Latin America, “with or without [communist] parties.”478  
In August, the Soviet Foreign Ministry prepared a report on the U.S. 
government’s “aggressive actions” against Cuba, which involved a propaganda campaign 
aimed at discrediting the Tricontinental. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had informed 
Congress that the Havana conference “reflects the strengthening of terrorist and 
subversive activity.”479 The report also took note of a special investigation into the 
conference by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. On June 7, the 
subcommittee published a report in which “international communism” was accused of 
meddling in the internal affairs of states and Havana was identified as “the headquarters 
of subversive and partisan operations on a global scale.”480 On May 27, Cuban president 
Dorticós had received the ambassadors of several socialist countries and informed them 
that the Cuban government considered U.S. actions and statements to be “a provocation 
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and a psychological preparation for armed aggression against Cuba.”481 Dorticós also 
informed his guests that the Cuban government was “ready to receive volunteers from 
brotherly countries that had evinced a willingness to render aid to Cuba in connection 
with the threats of aggression from the U.S.A.”482 The CIA was readying its mercenaries 
among the Cuban émigré community in Miami. Troops were being trained in Nicaragua 
as well.483  
The Soviet Foreign Ministry also reported on the successful use by the United 
States of the OAS to further its anti-Castro agenda. The OAS had essentially been used as 
a mechanism to pressure the countries of the Western Hemisphere into isolating Cuba. 
The U.S. campaign bore fruit. Mexico alone refused to sever diplomatic relations with 
Cuba. The report also warned that the United States was likely to use the Organization of 
Central American States (ODECA) as a tool for implementing military actions directed 
against the Castro regime. These actions would undoubtedly include “the training of 
Central American defense councils, the formation and preparation of Central American 
armed forces, and joint military maneuvers.” Finally, it should be expected that the 
United States would continue to push for the creation of “permanent armed forces,” under 
the auspices of the OAS, to use as a “tool in the struggle against the national liberation 
movement in Latin America.”484 This was possibly a reflection of Cuban fears and 
hostilities surrounding the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force and its deployment 
in the Dominican Republic the previous year. The Tricontinental had issued a resolution 
“condemning the so-called Inter-American Peace Force” as “the armed counter-
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revolution of Yankee imperialism,” which, through the “participation of the Latin 
American puppet troops,” was “disguised as Latin American.”485 Such a perspective 
clearly failed to ascribe even a modicum of agency or independent thought to Castro’s 
centrist and right-wing opposition in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, the prominence of the 
issue in the Soviet Foreign Ministry report suggests that to a significant extent, Cuban 
fears and preoccupations remained central to Soviet perceptions of U.S.-Latin American 
relations. 
On January 24, 1967, Castro and Dorticós penned a letter to Brezhnev, Nikolai 
Podgorny, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and Alexei Kosygin, chairman 
of the Council of Ministers. The letter essentially affirmed the loyalty of Cuba to the 
Soviet Union, assuring the Soviet leaders that the “friendship and cooperation between 
our peoples will continue to strengthen in the joint struggle against the reactionary and 
exploitative forces oppressing the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”486 
Dorticós and Castro expressed their strong desire for “the unity of all progressive and 
revolutionary forces of the world in their struggle for the utter annihilation of U.S. 
imperialism,” and for the “definitive victory of the communist and socialist cause.”487 
Such a statement seems clearly aimed at reassuring the Soviets of Cuban friendship in the 
face of the harshly critical statements made regarding the USSR’s revolutionary zeal (or 
lack thereof). Nevertheless, two months later, on March 13, Castro vehemently denied 
that Cuba was a Soviet “satellite,” and proclaimed that he would “never ask anyone’s 
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permission…be it in ideology or in domestic or foreign affairs.” He even expounded 
upon the real meaning of communism, arguing that in the context of the Western 
Hemisphere, “what defines a communist is…action in the armed revolutionary 
movement.”488 Clearly, Castro recognized that his reliance on Soviet largesse contributed 
to the labeling of Cuba as “Soviet satellite.” Yet he chafed under that label and the 
circumscribed independence of action it implied; seeking through reassurances to the 
Soviets to keep the aid flowing, Castro reiterated for international audiences Cuba’s 
independent orientation.  
 The first meeting of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), which 
emerged from the Tricontinental Conference, was held in Havana in August 1967. The 
Cubans envisioned the conference as an opportunity for the revolutionary movements of 
the hemisphere to “strengthen their solidarity and renew for the benefit of world public 
opinion the accusations against the growing American imperialist domination of Latin 
America and the complicity of the native oligarchies in this repression.”489 Just as the 
Cubans were preparing for the opening of the conference, Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin 
paid them a visit to issue a warning about the possibility that Soviet aid could dry up if 
Castro’s regime remained adamant about the armed struggle and continued to provide 
support for violent revolutionary movements in Latin America.490 Apparently, Kosygin’s 
visit did not yield the anticipated results. Castro used the conference to snub the Soviets, 
by ensuring that most delegations were headed by non-communist revolutionary leaders, 
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and by issuing provocative statements that were clearly aimed at Moscow. Arguing that 
“there is a much broader movement on this continent than the movement composed 
simply of the communist parties in Latin America,” Castro defiantly declared that “we 
shall judge the conduct of organizations, not by what they claim they are, but by what 
they prove to be, what they do, their conduct.” He seemed to be sending the message that 
Soviet “revisionism” would be judged accordingly, and that the communist parties of 
Latin America would not be considered truly revolutionary if they continued to oppose 
the armed struggle in favor of the electoral path to power. 
 In case that message was too subtle, Castro clarified his meaning. “There are 
some,” he intoned, “who wonder whether there may be a case in one of the Latin 
American countries where one can come to power without armed struggle.” In response 
to “those who really believe that peaceful transition is possible in some country of this 
continent,” Castro had nothing but contempt. “We do not understand what peaceful 
transition they are talking about,” he continued, “other than a peaceful transition in 
agreement with imperialism.” In response to those who claimed that socialism could be 
achieved peacefully, Castro retorted, “This is a lie, and those who say in any place in 
Latin America that they are going to achieve power peacefully will be deceiving the 
masses.”491 The twenty-point proclamation issued by the conference declared that “the 
armed revolutionary struggle constitutes the fundamental course of the Revolution in 
Latin America,” and that “all other forms of struggle must serve to advance and not to 
retard the development of this fundamental course, which is armed struggle.”492 
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 U.S. officials took note of the conference, and especially the participation of 
Stokely Carmichael, a radical activist, whose statements at the conference provoked the 
ire of Washington. Carmichael informed audiences in Havana that “we are moving 
toward guerrilla warfare within the United States since there is no other way to obtain our 
homes, our lands, and our rights.” In a message of solidarity with Che Guevara, 
Carmichael also proclaimed that “when the U.S. has fifty Vietnams inside and fifty 
outside that will mean the death of imperialism.”493 The Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate prepared an investigatory report on the 
conference. Though the report was mostly composed of factual information about the 
conference, including biographical sketches of the various delegates, in the brief analysis 
of the conference proceedings, the subcommittee failed to identify the conflict between 
the Cubans and the Soviets.494 
 The Soviets, for their part, were not happy about this turn of events. The USSR 
had hoped to use Cuba to raise its prestige and increase its influence in Latin American 
and the Third World, and had provided generous subsidies to the Cuban revolution. Now 
Castro was blatantly rejecting the idea of solidarity with the Latin American communist 
parties and developing his own international organization, thereby discrediting the Soviet 
Union among the non-communist revolutionary movements in Latin America and the 
Third World.495 OLAS did not last long, however, but was folded into the Organization 
for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAAL). 
                                                
493 Stokely Carmichael, quoted in Ryan, Death of Che Guevara, p. 111. 
494 “The First Conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization, July 28-August 5, 1967,” 
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other International 
Security Laws of the U.S. Senate. 
495 Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution, p. 132. 
 149 
Moreover, though the OLAS conference had provided a venue for Castro to criticize the 
Soviets, subsequent events ultimately served to mitigate tensions in the Cuban-Soviet 
relationship. 
THE DEATH OF CHE AND CUBAN-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT 
 Che Guevara’s attempts to establish a foco in Bolivia, from which it was hoped 
that the revolutionary struggle would spread throughout South America, was a major 
source of tension in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. Apparently, Fidel Castro had sent Che 
to Bolivia without consulting the Soviets, and his decision was frowned upon in the 
Kremlin. Sending Che to Bolivia flew in the face of Soviet attempts at détente, and made 
“peaceful coexistence” with the West more difficult. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin met 
with U.S. President Lyndon Johnson in New Jersey in June 1967, and apparently an 
exchange of acrimonious letters between Brezhnev and Castro had prompted Kosygin to 
visit Havana on the eve of the OLAS conference before returning to Moscow.496 Though 
Kosygin’s efforts to bring Castro to heel were apparently unsuccessful, the failure of 
Che’s mission in Bolivia catalyzed the rapprochement between Cuba and the USSR. 
 Che’s attempts to establish a foco in Bolivia ultimately came to naught, and there 
were several reasons for this failure. He was thoroughly unprepared for the level of 
acrimony between himself and Mario Monje, the secretary general of Bolivia’s 
communist party. The tension between Monje and Guevara reflected the broader 
doctrinal dispute between radical revolutionaries and orthodox pro-Soviet communist 
parties over the proper source of leadership for the revolution. For orthodox communists 
like Monje, the army was a tool to be controlled by the party, whereas for Che, the idea 
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of subordinating his military leadership to the political leadership of the party was 
anathema.497 For Monje to accept Che’s leadership of the Bolivian struggle would entail 
revising his entire theoretical approach and sacrificing party leadership of the struggle to 
a ragtag band of foreign guerrillas. In addition to their failure to account for the 
opposition of orthodox communists, Castro and Guevara also underestimated the strength 
of Bolivian nationalism. The widespread lack of support for revolution among the 
Bolivian peasantry was a reality check for the Cubans, who had posited their own 
revolutionary experience as the model for the rest of Latin America. They failed to 
consider that conditions in rural Bolivia were far from what they had been in 1950s 
Cuba.498 
 Moreover, Che had been an even more vehement critic of Soviet policies than 
Castro. In March 1964, he delivered a speech to the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), in which he chided the socialist bloc for the terms of trade 
offered to under-developed countries. The creation of the UNCTAD was proposed at the 
1961 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade and was envisioned as a 
platform for the presentation of Third World demands. The Group of 77, which was 
initially comprised of seventy-seven underdeveloped states, was created at UNCTAD, 
with the purpose of forming a bloc within the United Nations to represent the interests of 
the Third World within that organization. Guevara used UNCTAD to condemn trade 
discrimination against under-developed countries. Observing that “the socialist camp has 
developed uninterruptedly,” he lamented that “in contrast to the rapid rate of growth of 
the…socialist camp…the unquestionable fact is that a large proportion of the so-called 
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underdeveloped countries are in total stagnation.”499 Thus, he suggested that the socialist 
countries, with their highly developed industrial economies, had more in common with 
the capitalists than with the under-developed world. While absolving the socialist bloc of 
any responsibility for this situation, he argued that “in the case of trade relations with the 
socialist countries based on market prices, the latter will also benefit from this situation 
since they are, in general, exporters of manufactured goods and importers of raw 
materials.”500 Che was essentially castigating the Soviet bloc for participating in (and 
benefiting from) an exploitative system of international trade.   
Then, in a speech at the U.N. in December, Che rejected the concept of détente 
and reiterated his support for violent revolution. In February 1965, at the second seminar 
of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), he openly censured the 
Soviet Union for not doing enough to support decolonizing countries. Arguing that the 
development of such countries was the responsibility of the socialist bloc, he implied that 
the USSR had eschewed its international obligations. The socialist countries, due to the 
terms of trade based on world market prices, were “accomplices of imperialist 
exploitation.” Che argued that “the socialist countries have a moral duty to end their tacit 
complicity with the Western exploiting countries.”501  
Che’s capture and execution by the Bolivian armed forces was virtually ignored in 
Moscow. The only public demonstration to commemorate Che’s life was a rally by a 
small group of Latin American students from Moscow’s Patrice Lumumba People’s 
Friendship University. Soviet news media continued to sneer at the brand of 
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revolutionary “adventurism” exemplified by Guevara, and a month after his execution, 
Brezhnev gave a speech in which he declared that socialist revolutions should only be 
launched in countries where the necessary objective conditions for revolution had already 
been fulfilled. The message was clearly about Che’s failure in Bolivia. Orthodox 
communist parties in Latin America followed suit, issuing denunciations of armed 
struggle and declaring their loyalty to the CPSU line.502 
The death of Che and the obliteration of the nascent Bolivian foco he had 
nurtured, combined with guerrilla defeats in Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela, 
contributed to an improvement in Cuba’s relations with the USSR. Though Castro 
continued to aid revolutionary movements in the Western Hemisphere, he was more 
selective in determining which movements to support, and he toned down his fiery 
rhetoric about the inevitability of the armed struggle.503 
In November 1967, Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa sent a telegram to his 
Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko, expressing his confidence that “friendly relations 
and mutual cooperation between Cuba and the USSR,” along with the “support rendered 
to all peoples struggling for liberation,” would remain an “important contribution in our 
struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.”504 Two weeks later, 
however, the Soviet embassy in Havana prepared a report on the reception by the Cuban 
press of the 50th anniversary of the “Great October Socialist Revolution.”505 The embassy 
drew the Foreign Ministry’s attention to the fact that the Cubans were continuing to 
                                                
502 Ryan, Death of Che Guevara, p. 164. 
503 See Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, pp. 220-221. 
504 Telegram to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko from Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa Garcia, 
November 6, 1967. AVPRF, Fond 104, opis’ 22, papka 18, delo 9, p. 27. 
505 Soviet embassy in the Republic of Cuba, November 21, 1967. Cuban press coverage of the 50th 
anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (press review). AVPRF, Fond 104, opis’ 22, papka 
18, delo 9, p. 30. 
 153 
espouse the “armed path.” The communist daily Granma had emphasized the 
significance of the “armed struggle against imperialists and exploiters.”506 The 
publication of Cuba’s National Association of Small Farmers had also printed an article 
lauding the Bolshevik revolution, noting its significance for the peoples of Latin 
America, especially of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Colombia, where “with weapons in hand 
they battle against imperialism and the reactionary oligarchs for their freedom.”507 When 
it came down to it, virtually “all [press] materials” had focused on the “role and 
significance of the armed uprising in the fulfillment of the October revolution and 
accordingly, emphasized the importance and applicability of the armed struggle of the 
peoples of the modern era.”508 If the Soviets were looking for indications that Castro had 
moderated his stance in the aftermath of Che’s capture and execution, such expressions 
were certainly not reassuring. 
 The Cultural Congress of Havana, held from January 4-12, 1968, provided the 
Soviets with further evidence that Castro had not moderated his position in the aftermath 
of Che’s death. The Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Organization of 
American States prepared a report on the congress, which was characterized as “openly 
subversive,” an attempt “to incite the underdeveloped countries…to violent revolution,” 
and “an important landmark in the continued intervention of international communism in 
the Hemisphere,” which constituted an “obvious threat to the democratic countries of the 
Americas.”509 The report “presumed that in view of the deterioration of Cuba’s relations 
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with Russia, as well as the failure of armed subversion by guerrillas sponsored and 
supported by Castro,” the Congress “would be the most appropriate means for him to 
recover his declining revolutionary prestige and to ensure the continued economic 
support of Russia.”510 Cuban President Dorticós delivered the inaugural address to the 
congress, in which he declared that “noble revolutionary violence had to play an 
inevitable and decisive role…in that climb of man to the summit of his true liberation.”511 
The third committee of the congress, composed of delegates from Cuba, Argentina, Mali, 
and Portuguese Guinea, and tasked with “the responsibility of the intellectual regarding 
the problems of the underdeveloped world,” resolved that “liberation…can be achieved 
only through a process of armed revolutionary struggle.”512 The fifth committee also 
issued a resolution declaring that “armed struggle is required as the principal means by 
which the revolutionary forces can carry out their historical tasks.”513  
Expressions of solidarity with the Vietnamese people were found in almost every 
congress document, speech, and statement. The General Declaration of the Cultural 
Congress of Havana asserted the “necessity” of “revolutionary violence,” and expressed 
“militant solidarity with all the peoples in struggle and most especially with the people of 
Vietnam.”514 The “heroic example of Che” was naturally lauded.515 In what can be read 
as a subtle dig at the Soviets for the inadequacy of their support to the Vietnamese, the 
Congress’s Resolution on Vietnam exhorted “all peace and justice-loving individuals, 
peoples and governments to do everything in their power to…give the Vietnamese people 
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the utmost help in their titanic struggle against the most brutal aggressor ever known in 
history.”516 
 Mere weeks after the Cultural Congress of Havana, Castro made another display 
of Cuban independence from the Soviets.  Aníbal Escalante had returned to Cuba in 1964 
after a brief exile in Czechoslovakia, and had resumed leadership duties in the Cuban 
communist party. In January 1968, behind closed doors, Fidel and Raúl Castro 
prosecuted the pro-Soviet “micro-faction” of the party, delivering a clear message to 
Moscow that it no longer had any communist allies in Havana with whom it could 
intrigue against Fidel.517 The timing of the exposure of the microfaction coincided with 
the anniversary of José Martí’s birthday, which was clearly symbolic of Cuban strivings 
toward national independence and sovereignty. The message seemed to be that Castro’s 
government would not tolerate any threat to its sovereignty, even from its Soviet patron 
and ally.518 Though the episode clearly boded ill for the Cuban-Soviet relationship, 
developments later in the year constituted a sort of about-face and Castro actively took 
measures to improve relations with his patrons in the Kremlin. 
 The turning point came with the crushing of the Prague Spring. Though Castro 
supported the Soviet invasion, he also tacitly chastised Moscow for its unwillingness to 
provide military support to the peoples of North Vietnam, North Korea, and to Cuba 
itself. Some have argued that Castro’s speech in response to the crushing of the Prague 
Spring represented a decisive move into the Soviet foreign policy camp. Richard Gott has 
claimed that the speech proved that “Castro had drunk deeply at the well of Soviet 
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orthodoxy,” and even that Castro had “surrendered to the Soviet empire.”519 The truth 
seems to be a bit more ambiguous. By refusing to condemn the Soviet invasion, Castro 
was signaling to the Soviets that he would support their foreign policy line. However, his 
speech was not a wholehearted endorsement of Soviet policy; indeed, it contained several 
veiled criticisms of the Soviets. Yet the occasion did represent a turning point, after 
which Soviet-Cuban relations were much closer and less contentious. 
 The twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly provided 
cause for cautious optimism. Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa had devoted a 
“significant portion of his speech” in the committee discussions to the “unmasking of the 
imperialist policy of the United States and its Latin American allies in the internal affairs 
of Cuba.” Soviet officials in the Latin American department of the Foreign Ministry 
seemed pleased with Roa’s speech, believing that it had a “more constructive character” 
than many of his past utterances in the assembly. He had devoted more attention to 
“propagandizing the victories of socialism in Cuba.” Roa had also spoken out against the 
U.N.’s decision on “the Vietnam issue,” arguing that the prerogative of making such 
decisions belonged “exclusively to the Vietnamese people,” who were “already on their 
way” to delivering a “devastating defeat to the invaders and their puppets.”520 On the 
most pressing international issues, the Cuban position had not changed, and on a number 
of these issues, Cuba’s position “seriously diverged” from that of the majority of socialist 
countries, especially on the issues surrounding disarmament.521 Overall, however, the 
Latin American department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry concluded that Cuba’s 
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engagement with the United Nations and its “more active and constructive participation 
in its work,” would lead to a “strengthening of Cuba’s internal political situation, the 
elevation of its international authority,” and a corresponding “weakening of Cuba’s 
political isolation.”522 
 Despite these indications of a more positive outlook for Soviet-Cuban relations, 
the Soviet embassy in Havana continued to monitor developments in Cuba for any signs 
of friction. In May 1969, the third secretary of the embassy, Vladimir Makarenko, 
reported back to the Foreign Ministry about a lecture prepared by two professors in the 
political science department at the University of Havana. The lecture emphasized that the 
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the “so-called Third World,” had “for a 
long time” been in thrall to “imported ideologies.”523 Because of the “peculiarities of 
historical development in Latin America,” the influence of “bourgeois ideologies” had 
been great. When Marxism arrived in Latin America, it was already “dead on arrival,” 
having been “ripped from…Latin America’s own historical traditions.” The Cuban 
revolution, therefore, was the first successful achievement of the “expression of Latin 
American realities through Marxism.”524 Castroism was identified as the first native Latin 
American ideology. To the chagrin of the Soviets, the lecture suggested that Latin 
American communist parties were no longer at the forefront of the “struggle of the 
masses,” and indeed, had remained “indifferent” to their plight.525 The lecture 
characterized the “peaceful path to socialism” as a sign of the “weakness” of the 
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communist parties, who “pretend to be in the progressive vanguard,” but in reality “are 
connected with the oligarchs and the economic pressure of imperialism.”526  
Castro would never really abandon his emphasis on the armed struggle, and 
would continue to promote the necessity of revolutionary violence even after the election 
of Salvador Allende in Chile vindicated the CPSU line. Nevertheless, during the early 
1970s, Cuban foreign policy became more moderate, and aimed less at fomenting violent 
revolutions than at re-establishing traditional diplomatic and political relations with Latin 
American countries and reintegrating into the inter-American community. By the mid-
1970s, Cuba had largely broken out of the diplomatic and political isolation imposed by 
the United States. The coming to power of Allende in Chile, and the military coup that 
brought General Juan Velasco to power in Peru, marked the beginning of a progressive 
alliance in Latin America. Castro also modified his support for revolutionary movements 
in the hemisphere and became more open to bargaining with Latin American leaders. As 
a result, several Latin American countries reestablished diplomatic ties with Cuba and 
signed trade agreements.527 
 The Latin American governments had excluded Cuba from their caucus in the 
United Nations, but in 1969 Cuba was elected to a vacant spot in the U.N. Development 
Program’s Council. Cuba had also been excluded from membership in the Group of 77, a 
caucus for less developed countries within the U.N. Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). In 1971, at the initiative of the Peruvian government and with 
the backing of the nonaligned countries, Cuba was admitted to membership in the 
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group.528 In 1972, Cuba became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), the Soviet-led economic assistance organization comprising the 
socialist bloc countries. Later in the year, the Soviets and the Cubans signed a series of 
trade, economic, and financial agreements, in which generous credits and the 
restructuring of Cuban debt featured prominently.529 Cuba’s economic dependence on the 
USSR at this point was almost total, and the Cuban economy developed along Soviet 
lines. As a result, Castro moderated his anti-Soviet rhetoric and subdued his antagonism 
toward regional communist parties. Cuban support for the Soviet international agenda 
manifested in the United Nations and especially in the Non-Aligned Movement, where 
Castro’s aspirations to Third World leadership frequently conflicted with his obligations 
as Soviet ally. 
The 1973 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers provided the occasion 
for Castro to demonstrate solidarity with the Soviets. Whereas previous Cuban delegates 
had deemphasized their country’s status as Marxist-Leninist, Castro declared up front that 
Cuba was a Marxist-Leninist state and expressed his gratitude to the Soviets, “who 
developed their technology and economy with tremendous effort and heroism and 
without exploiting other countries.” Without the efforts of the Soviets, “the end of 
colonialism would have been absolutely impossible.”530 Declaring that Soviet security 
guarantees and economic aid had contributed to the survival of the Cuban revolution, 
Castro suggested that “any estrangement from the socialist camp means weakening and 
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exposing ourselves to the mercy of the still-powerful forces of imperialism.”531 Castro 
put forward the “natural ally” thesis, which held that the Soviet Union and the communist 
bloc were the natural allies of the Non-Aligned Movement. It was a difficult sell. 
Influential states like Yugoslavia, India, Tanzania, and Algeria rejected the thesis in favor 
of the concept of “equidistance” – a refusal to endorse one side or the other in the Cold 
War, thus remaining equally distant from both superpowers. The “two imperialisms” 
theory, moreover, which was spearheaded by the Chinese and viewed the United States 
and the Soviet Union as morally equivalent, was held by many nonaligned states, with 
Algeria and Libya among its strongest advocates. Castro strenuously repudiated the 
theory of two imperialisms, extolling the “glorious, heroic, and extraordinary services 
that the Soviet people have rendered to humanity” and asking, “how could the Soviet 
Union be classified as imperialist? Where are its monopolist enterprises? What is its 
participation in multinational companies? What industries, what petroleum deposits does 
it own in the under-developed world? What worker is exploited in any country of Asia, 
Africa or Latin America by Soviet capital?”532 Indeed, others have observed, for Castro 
to accept the “two imperialisms” theory would “suggest that he is exchanging one 
imperialism for another,” and this would be “more than his pride can bear.”533 Despite 
being unable to convince his colleagues of the natural ally thesis, Castro did succeed in 
removing any direct condemnation of the USSR from the official conference 
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statements.534 Moreover, the Algiers summit marked the advent of the Non-Aligned 
Movement as a reliably anti-U.S. voting bloc in the United Nations.535 
CONCLUSION 
 The missile crisis had ruptured the Cuban-Soviet alliance and exposed the reality 
of Soviet great-power chauvinism, proving that in times of crisis, Moscow would have no 
qualms about sacrificing the goals and interests of its Third World allies to the necessity 
of maintaining cooperative relations with the United States. Though ultimately the breach 
was repaired and the Cubans became consistent defenders of the Soviet Union in the 
United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement, this was reflective more of Castro’s 
unwillingness to antagonize his revolution’s patrons in a changed situation of Cuban 
economic dependence on the USSR. Moreover, as the Cuban leadership subordinated its 
support for armed revolutionary movements to more traditional diplomatic and political 
engagement with the countries of Latin America, Cuba was reintegrated into the inter-
American community and Soviet-Cuban relations improved dramatically. With the 
election of Salvador Allende in Chile, Soviet and Cuban optimism about the prospects for 
progressive and socialist development in the Western Hemisphere peaked. Such hopes 
were subsequently crushed by the military coup that overthrew Allende, which ultimately 
ushered in a new cycle of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence in the region. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Soviet Union and the Chilean Solidarity Campaign 
On September 11, 1973, a military coup headed by General Augusto Pinochet 
Ugarte seized Chile’s Presidential Palace, violently deposing the Popular Unity 
government and leading President Salvador Allende Gossens to take his own life in a 
tremendously gruesome fashion. Allende had been the first Marxist leader in the world to 
come to power through electoral means and the coup was a watershed in Chilean history, 
marking the abrupt and traumatic end of 140 years of “almost uninterrupted 
constitutionalism and civilian rule.”536 Allende had run for president as head of the 
Chilean socialist party (PS) and leader of the Popular Unity (UP) coalition of leftist and 
Marxist parties, campaigning on a platform that explicitly called for Chile’s rapid 
conversion to socialism. One scholar has opined that those who have mistakenly 
characterized Allende as a social democrat “confused the methods of his struggle with the 
desired outcome.”537 Thus, although Allende’s ultimate goal was to do away with 
capitalism and to install a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” he loyally adhered to Chile’s 
democratic processes and traditions. 
Scholars have debated the salience of the various factors that contributed to the 
overthrow of Allende. From the left, critics have charged that he underestimated the 
strength of the rightist opposition and the determination of the United States to bring the 
Popular Unity government to an end. The communist critique of Allende focused on his 
inability to deal decisively with the leftist radicals in the socialist party and the 
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Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). Historian Paul Sigmund has argued that the lesson 
of Chile, was not, as the left would have it, that Allende moved too slowly in 
implementing his reform package, but that considering the constraints built into the 
Chilean political system, he moved too quickly to implement “irreversible” changes.538 
Critics on the right have tended to emphasize the disastrous economic situation prevailing 
under the Popular Unity government, suggesting that Allende’s refusal to retreat from his 
revolutionary program made the coup all but inevitable. Contrary to the myth of the 
apolitical nature of the Chilean military, the army had a history of interference in the 
country’s governmental and political affairs and “at the very least they regarded 
themselves as the first line of defence of the constitutional order.”539 Largely due to this 
misplaced faith in Chile’s military, the UP miscalculated its room for maneuver within 
the political system.540  
The majority of the scholarship on the coup focuses on the Nixon administration’s 
covert intervention in Chile. Former U.S. ambassador Nathaniel Davis maintains that 
“there is a real difference between covert financing that facilitates the continuation of a 
country’s free political processes and covert financing that corrupts them.”541 While this 
is undoubtedly true, most scholars have categorized the Nixon administration’s actions in 
Chile as falling into the latter category. Nevertheless, as Tanya Harmer has argued, a 
clear distinction exists between “creating the conditions” for a coup, and 
“masterminding” a coup, and although CIA aid to the opposition forces made a 
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“psychological difference,” it is “doubtful that it was a necessary or sufficient cause.”542 
Another scholar has similarly concluded that while individual U.S. actions were not 
decisive, they had a “cumulative effect” that contributed to the collapse of the UP 
government.543 Even those scholars harshly critical of the CIA and U.S. interference in 
Chile tend to acknowledge that a significant source of opposition to Allende resulted 
from the UP’s lack of a coherent policy and Allende’s miscalculations of the military’s 
intentions.544 Conversely, those who have exonerated the CIA from responsibility for the 
coup have acknowledged the Nixon administration’s “hostile intent” toward Allende’s 
Chile.545  
The Soviets had provided substantial moral, political, and economic support to the 
UP government, but had refused to subsidize the regime to the extent necessary to keep 
Allende in power. This refusal was driven by Soviet fears of a “second Cuba,” and by 
concerns over Allende’s ability to impose discipline on his own governing coalition. The 
Soviets, nevertheless, were quick to capitalize on Allende’s overthrow at the hands of 
Pinochet. Through communist front groups, “non-governmental” organizations, and 
international institutions, the Soviets were active and enthusiastic participants in the 
transnational solidarity campaign that emerged in the wake of the September 11 coup. 
Interestingly, Soviet anti-Pinochet activism was driven more by a desire to improve the 
USSR’s international standing and to appease the Chilean communists than by the urge to 
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strike a blow against the United States. Soviet rhetoric only obliquely referred to the U.S. 
role in the coup; Chilean communists in exile, however, were quick to point the finger at 
the Nixon administration and the CIA.  
“NO MORE CUBAS”: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD ALLENDE’S CHILE  
The election of Salvador Allende in 1970 was a major triumph for the Soviet 
Union. It vindicated the CPSU party line emphasizing the peaceful road to socialism, and 
dealt a blow to the Chinese communists, who supported armed insurgency as the only 
legitimate means to revolutionary ends. Moreover, Chile had one of Latin America’s 
oldest, largest, and most well-organized communist parties (Partido Comunista de Chile, 
PCCh). Between 1956 and 1969, the PCCh formed a precarious and somewhat strained 
electoral alliance with the socialist party, which was more radical and militant than the 
country’s communist party. In 1969, the PCCh called for a broader electoral alliance and 
played a key role in the founding of the Popular Unity coalition. The communist party 
was one of the best-organized and most influential groups within the coalition.546 Though 
Allende was a member of the PS, he tended to side with the communists, who were 
determined to overthrow the existing “bourgeois” state and constitution but through the 
legal means of the plebiscite.547  
Salvador Allende was not a social democrat; he was a committed Marxist-
Leninist with ties to Moscow dating back to the 1950s. He had declared during the Stalin 
years that “the communist party is the party of the Soviet Union…and whoever wishes to 
form a socialist government without the communists is not a Marxist. And I am a 
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Marxist.”548 Socialist Party leader Carlos Altamirano carefully distinguished Chile’s 
party from the socialist and social democratic parties of Europe: “our party…has always 
defined itself as a Marxist-Leninist party.”549 Allende’s belief that “socialism was true 
nationalism” was what “prevented him from being another reformist nationalist.”550 
Allende’s close ties to Moscow and the strength and loyalty of the Chilean communist 
party to the CPSU virtually assured Soviet support for his government, and prevented the 
Kremlin from maintaining relations with Chile after the coup that toppled him from 
power. 
The Soviets treated Allende’s government with caution, and intentionally avoided 
becoming embroiled in an economic or military commitment to Chile. Soviet 
propagandists were careful not to describe the UP as “socialist,” as to do so would imply 
certain guarantees of communist-bloc protection. At the 24th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1971, Brezhnev described the UP victory as “an 
extremely important occurrence,” and evidence of a “progressive direction in Chile.”551 
By carefully avoiding a description of that direction as “socialist,” Brezhnev sidestepped 
the necessity of the extending the sort of ideological commitment that the Soviets had 
extended to Cuba. 
One of Moscow’s main concerns was Allende’s failure to keep his governing 
coalition unified. Chile’s communist and socialist parties had always been rivals for 
power, and relations between the two were uneasy at best. The Socialist Party had 
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undergone a process of radicalization from 1952 to 1970, and by the mid-1960s had 
eschewed electoral politics, declaring the inevitability of revolutionary violence. In 
practice, however, the party continued to adhere to parliamentary tradition.552 The 
Chilean communist party had followed the line set forth at the 20th CPSU party congress, 
which asserted that socialism could be achieved through electoral means. This stance 
contributed to the further erosion of relations between Chile’s communists and socialists, 
with the latter suspicious that the former would not be prepared to wage the armed 
struggle.553 The effects of the Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban revolution were to further 
reinforce the Chilean communist party’s loyalty to Moscow.554 The factionalism 
unleashed by these developments, moreover, rent the leftist forces in the country and 
undermined any prospects for unity.  
The Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) further detracted from Allende’s ability 
to unite the UP around his reform program. The MIR had criticized Soviet 
“bureaucratism” and the CPSU line stressing the peaceful path to power. Allende’s 
election proved, of course, that electoral methods could bring a Marxist government to 
power, but it did not ease relations between the MIR and the UP coalition.555 While the 
socialists argued that the revolutionary process had begun with the election of Allende 
and that the rapid implementation of the UP’s reform program would alter the balance of 
forces in the country, the MIR flatly rejected the idea that the conquest of power by the 
proletariat could occur within the existing political structure. Thus, the MIR called for 
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political and military preparations for the showdown it was sure would soon take place.556 
The Soviets had no patience for the ultra-radical leftists who contributed to the 
destabilization of the situation in Chile. Radio Moscow chided the extremists within the 
UP coalition “who make the air tremble with pseudo-revolutionary phrases,” and Pravda 
deprecated them as “provocateurs who hide behind all sorts of ultra-leftist masks.”557 
The Soviets had learned important lessons from their alliance with Cuba; the 
necessity of preventing another Latin American country from becoming a burden on the 
Soviet economy was perhaps the most significant. Though Chile was the second largest 
Latin American recipient of Soviet-bloc aid during the Allende period, that aid amounted 
to $350 million in credits, which, when compared with the $600 million dollar loan 
extended to Peronist Argentina in 1974, is shown to be rather insignificant.558 Another 
reason for Moscow’s reluctance to subsidize the UP government was Allende’s economic 
mismanagement. The Soviets did not push for Chile’s rapid conversion to a command 
economy, but consistently cautioned Allende to move slowly in implementing social and 
economic reforms.559 Though the first half year after Allende’s election had witnessed an 
impressive economic growth rate, soon severe inflation pummeled the economy, spurred 
on by massive government spending and the central banks printing and issuing a stream 
of currency. Even the Chilean communist party grew concerned about the direction of the 
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economy and worried about adhering too closely to the economic course of the socialist-
bloc countries.560 Because of the influence of dependency theory on UP’s economists, 
some of them assumed that increasing autonomy from the hegemon of the north would 
automatically confer economic benefits on Chile. Yet the results of Chile’s decreased 
dependence on the United States were disappointing at best.561  
Finally, the Allende years coincided with the period of détente, during which 
efforts to reduce tensions with the United States retained a very high priority. Détente  
circumscribed Soviet policy toward Latin America; as one scholar has noted, “the 
prestige to be won among the world’s left-wing forces by supporting Allende simply did 
not compare with the potential economic and political benefits of peaceful coexistence 
with the United States.”562 The Soviets were thus reluctant to intrude further into the U.S. 
sphere of influence; the fact that Allende’s government was plagued by mismanagement 
issues only compounded that reluctance.563  
UP FOREIGN POLICY: “IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM” AND NON-ALIGNMENT 
The UP government had come to power promising to review all treaty 
negotiations, especially those concluded with the United States. Yet the government 
made clear that it would not attempt to play the Cold War superpowers off each other, but 
would adhere to a course of strict non-alignment.564 Once in power, however, the UP 
government did not denounce any of the OAS treaties, nor did it sever links with the 
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United States; indeed, Chile continued to participate in the Alliance for Progress.565 
Military assistance to the Chilean armed forces continued and for a time enabled the 
military to resist pressure from the UP government to accept more generous terms of 
Soviet-bloc assistance.566 Chile was thus able to avoid becoming overly dependent on 
Soviet military aid. In November 1970, diplomatic relations with Cuba were restored. 
The UP government also moved within the OAS to reduce Cuba’s isolation in the 
Western Hemisphere and to bring it back into the inter-American fold. As one scholar has 
put it, the election of Allende marked the beginning of “Cuba’s formal re-integration into 
the inter-American system.”567 
Nixon administration officials were not the only ones who had learned the lessons 
of Cuba. Allende sought to prevent Chile becoming isolated by expanding state-to-state 
ties, broadening Third World solidarity, and increasing Chile’s involvement in 
international organizations. The UP foreign policy platform had called for a policy of 
“ideological pluralism,” a concept developed by Clodomiro Almeyda. Such a policy 
entailed full respect for the principles of the U.N. charter – non-intervention, self-
determination, and national sovereignty. The platform affirmed UP’s support of peaceful 
coexistence, and stressed that the Chilean government would maintain relations with “all 
countries of the world, irrespective of their ideological and political position.”568 
Moreover, despite UP campaign pledges of opposition to the OAS, Allende realized that 
only by keeping Chile within the inter-American system could it hope to influence its 
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agenda.569 In pursuit of these diplomatic goals, the Chilean government launched an 
offensive in 1971 aimed at strengthening relations with other Latin American countries. 
Chile was also a signatory to the Andean Pact, which was envisioned as an instrument for 
economic collaboration, but was ultimately ineffective as such. Chilean Foreign Minister 
Clodomiro Almeyda acknowledged that prospects for such economic collaboration were 
slim, and that the purpose of Chilean involvement was more political in nature.570 
Allende was a firm advocate of the restructuring of the global economy, and he 
used all available international forums to argue against the injustices wrought by U.S. 
monopolies. He also contributed to the radicalization of the Third World economic 
agenda, made manifest in the New International Economic Order.571 At the 1972 session 
of the U.N. General Assembly, Allende delivered a speech excoriating ITT, Kennecott 
and Anaconda, and more generally proclaiming the Third World the “victims of a new 
form of imperialism.” He also used the occasion to defend his government’s 
nationalization policy, and cited U.N. Resolution 1803, arguing that nationalization was 
an expression of national sovereignty, and that all disputes should be settled in domestic 
courts.572 
The third conference of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development was held 
in Santiago in 1972. The location for the conference underscored Chile’s growing 
prestige in Third World economic forums, and Allende used the occasion to reiterate 
Chile’s commitment to the restructuring of the global economy. As Chile had already 
initiated procedures to nationalize industry and was engaged in a protracted legal battle 
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with U.S. corporations, UNCTAD revealed not only Chile’s rising prestige, but also the 
deteriorating U.S. position and the decrease of U.S. influence in the Third World.573 
Indeed, the Nixon administration expressed concerns about not only UNCTAD, but about 
the revelations of ITT influence in Chile that had broken in the news media on the eve of 
the conference, lamenting the consequences for the global prestige of the United 
States.574 
At the April 1973 OAS General Assembly in Washington, Chilean foreign 
minister Almeyda delivered a speech that criticized the United States for having “lined up 
with the rich countries,” instead of with the hemisphere.575 The Chileans floated a 
proposal for the creation of a new regional organization, which would include Cuba and 
exclude the United States. Though the plan was initially supported by Peru and 
Argentina, it met with significant opposition and Allende was overthrown before it could 
be further pursued.576 Chilean proposals within the OAS tended to alienate the 
organization’s more conservative members.577 
Allende had participated in the Tricontinental Conference in Havana and had been 
a prominent figure in the founding of the Latin American Solidarity Organization in 
1966.578 As has already been seen, though the OLAS ultimately proved to be an 
ineffective instrument through which to cultivate revolutionary solidarity and disseminate 
the radical ideals of Latin America’s Marxists and other leftists, it did provoke the fears 
and concerns of the hemisphere’s centrist and right-wing political groups. The right-wing 
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elite of the region drastically over-estimated the capabilities of the OLAS, which was 
believed to be “responsible for all acts of terrorism” in Latin America.579 Allende came 
under fire from the Chilean opposition for his participation and leadership in OLAS.580 
On November 4, 1971, Chile formally joined the Non-Aligned Movement. 
Though former president Eduardo Frei had initiated the procedure for Chile’s 
membership in the movement, Allende accelerated preparations. This was significant as a 
demonstration of Allende’s international aspirations, and because Chile was only the 
second Latin American country to formally join the movement, though many had been 
sending observers to the NAM summits.581  
Castro visited Chile shortly thereafter, and pressured Allende to develop the 
Chilean economy according to Soviet prescriptions for economic growth and 
development.582 Castro’s visit ultimately created more difficulties for Allende, both with 
his domestic political opposition and for his international image.583 Castro’s relations 
with Allende’s Chile were tenuous at best. This is because Castro had moved closer to the 
CPSU line, eschewing support for violent revolutionaries in favor of conducting state-to-
state relations with Latin American governments. Allende’s Socialist Party, moreover, 
was far to the left of the Chilean communist party, and it was the latter behind which 
Castro had thrown his support. Castro still had contacts with MIR, and in meetings with 
MIR leaders he apparently cautioned them against opposing Allende. Nevertheless, 
Castro’s presence in Chile exacerbated political polarization there.584 In his farewell 
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speech on December 2, Castro warned that the Popular Unity government’s prioritization 
of pluralism and free speech was interfering with its ability to crack down on the 
opposition. Castro proclaimed that “all decadent social systems…have defended 
themselves with tremendous violence throughout history,” and that “the confidence of 
your [UP’s] enemies…is the result of weaknesses in your effort to consolidate your 
forces, to unite them and to increase them.”585  
The Algiers summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was convened in the fall of 
1973, and although Algerian president Boumedienne had pleaded with Allende to attend, 
the latter was unable to due to crisis conditions in Chile. Reflecting Chile’s growing 
prestige in the Third World, Chilean diplomats had been elected to chair the NAM’s 
Economic Council. Yet because of the situation in Chile, Allende was able only to send a 
message of support to the summit, hailing the “growing unity of our countries in the 
struggle against imperialism…dependency and underdevelopment.”586 
During the period of Allende’s tenure, the Soviets were optimistic about 
developments in the Western Hemisphere. The leftist military junta in Peru under 
General Juan Velasco, like the UP government in Chile, sought to break away from 
economic and political dependence on the United States and took radical steps to 
nationalize private industry and to chart an independent foreign policy course. The 
Velasco regime re-established relations with Cuba, while establishing diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist bloc countries. Peru became 
the second Latin American country after Cuba to sign military agreements with the 
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Soviets, and became the region’s second largest recipient of Soviet military aid. 
Additionally, Peru sought to play a leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement.587 
As early as 1966, the Latin American department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
noted that Peru under President Belaunde “will unwaveringly defend the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of states.”588 The department prepared a report on the 
positions taken by the Peruvian delegation to the 21st session of the United Nations 
General Assembly and noted that “on important international issues Peru occupied the 
exact same position as the Chilean delegation.” The Peruvians and the Chileans had both 
voted with the USSR and against the United States on the fulfillment of the declaration 
on presentation of independence to colonized states and peoples. The report observed that 
at the 21st assembly the Latin American nations had formed a “united bloc, especially on 
colonial issues, issues of non-interference and sovereignty,” and predicted that the 
“strengthening tendency” of the Latin American countries toward “foreign policy 
independence” would continue.589 
Soviet press accounts praised Velasco’s Peru, lauding its “striving to find its own 
road to non-capitalist development” and expressing optimism that “once capitalism had 
been rejected,” Peru would undoubtedly “choose the socialist road.”590 After Allende’s 
overthrow, moreover, the Soviets turned to Peru as the most promising prospect for 
socialist development in Latin America. At the end of 1973, Peru became the second 
largest Latin American recipient (after Cuba) of Soviet military aid, with the Soviets 
supplying 100-200 T-55 medium tanks and heavy artillery on generous terms. Soviet 
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military advisers were also sent to Peru to assist with training. In July, 1974, in a military 
parade commemorating 153 years of Peruvian independence, fifty T-55 tanks were on 
display in Lima.591 
THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN 
In the immediate post-coup period, non-governmental and inter-governmental 
organizations, exiled Chileans, philanthropic foundations, and religious and social groups 
formed a transnational advocacy network to shame and pressure the military junta into 
changing its policy of political repression.592 Domestic and international human rights 
pressure groups set important precedents for human rights legislation and activism. 
Indeed, their efforts led to the U.N. General Assembly’s 1974 resolution condemning the 
junta for human rights violations. Though South Africa and Israel had previously been 
condemned for their human rights records, these resolutions were tied to regional 
conflicts. By placing Chile in the same category as South Africa and Israel, and 
condemning the junta for human rights violations unrelated to regional or international 
conflict, the United Nations set an important precedent.593 The activities of this 
transnational advocacy network, in the words of one scholar, “constituted one of the first 
and most important international campaigns against gross and systematic human rights 
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abuses in a single country,”594 and facilitated what another scholar has described as the 
“tremendous growth in a global human rights consciousness.”595  
The Soviets played an active role in this transnational campaign, creating “non-
governmental organizations” that were ultimately beholden to the dictates of the CPSU, 
and pressuring the United Nations to condemn and isolate the military junta in Chile. The 
overthrow of Allende convinced many Soviet theorists that the successful transition to 
socialism in Third World countries required the full and active support of the country’s 
armed forces.596 Yet in the immediate aftermath of the coup, the Soviets continued to 
emphasize the possibilities inherent in the peaceful path to power, and to reiterate that the 
strategy had been correct, but the implementation of it had been faulty. Soviet theorists 
acknowledged that Allende had alienated the middle sectors of Chilean society and had 
failed to keep his own governing coalition unified.597 Though Soviet critiques of the 
Chileans focused on Allende’s failure to build the support of the middles classes and his 
refusal to crack down on the ultra-radical left, the exiled Chilean communists in the 
socialist bloc were at the forefront of efforts to apply the lessons learned from the coup, 
and ultimately embraced the necessity of combating counter-revolutionary violence with 
revolutionary violence. 
On September 18, a mere week after the Popular Unity government was toppled, 
Leonid Brezhnev visited Bulgaria and used the occasion to issue a joint Soviet-Bulgarian 
declaration of solidarity with the Chilean people. Brezhnev and Bulgarian leader Todor 
Zhivkov spoke at length about events in Chile and condemned the imperialist reactionary 
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forces that had moved to quash democracy in the country.598 Notably, the United States 
was neither named nor condemned.  
The Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean Democrats was founded on 
November 30, 1973, and gathered representatives from various Soviet social 
organizations, including the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the All-Union 
Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the All-Union Central Council 
of Trade Unions. The secretary of the latter group, Stepan Shalaev, was appointed 
chairman of the solidarity committee. The opening convention was, not surprisingly, 
dedicated to expressing “solidarity with the righteous struggle of the Chilean people.”599 
The participants demanded the immediate cessation of politically motivated arrests and 
the liberation of members of the UP government from the “junta’s torture chambers.”600 
The participants also expressed concern for the secretary general of the Chilean 
communist party (PCCh), Luis Corvalán, whose life was believed to be in danger.601 A 
report prepared by the solidarity committee bemoaned the fact that Chile had become the 
“victim of an imperialist plot and the treachery of the military establishment.”602 
Expressions of international solidarity were not, however, merely rhetorical. Indeed, such 
international solidarity had “helped revolutionary Cuba withstand the  economic blockade 
and direct military intervention organized by imperialism.”603 International solidarity was 
also credited with helping Cuba break out of its diplomatic and political isolation. 
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At the 1973 World Congress of Peace Forces, held in Moscow from the 25th to the 
31st of October, Brezhnev included in his speech an expression of “full solidarity with the 
democrats and patriots of Chile.”604  The congress was attended by 3,200 representatives 
of over 1,100 political parties and national organizations, and by the leaders of 123 
international organizations. At the first plenary session on October 25, the Secretary 
General of the World Peace Council, Romesh Chandra, delivered an address in which he 
proclaimed that “our hearts are with the resistance of Chile,” and expressed confidence 
that “the fascist junta shall not triumph.”605 Brezhnev’s speech the following day 
expressed “complete solidarity with Chile’s democrats and patriots” and vowed to 
“always cherish the memory of Salvador Allende.” Although Brezhnev vigorously 
denounced the military junta in Chile, declaring it a “monstrous and blatant outrage,” and 
vilifying the “junta’s truly fascist snarl,” he failed to so much as mention the U.S. role in 
the coup. Indeed, he lauded “the development of relations of peaceful cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and the United States of America,” which was “an important 
factor in…averting another world war and ensuring universal peace.”606 It seems that 
détente and the prospects for cooperation with the United States prevented the Soviet 
leadership from engaging in direct (or even oblique) criticism of U.S. interventionism in 
Chile.  
Brezhnev did, however, deliver a lengthy condemnation of the Chinese, 
denouncing their “total lack of principle” in foreign policy, and claiming that they “go 
out of their way to undermine the international positions of the socialist countries.” Even 
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though “they call themselves revolutionaries,” they nevertheless “cordially shake the 
hand of a representative of the fascist junta of Chilean reactionaries, a hand stained with 
the blood of thousands of heroes of the revolution, the sons and daughters of the working 
class, of the working people of Chile.” Such criticisms were far harsher than anything 
lobbed in the direction of the United States. Détente had clearly conditioned the Soviet 
propaganda line. Immediately after censuring the Chinese, Brezhnev announced that “the 
development of relations of peaceful cooperation between the Soviet Union and the 
United States of America is an important factor in solving the problems vitally important 
for the peoples of the earth, of averting another world war and ensuring universal 
peace.”607 Thus it seems that the strident condemnation of the Chilean junta was aimed 
not so much at the United States as it was at the Chinese. 
In May 1974, a Soviet analysis of revolutionary prospects in Latin America linked 
the Chilean junta to reactionary and oligarchic forces all over the continent.608 It was 
perhaps connected with several recent developments in the transnational human rights 
campaign against Pinochet. In early 1974, the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) passed a resolution exhorting the Chilean junta to “restore and safeguard 
basic human rights.” The resolution passed by a vote of 41 to 0, with the only two 
countries abstaining from the vote being Chile and the United States. Then, in April, a 
report issued by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) shed light on the 
interference in Chilean domestic affairs by multinational corporations and the CIA.609 
The ICJ exhorted the peoples of the world to protest “threats of bodily harm” against Luis 
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Corvalán and former Chilean Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda.610 In response to the 
commission’s findings, the Chilean embassy in Washington ran a series of newspaper ads 
labeling the International Commission of Jurists as a Soviet front organization.611 
Ironically, the ICJ had recently come under fire for being in indirect receipt of CIA 
funding.612  
The permanent secretariat of the International Commission of Enquiry into the 
Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile convened in Berlin on April 27th.613 The 
International Commission had been established in late 1973, and held its first meeting in 
March 1974 in Helsinki. The commission had close ties to the World Peace Council and 
was headed by Nordic statesmen who had a history of working with communist 
groups.614 The commission petitioned to send observers to Chile to visit concentration 
camps, prisons, and police stations and to interview representatives of opposition political 
parties, the press, trade unions, and religious leaders.615 The commission also composed a 
letter to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim detailing the crimes of the military junta 
and decrying its attempts to “defy justice” by means of “illegal judicial processes,” which 
were likened to the “fascist tribunal on the issue of the burning of the Reichstag.” The 
committee requested that Waldheim use the “lofty authority of the U.N.” to bring an end 
to human rights violations and “extralegal terror,” to “free all political prisoners and close 
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the concentration camps.”616 Another letter was sent to state governments, exhorting 
them to use their “authority in international organizations” to “take all possible measures 
for the political isolation of the Chilean junta,” including the immediate severing of 
diplomatic relations and the termination of “all economic and other aid to the junta.”617  
On September 11, 1974, the one-year anniversary of the violent overthrow of the 
UP government, the chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean 
Democrats, Stepan Shalaev, delivered a speech in which the United States was neither 
mentioned nor condemned; the coup was blamed on the forces of “internal reaction” and 
“foreign monopolies.”618 Although the peace-loving peoples of the world had already 
helped save the lives of “many of the loyal sons and daughters of Chile,” the junta, 
“supported by the most reactionary forces of international imperialism,” was now 
embracing “more sophisticated methods of repression.” The week was declared the 
“week of international solidarity with the people of Chile,” and Brezhnev personally 
issued a statement “in the name of the CPSU and all the Soviet people,” which 
proclaimed “the unchanging support for the Chilean patriots and democrats in their just 
struggle.”619 The Soviet solidarity committee boasted that the exiled Chileans in Moscow 
had emphasized the “extreme importance of radio programs aimed at Chilean listeners, 
which allow the people of Chile to be objectively informed about world events, the 
decisions of the U.N., the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
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Organization (UNESCO), and other international organizations on the Chilean issue, and 
about the world-wide indignation provoked by the current government of Chile.”620 
The following day, an article by Brezhnev commemorating Allende appeared in 
Pravda. Neither the United States nor the CIA was named specifically, but were referred 
to obliquely as “imperialist circles from abroad.” These imperialist circles had 
“committed a fiendish crime” – the murder of Chile’s constitutional president and the 
establishment in that country of a “bloody dictatorship.” The Soviet Union, and all of its 
people, was applauded for being among the first to “resolutely condemn the military 
coup.” The Soviet people would continue to “support the democratic, antifascist forces of 
Chile,” and indeed to “most actively participate in the international movement of 
solidarity with the Chilean democrats.” The movement had by now reached “worldwide 
proportions” and encompassed “millions of people with diverse views and 
convictions.”621  
In the fall of 1974, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for 
adequate protection of human rights in Chile. The only countries to vote in opposition to 
the resolution were Chile and seven other Latin American nations.622 In December, U.N. 
ambassador to the U.N. John Scali shocked the General Assembly with an open 
denunciation of the trend toward the consolidation of the Third World and socialist 
voting blocs in the United Nations.623 Also in December, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization of American States released a report 
charging the Chilean junta with “extremely serious violations” of fundamental human 
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rights.624 Although the OAS had adopted the American Declaration of Human Rights at 
its founding in 1948, it was not until 1959 that the organization established an 
institutional mechanism to protect the rights enumerated in the declaration, and it was 
partly in response to the Cuban revolution that the IACHR was created. However, it was 
not until 1969 that the OAS finally adopted a binding treaty, the American Convention on 
Human Rights.625 The IACHR was thereby upgraded from an “autonomous entity” to a 
major instrument of the Organization of American States for the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the hemisphere.626  
 It was around this time as well that the U.S. Congress assumed the human rights 
mantle. Starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, two groups emerged within Congress – 
one that focused on human rights in communist-bloc countries, and the other more 
concerned with human rights in anticommunist countries allied with the United States. 
The latter group argued that U.S. policy was profoundly contradictory in its embrace of 
certain ideals and in its support of anticommunist regimes guilty of extensive human 
rights violations.627 The Nixon administration viewed a focus on human rights as contrary 
to its primary mission, and the efforts of Congress were viewed as an obstacle. 
Congressional efforts to pass human rights legislation barring aid to Chile, Argentina, and 
Uruguay were undermined by both Nixon and his successor, Gerald Ford.628 It was not 
until Jimmy Carter came into office that the executive branch embraced human rights as a 
foreign policy plank. Carter had made repeated references to Chile during the 1976 
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presidential campaign, invoking the case more often than any other foreign policy issue. 
He pointed to Chile as a glaring example of the U.S. failure to promote democratic ideals 
and values in foreign policy, and also to accuse the Nixon administration of complicity in 
the coup that toppled Allende and thus the human rights violations that followed.629 
Carter’s strident condemnation of the Nixon and Ford administrations was far harsher 
than the Soviets’ own rhetoric about the overthrow of Allende. 
From November 14 to 16, 1975, an international conference for solidarity with the 
Chilean democrats was held in Athens, and was attended by members of parliament, 
clergy, representatives of scientific and cultural organizations, jurists, trade unions, 
political parties, and women’s and youth organizations from eighty-five countries. A 
letter was sent to the chair of the U.N. General Assembly, in which the delegates praised 
the efforts of the U.N. to date, but lamented that the junta had “ignored [both] U.N. 
appeals and world public opinion.”630 Indeed, the junta “systematically insults the U.N., 
its organs, its charter, and its functionaries.” The committee called for “all possible 
measures” to be used against the junta, including sanctions, coercive measures, and the 
emplacement of enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the junta complied with U.N. 
resolutions. Specifically, the committee exhorted the U.N. General Assembly to 
implement an economic boycott, and to take all possible measures aimed at the political 
and diplomatic isolation of the junta.631 
The international conference also drafted an appeal to the “peoples of the world,” 
which detailed the crimes of the military junta, whose “demagoguery and lies” had not 
succeeded in “deceiving world opinion.” The junta’s actions were totally “contradictory 
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to the general tendencies of contemporary development and the spirit of the times.” The 
worldwide condemnation of Chilean fascism was “eloquent testimony” to this.632 The 
communiqué exhorted the peoples of the world to demand an immediate end to the terror, 
torture, and systematic violation of human rights, the closure of all concentration camps 
and interrogation centers, the immediate release of all political prisoners, and the 
prevention of further arrests. The communiqué also called upon the peoples to “exert 
pressure” on their governments to enact measures for the further political, diplomatic, and 
economic isolation of the junta.633 The adoption in December of a U.N. General 
Assembly resolution accusing the Chilean junta of “the institutionalized practice of 
torture” suggests that the efforts of the solidarity committee were at least somewhat 
successful.634 
In the late 1970s, as the human rights situation improved, the focus of the 
solidarity movement shifted. Foreign investment in Chile, which had been virtually non-
existent in 1974, began to skyrocket in later years. Thus, during the late 1970s, the efforts 
of the international solidarity movement focused on cutting off loans, credits, and private 
investment in Chile.635 In January 1978, the International Commission of Enquiry into the 
Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile convened its fifth session in Algiers. The 
commission reviewed a trove of evidence that had been smuggled out of the country by 
concerned activists – things like video recordings captured by secret cameras and 
conversations captured on tape recorders.636 The commission expressed disappointment 
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that the international financial community continued to invest in and provide credits to 
the military junta, and called for more extreme “government measures” to prohibit further 
foreign investment in Chile.637  
THE ROLE OF THE CHILEAN EXILE COMMUNITY 
Chileans exiled to communist-bloc countries were hugely influential in 
determining the agenda of the international solidarity campaign and in shaping the 
narrative of Allende’s overthrow. During this period, Chilean communist party members 
in exile in the socialist camp began to develop proposals that the PCCh create an armed 
faction to combat the Pinochet regime with revolutionary violence. A group of young 
communist party activists in East Germany formed the Leipzig Group, which was 
inspired by the revolutionary groups in Central America and sought to apply the guerrilla 
techniques championed by Che Guevara to the situation in Chile.638 The Leipzig Group 
has been credited with developing a critique of the UP government that focused on its 
failure to arm the populace. The group also developed a strategy for bringing down the 
military junta, which called for the use of all means necessary, including armed 
rebellion.639 The Chilean exiles dedicated themselves to the solidarity movement. Jorge 
Insunza was one such exile, and had remained in Chile clandestinely until 1975, when he 
went into exile in East Germany. He spent the early 1980s in Moscow, and he recalls that 
his experiences as an exile in the socialist bloc reinforced his commitment to 
communism. While in exile, he developed a critique of the UP government centered on 
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its inability to mobilize the masses and its failure to develop a military strategy that 
involved the Chilean armed forces as well as the middle sectors of Chilean society.640 
In January 1976, at the Moscow House of Friendship with Peoples from Foreign 
Countries, a “solemn assembly” was held to commemorate the 54th anniversary of the 
founding of the Chilean communist party. Fernando Contreras, who had joined the 
Chilean communist party in 1963, and fled to East Germany at the party’s orders when 
Allende was overthrown, delivered a speech at the assembly.641 His tone was defiant; the 
junta’s repression had not succeeded in “destroying [the PCCh]…nor in severing its ties 
to the working class,” nor had it managed to “root out Marxism.”642 He expressed 
optimism that the junta would not ultimately succeed in destroying Marxism, and cited 
the solidarity that the communist parties of Latin America had evinced for their Chilean 
brothers. The struggle of the Chilean people was the struggle of “Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Nicaragua, Argentina, Haiti, Bolivia, Guatemala, Puerto Rico”; indeed, it was a 
“struggle against a common enemy.”643  
In August 1976, Chilean exile Graciela Uribe sent an update on internal Chilean 
developments to the Soviet solidarity committee. She indicated that the CIA was 
cooperating with the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) and helping to improve 
the “technical means for carrying out repression.” But the opposition to the junta was 
growing, and was “felt even in the United States.” The forces of imperialism had 
attempted to use the recent OAS meeting in Santiago to pressure the Latin American 
countries to support the Pinochet government, but the discussions had instead focused on 
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human rights issues. Uribe described the principled absence of the Mexican delegation, 
combined with the opposition of states like Peru, Venezuela, Jamaica, and others, as 
“evidence that imperialism is no longer able to suppress the growth and development of 
progressive tendencies in Latin America.”644 Exiled Chilean communists were much 
quicker to point the finger at the Nixon administration and the CIA than were the Soviets.  
In February 1977, the Soviet solidarity committee issued a bulletin describing the 
October 1976 visit of Chilean exile Alberto Texier to several African and Arab countries, 
during which he met with trade union delegations and others to encourage solidarity 
efforts on behalf of the Chilean patriots. Texier visited Algeria, Ghana, Libya, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Syria, meeting with representatives of various professional and 
trade unions and encouraging them to support various initiatives of the Chilean solidarity 
campaign, including sending telegrams to the U.N. and petitioning Pinochet for the 
immediate release of all political prisoners and the dissolution of DINA. Texier also 
participated in the 19th UNESCO conference in Nairobi, where he “contributed to the 
campaign of solidarity with the Chilean people.” The Soviet solidarity committee 
characterized the “activism of the trade unions in the international arena” as a “major 
factor” in contributing to the “condemnation of the military junta at the UNESCO 
conference, and also in the U.N.”645  
In December 1976, the U.S. government arranged an exchange of Luis Corvalán 
for Vladimir Bukovsky, a Soviet dissident who had been committed to a psychiatric 
hospital. Former U.S. ambassador to Chile Nathaniel Davis was responsible for arranging 
the exchange, which he suggests might have been the first time that the Soviets implicitly 
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acknowledged that they had imprisoned their citizens for political crimes. The Soviets 
wasted no time in portraying Corvalán’s release as the result of pressure from worldwide 
democratic forces, and assigned themselves one of the leading roles in achieving this 
victory.646 The Soviets simultaneously sought to evade the implications of their own 
human rights practices, which had resulted in the imprisonment in asylums of citizens 
whose only “crime” was political dissidence.  
 The International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the People and 
Workers of Chile, which functioned as an appendage of the World Federation of Trade 
Unions, convened in Prague on December 20. They characterized Corvalán’s release as a 
“major victory” for the Chilean people and for “international solidarity.” After engaging 
in a brief hagiography of Corvalán, the committee “did not fail to express its gratitude to 
the Soviet government for its efforts, which have paid off.” The committee also 
expressed certainty that as an émigré in Moscow, Corvalán would be “surrounded by the 
friendship and solidarity of all advocates of peace and progress,” and would have the 
“opportunity to further develop the tireless struggle for the liberation of his homeland 
from the fascist yoke.”647  
In January 1977, a meeting of workers was held in a “great hall” in Moscow, 
where Luis Corvalán was the guest of honor. The Soviet solidarity committee pointed to 
the meeting as “clear evidence of the loyalty of Soviet workers to the principle of 
proletarian internationalism and support of the people of Chile in its serious and difficult 
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struggle against the Pinochet regime.”648 On April 21, Corvalán was awarded the Lenin 
Peace Prize. At the award ceremony, Stepan Shalaev delivered a speech in which he 
described the decision of the award committee as the “international recognition” of 
Corvalán’s “service…in the struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress, against 
the forces of reaction and fascism” and praised Corvalán’s “readiness to sacrifice 
everything in the name of the interests of the working people.”649  
On September 4, 1978, a meeting of the Soviet solidarity committee was held at a 
factory in Moscow to honor the anniversary of the election of Salvador Allende. Luis 
Corvalán was the guest of honor, and he gave a speech in which he thanked the Soviet 
Union “with all [his] heart” for its solidarity efforts and for its commemoration of “the 
victorious battle waged by Chilean people on September 4, 1970.” Correctly 
characterizing the election of Allende as a hemispheric development second only to the 
Cuban Revolution in its “major international impact,” Corvalán praised the UP 
government for having “carried out the most profound economic and social changes” in 
Chile, among which the nationalization of industry, agrarian reform, and the decision to 
“reject the yoke of ignominious imperialist domination” figured most prominently. The 
“Chilean Revolution,” however, had provoked the “profound anxiety and concern” of 
“North American imperialism,” and thus, plans for the “fascist coup” were “hatched in 
the United States.”650 Corvalán’s rhetoric was clearly more radical than that of the 
Soviets, and he did not shy away from placing the blame for Allende’s overthrow 
squarely on the shoulders of the United States. He also enumerated the lessons of the 
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coup, among which the most important was the necessity of the armed struggle. Thus, 
exiled members of the Chilean communist party were “preparing military cadres” for the 
struggle in Nicaragua. Fifty members of the PCCh were participating as officers in 
“armed actions in Nicaragua,” and were playing a “decisive role in the successes of the 
southern front of the Sandinista army.”651 Chilean communists in exile were at the 
forefront of efforts to embrace the armed struggle, and actively called for the violent 
overthrow of not only Pinochet, but Somoza in Nicaragua, and other hemispheric 
dictators as well. 
THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY: THE CHILEAN RESPONSE 
The Chilean military junta’s initial reaction to international pressure was to 
defend the repression of the Marxist left as a national security requirement. Rather than 
denying the charges of human rights violations, the regime responded by asserting the 
necessity of violence to wipe out the Marxist threat to democracy, and dismissed 
international advocacy efforts as a communist conspiracy to discredit Chile’s 
government.652 The junta was clearly concerned about the effects of what it described as 
a Soviet-orchestrated propaganda campaign. The Chilean Foreign Ministry was 
convinced that the “efforts of Soviet communism” were directed at “achieving the 
overthrow of the  government of Chile.” Votes in the U.N. and other international 
organizations created the “serious problem” of how to defend “the authority of our 
delegation to the U.N. General Assembly or any other international organization.”653 
                                                
651 Memorandum of Conversation with the delegation of the Chilean Communist Party, February 11, 1978. 
GARF, fond 9644, opis’ 1, delo 38, p. 2. 
652 Hawkins, International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile, p. 60. 
653 The Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean Democrats had, by means unknown, come into 
possession of a top-secret analysis prepared by the Chilean Foreign Ministry. Confidential Memorandum, 
 193 
Clearly, the junta saw the parallels with Cuba, and worried about Chile’s political and 
diplomatic isolation. The junta also realized that there would be difficulties in continuing 
to secure private investment in Chile, obtaining shipments of arms and other materiel, 
and maintaining trade relations. It was also frankly acknowledged that Chile’s neighbors 
would exert pressure in the hopes of “securing their traditional geopolitical goals.”654 
The Foreign Ministry proposed a new strategy for enhancing the legitimacy of the 
Chilean government in international forums. Emphasizing the nature of the struggle 
against international communism as a purely internal affair would allow the Chileans to 
“appeal to the principle of non-interference.” It was suggested, moreover, that Chile’s 
efforts in international forums be “based on the unchanged anti-colonial position of Chile 
and on its solidarity…with developing countries.” The opening of legations in some 
countries of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean basin, as well as the “strengthening of our 
representation in the U.N. and in Central America could provide the basis…for this new 
strategy,” which envisioned a spirited defense of Chilean interests and the “firm 
repudiation…of any direct attack on our government”.655 The Foreign Ministry also 
emphasized the importance of “strengthening our representation in the United States, in 
some countries of South America and all of Central America, and especially in the areas 
of traditional Chilean influence.”656 
The Foreign Ministry also proposed initiatives to combat the efforts of the 
Chilean solidarity movement. The release of political prisoners, would “help our 
friends…defend us.” Moreover, it was considered necessary “to assert the necessity and 
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legality of extreme measures,” rather than “attempting to present a false picture of full 
democracy.”657 The junta sought to use the existence of armed insurgencies as a 
justification for what was increasingly being branded “state terrorism.” When the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights issued a report in December 1974 on the 
junta’s systematic human rights abuses, the government rejected the premises of the 
report and argued that the state of emergency in Chile served as a legitimate basis for the 
restriction of certain constitutional guarantees.658 The junta prepared a formal rebuttal to 
the report and requested that it be disseminated to the U.N. General Assembly. Such 
actions were a clear demonstration of Pinochet’s desire for international legitimacy.659 
Indeed, the military junta apparently considered the 1976 convening of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States in Santiago as a clear political 
victory and an indicator of its own enhanced legitimacy.660 In June, the Soviet Committee 
for Solidarity with the Chilean Democrats had lodged protests against the convening of 
the OAS in Santiago.661 In June 1976, the Soviet solidarity committee had sent telegrams 
to all the OAS delegations, condemning the decision to hold the session in Santiago and 
declaring that it was a clear attempt by “Chilean and international reaction…to strengthen 
the foreign policy position of the junta.”662 It seems that this assessment of the junta’s 
intentions was fairly accurate. 
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 In 1977, in an attempt to further enhance the junta’s international legitimacy, 
Pinochet disbanded the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA). Though he replaced it 
with the National Information Center, it did mark an improvement in the human rights 
situation in Chile. The timing of the junta’s announcement of its intention to dissolve 
DINA reflected the influence of the Carter administration’s human rights-based foreign 
policy. It occurred during what one scholar has characterized as the early “active phase,” 
when both Congress and the administration were applying heavy pressure on Pinochet to 
improve the human rights situation in Chile, and specifically to dissolve DINA.663 The 
murder of human rights activist Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C., presumably by 
agents of Pinochet, led U.S. officials to intensify pressure on the junta.664 Thus it seems 
that the Carter administration’s efforts to improve the human rights situation in Chile 
were at least partly successful.  
The Soviets were quick, however, to take credit for this development. The Soviet 
solidarity committee, though characterizing the dissolution of DINA as one of many 
“various maneuvers…attempting to misinform and deceive world public opinion,” and 
part of the junta’s shift from “open terror to secret repression,” nevertheless described 
such maneuvers as resulting from the direct pressure of the solidarity movement.665 Three 
weeks after the announcement of the dissolution of DINA, General Secretary of the 
Soviet solidarity committee Stepan Shalaev went on Radio Moscow to applaud the 
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“various sectors of Soviet society” that had so “decisively” defended the Chilean 
people.666  
By 1979, the human rights situation in Chile had improved dramatically. Amnesty 
International reported that the number of remaining political prisoners in the country was 
very low as a result of the junta’s release of many of them into exile. The U.S. State 
Department issued its annual report on the human rights situation, which observed that 
the disappearances had been stopped, allegations of executions had become extremely 
rare, and incidents of torture had declined dramatically. Nevertheless, some 1,500 people 
remained missing and the OAS General Assembly reported in October on the “serious 
limitations on the exercise of human rights” in the country.667 Moreover, as one scholar 
has pointed out, Pinochet probably would not have disbanded DINA had it not 
“essentially accomplished its mission.”668 Likely sensing that there was little more to be 
gained from its activism, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Chilean Democrats 
was dissolved at the end of 1979. 
CONCLUSION: HUMAN RIGHTS VS. SOVIET SELF-INTEREST 
None of this is to say that Soviet anti-Pinochet activism falsified events or created 
the disillusionment and despair that so many of Latin America’s leftists felt during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s period of intense state repression. The military junta that 
violently toppled the UP government was brutal and thuggish, and the crimes of Pinochet 
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and his cronies have been examined in detail.669 According to the Chilean truth 
commission, state repression peaked in 1973, declining significantly after 1976, but 
terminating only with the end of Pinochet’s rule. After the 1973 peak, there were an 
average of 189 deaths and disappearances per year from the period 1974 to 1976, an 
average of 16 per year from 1977 to 1982, and an average of 43 per year from 1983 to 
1990.670 The average number of deaths and disappearances during the years that coincide 
with the Carter administration’s human rights-based foreign policy was significantly 
lower, which suggests that such an approach did indeed have an impact. Moreover, 
though the Soviets were a vocal and active participant in the transnational solidarity 
campaign, they were nevertheless a small part of a much broader movement composed of 
non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, religious, social, and 
advocacy groups, and international institutions. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Soviet actions were not driven by a genuine concern 
for human rights. During the same period, the Carter administration had become 
embroiled in a protracted confrontation with the USSR over its own human rights 
practices, and particularly over the issue of emigration. Moreover, the Soviets maintained 
and even strengthened relations with Argentina, which during the late 1970s killed or 
“disappeared” over twice as many of its citizens than did Pinochet. The average number 
of deaths and disappearances in Argentina from 1976 to 1978 was over twice as high as 
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the average in Chile, even during the peak of repression in the latter country.671 Yet this 
did not prevent the Soviets from supporting the Argentine junta in international 
organizations, particularly the United Nations, where Soviet officials used their clout to 
prevent the U.N. Human Rights Commission from condemning the junta’s human rights 
violations.672 Nor did it prevent the Soviets from signing a trade agreement with 
Argentina. During the period of the junta’s most severe repression, from 1975 to 1979, 
the Soviet Union’s annual trade turnover with the country averaged $330 million.673 
When the Carter administration imposed a grain embargo on the USSR in retaliation for 
the invasion of Afghanistan, Argentina pointedly refused to join the embargo, though not 
so much out of a sense of solidarity with the Soviet Union as out of financial necessity. In 
1978, Argentina exported almost a million and a half tons of grain to the USSR, and by 
1980, that figure had reached 7.6 million tons.674 By 1981, the USSR had become the 
recipient of 80 percent of Argentina’s grain exports and 33 percent of its total exports.675 
The overthrow of progressive regimes in Latin America did not preclude the 
maintenance of diplomatic relations with the USSR, which was perfectly content to 
maintain relations with Brazil after the fall of Goulart, Bolivia after the overthrow of 
Torres, and Uruguay after the military coup in 1973. Indeed, according to Sergo 
Mikoyan, immediately after the September 11 coup in Chile, Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko cabled the Kremlin with a proposal to maintain diplomatic relations 
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with the Pinochet government.676 Yet because of the close relationship between Allende 
and the USSR, the strength and loyalty of the Chilean communist party, and the junta’s 
severe repression of the Chilean communists, the Soviets saw more to gain in a vocal and 
activist anti-Pinochet effort than in making accommodations with the new regime.677 
 The content of the Soviet propaganda campaign, moreover, reveals the influence 
of détente on both Soviet-Latin American and U.S.-Soviet relations. Whereas in earlier 
periods of the Cold War, Soviet propaganda had adopted a viciously anti-U.S. tone, the 
downfall of Allende and the UP government was not explicitly blamed on the United 
States. Though Soviet propaganda occasionally referred obliquely to the U.S. role in the 
coup, the importance of détente and maintaining cooperative relations with the Nixon 
administration and its successors took precedence over the desire to strike a blow at U.S. 
influence in Latin America. It was the Chilean communists who were vocal about the role 
of the Nixon administration and the CIA in destabilizing the situation in Chile and 
contributing to the overthrow of Allende. In order to remain credible in the eyes of its 
allies, the Soviets were pushed by the radicalism of the Chileans to pursue an active role 
in the transnational solidarity movement. 
 That the Soviets were very active in the solidarity campaign also suggests that 
they attempted to take advantage of the situation to portray themselves as protectors, not 
violators, of human rights, and to deflect international attention from their own appalling 
human rights record. This was especially necessary after the signing of the Helsinki 
accords committed the USSR to upholding certain human rights guarantees. Though the 
                                                
676 Sergo Mikoyan, “The Soviet Union and Latin America: The Political and Strategic Domain,” in Edmé 
Domínguez, The Soviet Union’s Latin American Policy: A Retrospective Analysis (Sweden: Göteborgs 
Universitet, 1995), p. 41. 
677 Leon Gouré and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet Penetration of Latin America (Florida: Center for Advanced 
International Studies at the University of Miami, 1975), p. 17. 
 200 
accords were largely unenforceable, Soviet dissidents attempted to use them to hold the 
state and party accountable for its human rights violations. Ironically, the Soviet Union 
had opposed measures designed to strengthen the U.N.’s human rights apparatus until it 
sought to use a strengthened U.N. against Pinochet.678 
 The fall of Allende also occurred during a period in which the Soviet Union often 
found itself siding with the United States against the demands of Third World countries 
for economic justice. The New International Economic Order (NIEO), for instance, 
which was championed by the Group of 77 in the United Nations, called for a total 
restructuring of international economic relations and was opposed by both Cold War 
superpowers. Though at first the Soviets supported such demands, many Third World 
countries had become more vocally critical of the USSR, blaming it equally for 
underdevelopment and other economic ills. Moreover, since the Soviets had shifted focus 
to expanding trade relations with Western countries, they recognized that their interests in 
becoming a greater part of the international economy would not be served by the 
NIEO.679 Thus, the vocal support for Allende and the strident condemnation of Pinochet 
may have been at least partly aimed at improving Moscow’s standing in the eyes of the 
Third World. 
 Soviet anti-Pinochet activism also revealed and took advantage of the changed 
balance of power in the United Nations. In 1971, one Soviet commentator was crowing 
that “in the United Nations…Latin American countries have ceased to be mere cogs in a 
once smoothly running U.S. ‘voting machine,’” and that “some Latin American countries 
act jointly with the socialist countries, especially on such issues as stopping the arms 
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race, prohibiting nuclear weapons, condemning acts of aggression and the use of 
force.”680 By the early 1970s, the U.S. Congress was vocally questioning the purpose of 
contributing such a large percentage of money to the coffers of an international 
organization that failed to represent U.S. interests. The U.S. share of the U.N. budget was 
31.5 percent, and partly as a result of U.S. pressure, the U.N. General Assembly voted in 
1972 to lower the ceiling on assessments to 25 percent.681 During the same period, 
Brezhnev sought to strengthen the mission of the USSR in New York and to broaden 
Soviet policy in the United Nations.682 As one former Soviet diplomat recalls, Soviet 
proposals in the U.N. were “overtly propagandistic in nature,” and did not have to be 
“genuine” or even to have “the slightest chance of being implemented.”683 Thus, Soviet 
anti-Pinochet activism in the United Nations was concerned less with the actual situation 
in Chile than it was aimed at portraying the USSR as a protector of international human 
rights. 
 Finally, Soviet anti-Pinochet activism revealed the influence of the Chilean 
communists, particularly those exiled to communist-bloc countries. The Leipzig Group in 
Berlin, and Corvalán and others in Moscow were at the forefront of efforts to reshape the 
narrative of the Chilean coup and to apply its lessons to the revolutionary struggle in 
Central America, where the Sandinista National Liberation Front battled Somoza’s forces 
for control of Nicaragua and an entirely new phase in Latin America’s Cold War was 
unfolding. 
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Chapter Five:  The Soviet Union and the Nicaraguan Revolution 
The 1979 victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista 
Liberación Nacional, FSLN) over the Anastasio Somoza Debayle regime in Nicaragua 
marked the first successful Latin American revolution since the Cuban revolution. The 
FSLN had begun as a fidelista political movement in 1961 and had by the mid-1970s 
emerged as the leading opposition group to the Somoza dictatorship. The FSLN was 
inspired by (and named after) Augusto César Sandino, who in the late 1920s and early 
1930s led a rebellion against the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua. Interestingly, the policy 
of the Communist International (Comintern) toward Sandino had been based on the 
principle of “non-ideological collaboration,” which aimed to take advantage of the 
rebellion’s anti-imperialism. The Comintern dispatched two Latin American cadres to 
Nicaragua, Carlos Aponte and Augusto Farabundo Martí, who joined Sandino’s high 
command and sought to radicalize the movement. The Comintern, however, lacked both 
an appreciation of Sandino’s methods and motivations, and an adequate understanding of 
the situation in Nicaragua. As a result, the Comintern ultimately disavowed Sandino and 
condemned him as a “traitor” for his failure to transition the movement into a more 
“revolutionary phase.”684 
By the time the FSLN came to power, Soviet policy toward Latin America was 
less ideological than it had been during any other period of the Cold War, and focused 
primarily on the cultivation of traditional diplomatic relations and political support in the 
international arena. The Sandinistas looked to the Soviet Union for political, moral, and 
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military support, but ultimately came to realize that the situation in the USSR was vastly 
different from the realities of Nicaraguan society and should therefore not be taken as a 
model.685 Though the Sandinistas petitioned the Soviets for military hardware and for 
offensive weaponry for use in the regional conflict that had been simmering in Central 
America and the Caribbean since the mid- to late 1970s, the Soviets refused to provide 
the FSLN with anything other than defensive weaponry. Moreover, as relations with the 
Reagan administration began to improve, Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev 
subordinated support for the Sandinistas to the imperative of cooperation with the United 
States. 
THE TRIUMPH OF THE SANDINISTAS 
Though some historians have considered revolutions like the one in Nicaragua to 
have been “inevitable” due to a combination of factors, among which grinding poverty 
and geographical proximity to the United States figure prominently, others have 
emphasized the unique set of circumstances in Nicaragua to show that its revolution was 
far from preordained.686 The latter perspective, put forward by historian Hal Brands, 
contends that the revolution in Nicaragua was not exemplary of hemispheric trends, but 
owed its success to four distinct though interrelated factors that combined to render the 
situation in that country unique. Not only was the Nicaraguan system deteriorating from 
the late 1960s, but the guerrillas had learned enough from the travails of their 
predecessors to earn substantial support from among the agrarian population. Moreover, 
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the insurgents enjoyed significant foreign backing, not only from Moscow and Havana, 
but from other Latin American nations as well. Finally, the Carter administration, by 
means of a confused and incoherent foreign policy, effectively weakened or destroyed the 
traditional levers of U.S. influence in Nicaragua. The period of revolutionary ferment in 
1980s Central America, when viewed through the lens of foreign intervention, reveals the 
meddling of several players; external intervention, writes Brands, “was not a one-sided 
affair.”687 In contrast to the Cuban revolution, the Nicaraguan revolution lacked 
charismatic political figures like Fidel Castro and Che Guevara; the Sandinista 
leadership, moreover, was moderate and embraced incremental reforms in contrast to the 
rapid pace of radical reform in Cuba.688 The Sandinistas did not make the same mistakes 
as other armed revolutionary groups; they worked hard to develop international support 
and to forge domestic alliances with moderate groups.689 The Nicaraguan revolution did, 
however, inspire other revolutionary movements, particularly those in El Salvador and 
Guatemala, which contributed to the further destabilization of Central America and 
intensified the hostility of the Reagan administration.  
Much of the controversy surrounding U.S. policy toward Central America in the 
1980s has focused on U.S. support for the Somocista counter-revolutionary forces, widely 
known as the contras. The Somoza dynasty had been one of the hemisphere’s most loyal 
U.S. allies, and its fierce anticommunism translated into domestic repression of the 
political left and firm support for the U.S. international policy agenda, in both the 
Organization of American States and the United Nations. Nicaragua had provided the 
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United States with territorial access in order to launch the invasion of Guatemala in 1954, 
and the invasion of Cuba in 1961. Nicaragua also sent troops to the Dominican Republic 
in 1965, and had offered troops for the Korean and Vietnam wars. Successive U.S. 
administrations rewarded the Somozas with generous financial and military aid. Liberal 
critics of the Reagan administration have wax outraged over the “imperial presidency” 
and decried the immorality of U.S. support for the contras, while downplaying or 
ignoring altogether the extent of Soviet support for the Sandinistas.  Commentators on the 
right tend to dismiss the moral implications of U.S. policy and some even criticize 
Reagan for not defying Congress more flagrantly than he did.  Such assessments tend to 
be based on an exaggerated view of Soviet and Cuban aims in Nicaragua, with some 
going so far as to suggest that the FSLN was manipulated by its “Cuban masters,” and 
that if the Soviets succeeded in drawing Nicaragua into its orbit, “the Soviet Union, 
through its Cuban satellite, will have achieved the greatest possible victory in its march 
toward world hegemony.”690 While the FSLN clearly enjoyed the backing of Moscow 
and Havana, it was far from a mere marionette in the hands of its puppet-masters. And as 
we have seen, Cuba exercised enough independence from the USSR as to render the 
“satellite” label inaccurate at best. Moreover, by the early 1980s, and certainly by the 
time of Gorbachev’s ascent to power, the Soviets did not wish to become further 
embroiled in Central America; indeed, they pursued a number of face-saving measures to 
extricate themselves from the imbroglio, among which was the active promotion of the 
Contadora peace process. 
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William LeoGrande, a former Democratic staffer who worked for Congress on 
Central American issues during the 1980s and whose bias is distinctly anti-
administration, nevertheless provides a thorough and reasonably balanced account of 
U.S. policy during the Reagan era.  While hard-liners like Alexander Haig rang the alarm 
about Soviet-Cuban penetration of Central America, moderates like George Schulz 
sought to mitigate the social and economic causes of the regional crisis.691  While his 
treatment of the ideological preconceptions that virtually guaranteed Reagan’s support for 
the contras is not entirely unsympathetic, he launches a blistering – though not 
undeserved – attack on the administration for its “reluctance to peer too closely into the 
charnel house of the death squads.”692 Others have argued that the Reagan administration 
did not have a clear and consistent policy towards Central America, and that officials on 
the ground in these countries were frequently confused by conflicting policy imperatives. 
A former commander of the U.S. Military Group in Honduras recalls that some U.S. 
officials thought U.S. policy was to overthrow the Sandinistas, while others thought the 
policy was one of “calculated intimidation” towards the Nicaraguan government, while 
yet others thought the policy was to goad the Sandinistas into committing an act that 
could provide the United States with a pretext for intervention.693 As a result, U.S. 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) was unable to coordinate an effective regional policy 
or strategy.694 
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With the exception of Cuba, we know more about Soviet policy in Central 
America than about any other aspect of Soviet-Latin American relations during the Cold 
War.  The KGB had established contacts with the Sandinistas two decades before their 
ascent to power, and the success of the revolution in Nicaragua had much the same effect 
as the Cuban revolution in reviving the optimism of Soviet leaders regarding the 
revolutionary potential of Latin America.695  In the initial period of the Sandinista 
revolution, Moscow took a backseat to Havana and was content with providing the bulk 
of economic assistance and military hardware.  However, as the Sandinista leadership 
became more frustrated with Castro’s excessive demands, they sought a more balanced 
position and Moscow gained influence at Havana’s expense.696   
Robert Kagan has examined the Managua-Havana-Moscow nexus in exquisite 
detail.  He refutes charges that hostile U.S. policy drove the Sandinistas into the arms of 
the Soviets.  Instead, he argues, the Sandinistas actively sought an alliance with the 
Soviets and availed themselves of every opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to 
Moscow.697  They extolled the Cuban revolution as a model for the transformation of 
Nicaragua and looked to Havana for material, military, and moral support.  Kagan 
catalogs and itemizes the Soviet-bloc shipments of arms and materiel furnished to the 
Sandinistas – and the list is indeed impressive.  He is also attentive to key shifts that 
occurred in Soviet Third World policy as the result of the rise to power of a new 
generation of leaders and a rapidly deteriorating internal economic situation.698  
Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” explicitly subordinated ideological solidarity to economic 
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realities.699  On the U.S. side, the Reagan Doctrine subsumed the anticommunist crusade 
within the larger goal of promoting democracy and therefore attracted support from both 
sides of the political aisle.700  Thomas Carothers has supported this view, documenting 
official attention to democratic development in Latin America from his vantage point 
within the State Department.701 The overriding rhetorical emphasis on promoting 
democratic development, rather than existing merely as window-dressing, actually led 
officials on both sides of the aisle to pursue policies that they believed were conducive to 
strengthening democracy in the region. Kagan’s pro-administration bias is nevertheless 
evident throughout the study, particularly in his assertion that “the contra army was the 
only threat capable of forcing moderation on the Sandinistas.”702 The Reagan 
administration is therefore vindicated and the moral implications of U.S. support for the 
contras elided. 
Walter LaFeber has suggested that Brezhnev hoped the guerrilla war in Central 
America would preoccupy the United States as the Red Army bogged down in 
Afghanistan.703  If this is true, then U.S. policies toward Central America during the 
tumultuous 1980s played into Soviet hands.  After Brezhnev passed from the scene, 
however, Soviet policy underwent a fundamental transformation.  Support for Third 
World regimes and national liberation movements was scaled back and Soviet national 
security interests re-examined.  As Gorbachev and Reagan became ever closer, they 
began to cooperate on Central American issues.  In October 1988, Moscow suspended 
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shipments of heavy arms to Nicaragua in response to the U.S. decision to cease delivery 
of military aid to the contras.  This decision was premised on the understanding that 
continued weapons deliveries to the Sandinistas would be viewed by Washington as 
evidence of Soviet intransigence in reaching a diplomatic solution to the crisis.704  
Nevertheless, Gorbachev’s efforts to improve relations with the United States and 
extricate the Soviet Union from cumbersome Third World commitments met with 
resistance from party hardliners.705  His restructuring of the Soviet foreign policymaking 
apparatus also widened the circle of decision-makers so that Soviet policy became subject 
to constraints, including public opinion, that had formerly played little or no role in the 
policy process.706 
Though the Soviets had been following the situation in Central America for years, 
the triumph of the Sandinistas came as a surprise. According to Sergo Mikoyan, as late as 
1979, the Soviets still did not anticipate a Sandinista victory in Nicaragua’s civil war. 
This was at least partly due to the fact that Somoza’s National Guard was so well-
equipped that the Soviets doubted the guerrillas even stood a chance.707 This view was at 
least partly conditioned by the pro-Moscow Nicaraguan communist party (Partido 
Socialista Nicaragüense, PSN), which informed the Soviets that the FSLN was 
“adventurist” and “too daring.” Indeed, the PSN did not join the anti-Somoza insurrection 
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until its last months, and even then provided only propaganda support and modest 
financial aid.708 
Yet the triumph of the Sandinistas was clearly a welcome development for 
Moscow. On July 20, Brezhnev declared the USSR’s intention to “develop multifaceted 
ties with Nicaragua,” and formal diplomatic relations were established on October 19.709 
As with Allende’s Chile, the Soviet approach to the Sandinistas was cautious, and 
Moscow deliberately refrained from categorizing Nicaragua as “socialist” or “Marxist-
Leninist.” Instead, the country was referred to as a “progressive democratic state” that 
had “embarked on the road of independent development.” Victor Volsky, the director of 
the Latin America Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, stated that “we would 
not like to repeat…the commitment which we have made to Cuba for the last twenty 
years,” and asserted that “Nicaragua must maintain flexibility in its international 
relations; it must not adhere to a single country.”710 Soviet involvement in Nicaragua was 
envisioned in terms of the Reagan administration’s desire to challenge the USSR through 
its perceived “proxies” in Central America. Thus, the Soviets did not seek so much to 
expand their own presence in the region as they sought to challenge U.S. interventionism 
there.711  
International developments contributed to the moderation of the Sandinista 
government. In the Soviet Union, the reforms championed by leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
moved Soviet society toward an accommodation with Western culture and a tentative 
embrace of free-market principles. As a result, even committed Marxists began having 
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doubts about the viability of the Soviet economic model. Moreover, the trend in the Third 
World during this period was away from centralization and toward privatization.712 The 
Soviets, additionally, had learned important lessons from the experience with Allende’s 
Chile. Thus, they encouraged the Sandinistas to not move too quickly toward 
implementing a command economy, and recommended instead the maintenance of a 
mixed economy, which would entail state ownership of some sectors, but would maintain 
private control over others. This approach would be less likely to alienate Nicaragua’s 
middle classes and thereby avoid making what had been considered one of Allende’s 
greatest mistakes.713 Socialist bloc aid to Nicaragua during the period 1979 to 1983 was 
estimated at only twenty percent of total aid rendered, with the majority being provided 
by other countries of Latin America and Western Europe. Moscow’s share of the socialist 
bloc aid proffered to Nicaragua was estimated at less than one percent.714 
The degree of Cuban support for the FSLN during the civil war is disputed. It 
seems that the support of other Latin American regimes exceeded that provided by Cuba. 
In May 1979, Havana sent a few planeloads of light weaponry and a small contingent of 
military advisers. However, it seems that the bulk of support provided by Castro during 
the insurrectionary period was political, and involved negotiations with various factions 
to unite them behind the FSLN.715 During the FSLN’s first year in power, Cuba stepped 
up its aid to Nicaragua, providing $10 million in emergency relief and economic aid, and 
signing in April 1981 an economic cooperation agreement totaling $64 million.716 
Though provided immediate aid to the Sandinistas upon their triumph over Somoza and 
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his security forces, he urged them to be cautious and to not provoke the United States 
unnecessarily. Though the Cubans also supported the revolutionaries in El Salvador, 
Castro supported a negotiated settlement to end the conflicts in Central America.717  
Thus, as two prominent scholars argue, “the Reagan administration’s claims about 
an active Soviet effort to establish revolutionary footholds in Latin America credited 
Moscow with far more interest and investment in the region than Soviet behavior ever 
actually warranted.”718 Nevertheless, as at least one scholar has observed, during the 
period leading up to Reagan’s inauguration, Soviet and Cuban rhetoric about the 
revolutionary prospects in Central America gave considerable cause for concern that the 
Soviets and Cubans “might try to exploit the situation in an increasingly aggressive 
manner.” Nevertheless, the origins of the upheaval in the region were clearly indigenous, 
and the Reagan administration “grossly exaggerated” the threat of Soviet-Cuban 
subversion.719 
MOSCOW AND THE FSLN 
The downfall of Somoza had a transformative effect on Central America’s 
communist parties. Though the Nicaraguan communist party had not joined the 
insurrection until the last months, and then only provided minimal support, the 
communist party of El Salvador had reached a decision at its 7th Congress in April 1979 
to abandon its commitment to legality and to support the armed struggle.720 As we have 
seen, the Chilean communists in exile in Moscow were at the forefront of efforts to 
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reshape the narrative of Allende’s downfall and to argue for the necessity of 
revolutionary violence to combat counter-revolutionary violence. As ties between 
Managua and Moscow developed, it was not the Soviets who were probing for 
opportunities to expand their influence in Central America, but the Sandinistas who 
pushed for more support than the Soviets were willing to proffer. 
 On July 20, 1979, the day after the FSLN captured Managua, Soviet Premier 
Leonid Brezhnev issued a relatively moderate and measured declaration of support for 
the Nicaraguan revolutionary regime, in which he emphasized the USSR’s respect for the 
principle of self-determination and stressed the “right of every people, every country to 
choose its own path of development.” Brezhnev expressed the readiness of the USSR to 
establish diplomatic relations with Nicaragua and to “develop diverse ties with 
Nicaragua…in the interest of strengthening world peace and international cooperation.” 
This was a measured statement that shied away from direct criticism of the United States, 
or even of oblique references to the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism. By 
August, Nicaraguan and Soviet representatives were already engaged in negotiations to 
normalize relations and exchange embassies.721 On October 18, an agreement on the 
establishment of diplomatic relations at the embassy level and the exchange of 
ambassadors was signed by representatives of the Nicaraguan and Soviet governments in 
Managua.722 
After the July triumph of the FSLN, many countries and international financial 
organizations had proffered support to Nicaragua. But, as the Nicaraguan ambassador to 
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the United States Rafael Solís complained to the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in 
Washington, such aid was far from sufficient. The Nicaraguan ambassador lamented that 
his country was “lacking in means and resources,” and that the U.S. withholding of aid to 
the country was being “keenly felt.” Solís predicted that the United States would continue 
to take a “wait-and-see” approach to Nicaragua, and that further aid would not be 
forthcoming.723 
 In August, 1979, the Soviet embassy in Costa Rica prepared a report for the 
Foreign Ministry on the actions of the Sandinista government. It lauded the steps taken to 
nationalize industry and “the liquidation of the repressive institutions of Somoza,” and 
argued that the Sandinista program represented “a foundation for the creation of a 
democratic state in Nicaragua.”724 The report noted that Nicaragua’s army and security 
forces were being strengthened and reorganized; the urgency of such a task was 
intensified by the “very real threat of intervention…by former National Guardists” 
located in Honduras and other countries of Central America. The creation of the 
“Sandinista military police” was aimed at the “struggle against counter-revolutionary 
elements.”725 Nicaragua’s foreign policy predilections were identified as the defense of 
the “principles of non-alignment, peaceful coexistence and cooperation of states on an 
equal basis.” The interim government had sent a request for formal membership in the 
                                                
723 Memorandum of Conversation between Nicaraguan ambassador to the U.S. Rafael Solís and First 
Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington, G. Elkin, November 6, 1979. AVPRF, fond 114, opis’ 22, 
papka 2, delo 2, p. 5. 
724 Embassy of the USSR in Costa Rica, August 18, 1979, Nicaragua (Summary). AVPRF, fond 114, opis’ 
22, papka 2, delo 4, p. 4. 
725 Ibid., p. 6. 
 215 
Non-Aligned Movement and hoped to participate in the 6th Conference of Heads of State, 
scheduled to take place in Havana in September.726 
 In October, Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States Rafael Solís delivered a 
speech at Johns Hopkins, in which he declared that the United States was “always 
concerned with influencing foreign governments in the Caribbean basin, viewing the 
region as their own domestic sea.”727 The first secretary of the Soviet embassy in 
Washington prepared a report for the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the speech, in which he 
suggested that Nicaraguan foreign policy was aimed at non-alignment and would “not 
take an anti-American direction if there is not sufficient reason to.”728 In response to a 
question about Cuba, Solís had assured listeners that neither Cuba nor the Soviet military 
personnel in Cuba posed a threat to U.S. interests. The first secretary found it “perfectly 
obvious” that the U.S. “scare campaign” regarding the Soviet brigade in Cuba was an 
attempt to “justify the cultivation of their own military presence in the Caribbean basin.” 
He also noted that Nicaragua intended to improve and develop its relations with Cuba.729 
By the end of the month, the Latin American Department of the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry was warning of the constant “threats of counter-revolutionary and 
interventionist forces.”730 The department noted that the Nicaraguan government had 
announced “its intention to renounce all military agreements with the US.”731 The 
permanent delegation of the USSR to the U.N. composed a report on U.S. policy toward 
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Nicaragua, in which was noted the tendency of the Carter administration to refrain from 
“responding to criticism of U.S. policy in the local Nicaraguan mass media, in the U.N. 
General Assembly, and at the recent conference of non-aligned countries in Havana.”732 
The report emphasized that U.S. officials were gravely concerned that “economic 
feebleness attracts the attention of Fidel Castro.” The U.S. news media, moreover, was 
expressing the “danger that Nicaragua will turn into a second Cuba.”733 In January, 1980, 
the United States cut off all aid to the FSLN. Sandinista leaders traveled to Moscow in 
March, where an inter-party agreement was signed, denoting official Soviet recognition 
of the FSLN as the vanguard force in the Nicaraguan revolution. The Soviets had granted 
Castro’s 26th of July movement the same status, which amounted to a recognition that 
Latin America’s communist parties were often not the leaders of the region’s 
revolutionary movements.734 
 In February, the Soviet Foreign Ministry prepared a report with background 
material to prepare Soviet officials for upcoming negotiations with a Nicaraguan 
delegation comprised of both party and government representatives. The report detailed 
the Nicaraguan delegation’s activities and voting record at the 34th U.N. General 
Assembly. Describing the Nicaraguan revolution as “clear evidence” of “the ascent of the 
national liberation movement,” the report noted that at the 34th session, Nicaraguan 
officials “condemned U.S. hegemony,” with Daniel Ortega drawing attention to the fact 
that “aggressive circles in the United States dream about restoring Somoza’s regime.”735 
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At the General Assembly, the USSR had sponsored resolution 34/103, on the 
“impermissibility of hegemonic policies in international relations,” of which the 
Nicaraguan delegation had voted in favor. Among other provisions, the initiative called 
or “strict respect for the rights of all states to determine their own political and social 
systems.”736 The Soviets expressed “deep satisfaction” that the Nicaraguans had voted for 
the resolution, and expressed their “hopes for the most active cooperation with the 
delegation of Nicaragua.”737 
 The report also condemned the “attempts of American imperialists and Chinese 
hegemonists to use the U.N. for interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,” and 
asserted that the “further cooperation of all progressive forces is needed in order to 
frustrate the attempts of imperialism and reaction to again impose upon the U.N. 
discussion of the non-existent Afghan question.”738 On March 15, a joint Soviet-
Nicaraguan communiqué announced the “decisive support” of the USSR and Nicaragua 
“for the inalienable right of the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to go 
along the chosen path of progressive transformation.”739 The communiqué denounced the 
“attempts of some states to dominate others by…announcing entire regions of the world 
to be the sphere of their ‘vital interests,’ and by means of direct politico-military and 
economic pressure.”740 
 On April 8, 1980, the first Nicaraguan ambassador the USSR, Ricardo Wheelock, 
met with the vice chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and informed him 
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that Nicaragua could consolidate its “revolutionary gains” only with the “provision of 
effective economic and military support from the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries, who are the true friends of Nicaragua.” Wheelock added that the 
“consolidation of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua” would stimulate the “further 
development of the liberation struggle in Central America.” However, in light of the U.S. 
administration’s “worsening of the international atmosphere,” Wheelock emphasized the 
necessity of “decisively rejecting…the attempts of imperialism to destabilize progressive 
regimes in different regions of the world.”741 The vice chairman of the Supreme Soviet 
assured Wheelock that the Soviet Union was “ready to provide help and assistance in the 
goal of progressive development in Nicaragua,” but emphasized that the Soviets “feel 
that the important factor in the struggle against imperialism, with which the core interests 
of developing countries are connected, is the…strengthening of the process of détente.” 
Though Wheelock had indicated that Nicaragua “firmly intends to lead the country along 
the path of constructing socialism,” the Soviets served notice of their unwillingness to 
take steps in support of the FSLN that would jeopardize prospects for détente.742 
The Soviet Foreign Ministry also expressed approval of the entrance of Nicaragua 
into the Non-Aligned Movement, and positively noted that the Nicaraguans “firmly 
support Cuba as representative of the movement.” At the Havana summit of the NAM, 
“Nicaragua immediately became sufficiently active…with anti-imperialist positions.”743 
Daniel Ortega had proclaimed the NAM as a “growing influence in the international 
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arena in the peoples’ struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, 
apartheid, and all forms of interference and hegemony.”744 Moreover, the Foreign 
Ministry applauded Nicaragua’s opposition to “the attempts of the West, Peking, and 
their accomplices to connect the movement to the anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan campaign 
around the ‘Afghan issue,’” and noted that the Nicaraguan delegation had “refrained from 
voting on the resolution concerning the ‘Afghan question’” at the 35th session of the U.N. 
General Assembly.745 The Foreign Ministry characterized the position of Nicaragua as 
adhering to the “progressive wing of the Non-Aligned Movement,” and noted positively 
the Nicaraguan delegation’s “active” stance toward issues of decolonization.746 
 During the fall of 1980, with Reagan’s campaign rhetoric heating up, the Soviets 
expressed anxiety about further regional and international destabilization, and concern 
about the continued Cold War politicization of the United Nations. The Latin American 
Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry accused the United States of “violating 
military parity,” causing “damage to international détente,” intensifying the arms race, 
and “inflaming international tension.” Soviet officials condemned the “partnership 
between imperialism and Peking’s hegemonism,” which was “dangerous for all of 
humanity.” The United Nations had a crucial role to play in “creating an atmosphere 
of…constructive cooperation,” and in “mobilizing state for the prevention of…war.” The 
report emphasized the “decisive opposition” of the Soviet Union to “attempts to convert 
                                                
744 Participation of Nicaragua in the Non-Aligned Movement. AVPRF, fond 114, opis’ 23, papka 4, delo 3, 
p. 53. 
745 Material for talks with the Nicaraguan delegation – Non-Aligned Movement, November 25, 1980. 
AVPRF, fond 114, opis’ 23, papka 3, delo 3, p. 44. 
746 Material for Soviet-Nicaraguan discussions, November 25, 1980. Latin American Department of Soviet 
Foreign Ministry [hereafter, LAO MID]. AVPRF, fond 114, opis’ 23, papka 3, delo 3, p. 47. 
 220 
the U.N. into an instrument of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states [and] 
into an arena for leading slanderous anti-socialist campaigns.”747 
 The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened in 
February, 1981, mere weeks after Reagan’s inauguration. The congress was notable for 
the short shrift given to Latin America. Brezhnev’s speech focused on the Reagan 
administration’s apparent bid for strategic superiority, and presented a hierarchy of Soviet 
security interests that placed Latin America on the bottom rung. Brezhnev’s only 
treatment of Latin America was brief; he stated that “the role of the states of Latin 
America in the world arena has increased considerably, notably that of Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru.” He merely took note of “the development of mutually 
advantageous links between the Soviet Union and the Latin American countries” and 
expressed “willingness to continue this development.”748 No mention was made of 
Nicaragua or El Salvador. These statements underscore the degree to which support for 
national liberation movements had been subordinated to the pursuit of traditional 
diplomatic and political relations with the states widely considered to be emerging 
regional powerhouses. 
 In April 1981, the new Nicaraguan ambassador to the USSR, Jacinto Suarez 
Espinoza, informed the Soviets that his country was undergoing a “critical period.” In a 
campaign of “economic aggression,” the United States had cut off all forms of aid to 
Nicaragua, and preparations were being made for armed intervention. In talks with Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgi Kornienko and First Deputy Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Vladimir Kuznetsov, Suarez emphasized that the 
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Sandinista government was “counting on fraternal aid from the USSR and socialist 
countries.”749 Kuznetsov informed Suarez that the “support Nicaragua has given to new 
Soviet foreign policy initiatives” was “highly valued” and that in the current deteriorating 
international atmosphere, the responsibility for which was “carried by the imperialist 
circles, especially the United States,” it was “especially important for all peace-loving 
states to work together to improve the international climate and lessen the threat of 
war.”750 
 On November 15, 1981, the Soviet embassy in Nicaragua sent a report of 
recommendations for upcoming talks between Andrei Gromyko and Miguel D’Escoto. 
The report noted that “it would be beneficial” to “express our anxiety about the 
worsening of the international atmosphere as a result of the aggressive course of the 
Reagan administration.” Therefore, the Soviet side should “acquaint Foreign Minister 
D’Escoto” with the essentials of Soviet foreign policy, “with the goal of drawing 
Nicaragua into more active support for the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet 
Union…against the aggressive policy of western imperialists.”751 It was recommended 
that Gromyko “express complete solidarity of the USSR for the Nicaraguan 
revolution.”752 Moreover, the embassy considered it expedient to “reveal our total support 
for Cuba…and note the importance of close cooperation between Nicaragua and Cuba.” 
It was also recommended that Gromyko “express satisfaction with the firm anti-imperial 
course of Nicaraguan foreign policy,” and to inform D’Escoto that “in its struggle with 
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aggressive U.S. imperialism, Nicaragua can count on the firm political support of the 
Soviet Union.”753 Embassy officials thought that the “peaceful solutions to…the situation 
in Central America” proffered by Daniel Ortega at the 36th session of the U.N. General 
Assembly should be “especially emphasized.” Predicting that D’Escoto would “be 
interested in the character of relations between the USSR and developing countries that 
have taken the path of socialist orientation,” embassy officials considered it very 
important that “Nicaragua see the sphere of possibilities of political, economic, and other 
areas of mutual cooperation with the USSR.”754 
 D’Escoto was on an official visit to the USSR from December 10 to 15, 1981. He 
informed Soviet officials of the “aggressive policy” of the United States and some 
Central American countries, which were “trying to destroy or deform revolutionary 
gains.” The Soviets, for their part, “noted the growing role of Nicaragua in the 
international arena,” and especially its “active participation in the non-aligned 
movement” and its “opposition to the aggressive plans of the U.S.”755 Both the 
Nicaraguans and the Soviets condemned the “attempts of imperialist circles” to equate 
“international terrorism” with the “peoples’ liberation struggles,” and repudiated the 
“pretensions of the imperialists” to thwart the national independence movements “behind 
the mask of the struggle against ‘international terrorism.’”756 Both sides also affirmed 
“the important role of the U.N.” and “announced their intention to work together for the 
further strengthening…of the U.N. on the basis of observance of its charter.”757 
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 The Soviet Foreign Ministry subsequently prepared a report on U.S.-Nicaraguan 
relations, which observed that the Reagan administration “justly” viewed the Sandinista 
government as an “enemy in the international arena,” and had adopted the “goal of 
liquidating the Nicaraguan revolution.”758 The Sandinistas had declared the “cessation of 
U.S. military interference and…respect for the Salvadoran people’s right to self-
determination” as a pre-condition for normalizing relations with the United States.759 The 
ministry also applauded the Nicaraguan use of the Organization of American States to 
“unmask the U.S. policy of economic pressure and blackmail,” and noted that the 
Sandinistas had “achieved political support and economic aid for national reconstruction 
of the country.” At the OAS meeting in Washington in November 1980, Nicaragua and 
several other Latin American countries had criticized U.S. policy in the hemisphere, and 
at the April 1981 OAS session, the Nicaraguan delegation “sharply condemned the 
blatant political pressure of the U.S….and expressed determination to rebuff any attempt 
at meddling in the revolutionary process.”760 
 On May 30, 1981, the Soviet embassy in Nicaragua sent the Foreign Ministry a 
report about “anti-government, counter-revolutionary forces” being prepared “on U.S. 
territory and on U.S. military bases in the Panama Canal Zone” for “military 
provocations against the Sandinista Front.”761 In order to “compromise” the Sandinista 
government, “bourgeois” factions were using the mass media in a “propaganda campaign 
accusing the Sandinistas of conspiring with the USSR, Cuba, and the international 
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communist movement.” The report characterized such charges as “falsification, 
fabricated by the CIA.”762 The Reagan administration was “activating forces” in 
Honduras in fulfillment of its “plans to strangle the revolution.”763 The report noted that 
because an amendment to the Honduran constitution allowed foreign armed forces to 
cross through Honduran territory, “a constitutional basis has been created for open 
military intervention in Nicaragua.”764 The U.S. administration relied upon “the 
reactionary regimes of the Southern Cone” for support. The first secretary of the embassy 
predicted that “the fate of the Sandinista revolution will largely depend on the 
government’s ability to resolve pressing socioeconomic problems, on the unity 
of…Nicaraguan society, and on the support and solidarity of all progressive forces of the 
world, particularly the socialist countries.”765 
 A month later, the embassy prepared a report on Nicaragua’s relations with its 
neighbors. Noting that the Sandinistas were “pursuing a flexible line to avoid worsening 
relations with the reactionary regimes of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador,” 
embassy officials observed that “great attention” was being “devoted to strengthening 
relations with progressive democratic countries in the region, like Mexico, Panama, and 
Costa Rica.”766 The embassy also maintained that the Sandinistas viewed the 
revolutionary struggle in El Salvador as “a direct continuation of the Nicaraguan 
revolution.”767 On a positive note, relations with Panama were improving, as “in the 
U.N., OAS, and other international organizations, Panama evinces solidarity with 
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Nicaragua and Nicaragua supports Panama’s demands for U.S. observance of the Panama 
Canal Treaty.”768 
 In the latter half of 1981, Nicaragua strengthened relations with some countries of 
the socialist bloc, with the German Democratic Republic providing $55 million in credits 
and Bulgaria supplying $18.5 million for Nicaraguan purchases of technical 
equipment.769 Nicaragua and Czechoslovakia signed a protocol establishing inter-party 
relations, with the Czechs agreeing to provide Nicaragua with $30 million of credit. 
Yugoslavia also agreed to provide Nicaragua with $800,000 “for the reconstruction of 
Managua.”770 Such socialist-bloc aid was far from sufficient for Managua’s purposes, and 
the Sandinista leadership continued to emphasize the importance of economic support 
and development issues. At the 36th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Daniel Ortega 
delivered a speech emphasizing the failure of developed “imperialist” states to “regulate 
economic relations with developing countries on a fair and just basis,” arguing that this 
failure “creates an explosively dangerous situation in the world.”771 
 In November, 1981, the Latin America department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
prepared a report on Nicaragua’s relations with the countries of South America. South 
America was described as in thrall to a “growing fear” of a “second Cuba,” and as 
motivated by a “desire to prevent the spread of revolutionary influence in Central 
America and the Caribbean.” The United States, moreover, was “exerting strong 
pressure” on the countries of South America in order to “draw [them] into active support 
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for U.S. foreign policy and for the political and economic isolation of Nicaragua in Latin 
America.”772 The report noted that despite worsening relations with the majority of South 
American countries, Ecuador had opposed an OAS resolution “that could have opened a 
path for direct military intervention,” and that Ecuador and Nicaragua agreed to 
“combine forces” in the United Nations and the OAS “against foreign meddling in El 
Salvador.”773 
 The Latin America department also prepared a report about Nicaragua’s relations 
with the United States, in which the Reagan administration was charged with “launching 
a series of measures directed at undermining Nicaragua’s position in Latin America.” The 
CIA was accused of “coordinating practically all terrorist activity against Nicaragua,” and 
department officials scoffed that the “Americans are not even hiding the fact that they are 
training and hiding Somocistas.”774 The U.S. administration was “trying to force the 
Nicaraguan government to cease military aid to the patriots of El Salvador [and] to reject 
the ‘Cuban model’ of development.” The department took note of U.S. “promises to 
restore economic aid” and to respect the principle of non-interference in Nicaraguan 
internal affairs if demands for “political pluralism and a mixed economy” were met by 
the Sandinista Front.775 
 These reports were part of a series of briefings prepared by the Latin American 
department about Nicaragua. In December, it was noted that the Nicaraguan government 
“ascribes huge significance to strengthening relations with developing countries, 
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especially with governments of socialist orientation.”776 The primary “connecting link” 
between Nicaragua and the developing countries of Asia and Africa was described as 
“the anti-imperialist direction of their foreign policy, [and] common interest in defending 
and strengthening the revolutionary process.”777 Relations with Cuba were very close, 
with Cuba “rendering firm support to Nicaragua in the international arena.” In July 1980, 
Castro had visited Nicaragua and announced Cuba’s intention to support the Sandinista 
Front with “fraternal aid” and with “close cooperation in the U.N., Non-Aligned 
Movement, and other international organizations.”778 Both governments “agree that the 
defense…of the Nicaraguan Revolution will facilitate the activation of revolutionary 
movements in other Central American countries, including El Salvador, and will 
strengthen the positions of Cuba and Nicaragua in Latin America.”779 Noting that the 
Nicaraguan government was seeking broader cooperation in the international arena with 
the USSR and the countries of the socialist bloc, the Latin American Department warned 
that the Sandinista Front was “seriously concerned” about the “further worsening of the 
political atmosphere in Central America, particularly around El Salvador.”780 
In March, 1982, the Soviet embassy in Nicaragua prepared a report on 
Nicaragua’s position at the 11th session of the OAS General Assembly, which occurred 
during a period in which the United States was attempting to “isolate the Nicaraguans 
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diplomatically with the help of the OAS.”781 Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D’Escoto had 
delivered a speech characterizing U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s anti-
Nicaraguan “exhortations” as “actual terrorism” and declared that the OAS “continues to 
be used in the interests of the U.S. for interference in the affairs of other countries.” 
D’Escoto called upon the members of the OAS “not to allow the conversion of this 
organization into an instrument of U.S. interventionism,” and argued that the OAS could 
“play a positive role only when it serves the interests of Latin America countries.”782 The 
embassy observed that the resolution in support of general elections in El Salvador gave 
the United States “the opportunity to ascribe ‘legality’ to the military junta in El 
Salvador, with the aim of rendering political support.” Nicaragua, Mexico, and Grenada 
had voted against the resolution, which the Nicaraguan delegation denounced as a 
“warning sign that the U.S. is striving to use the OAS…against the revolutionary-
democratic forces of El Salvador.” The embassy described the general feeling in 
Managua toward the OAS session as one that “the U.S. succeeded…with the help of 
pressure and intimidation to achieve diplomatic cover for their aggressive plans in El 
Salvador.” The U.S. delegation had tried to include Nicaragua on a list of hemispheric 
human rights violators, but “a majority of participants” failed to support this effort.783 
Overall, the embassy concluded, the United States “did not succeed in enlisting the 
support of Latin American countries in its aggressive actions against Nicaragua.”784 
But the Organization of American States was not the only venue in which the 
United States was having difficulty selling its agenda. The U.S.A. Department of the 
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Soviet Foreign Ministry noted that during the April 1982 session of the U.N. Security 
Council, “the Americans were practically isolated” and that “all representatives present at 
the meetings to one degree or another supported the validity of Nicaragua’s complaints.” 
In order to avoid an explicit condemnation of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, the U.S. 
delegation used its veto to present the resolution from going to a vote.785 In November, 
1981, D’Escoto had sent a letter to the chairman of the U.N. Security Council, expressing 
“alarm and anxiety” about U.S. aggression, which “contradicts the basic values of the 
U.N.” In March, 1982, a special session of the Security Council was held in connection 
with “the sharp escalation of armed interference of American imperialism in Central 
America.” Daniel Ortega had exhorted the U.N. member-countries “to refrain from 
direct, indirect, overt, or covert application of force against any country of Central 
America or the Caribbean basin and to observe such principles of the U.N. charter as 
rejection of interference in internal affairs of state, self-determination of peoples, etc.” Of 
the fifteen members of the Security Council, twelve had voted for the resolution, two had 
abstained, and the United States had rejected the proposal and used its veto power.786 
In May, a Nicaraguan delegation headed by Daniel Ortega traveled to Moscow for 
talks about “cooperation…and development of political, economic, trade, scientific-
technical, and cultural relations.” 787 During the visit, Brezhnev repeatedly emphasized 
the “vast oceanic expanse” that separated the Western Hemisphere from the USSR.788 
Despite such indications of caution, during this visit the most substantial aid package yet 
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offered by the Soviets was signed. The agreement was largely centered on technical 
assistance, and crucially, did not contain subsidies for Nicaraguan exports or the hard 
currency of which the FSLN was so desperately in need.789 Another indication of Soviet 
caution was Moscow’s refusal to supply the FSLN with offensive weaponry, despite 
repeated requests. The Soviets agreed to provide only defensive weaponry – a clear signal 
to Washington that they were not seeking to inflame the situation in Central America. 
The Reagan administration, however, interpreted any Soviet involvement in the region as 
a prelude to communist control.790 Soviet arms shipments to Nicaragua corresponded to 
the escalation of U.S. threats but were restricted to what was considered necessary for the 
defense of the revolution.791 
In September 1982, the Soviet embassy in Nicaragua reported that Managua had 
used the June meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau to announce in 
connection with the Falklands crisis “that Latin America at the present time is being 
subjected to aggression from the United States and Great Britain.” D’Escoto “emphasized 
that the participation of Great Britain in the conflict is viewed by the majority of Latin 
American countries as aggression against the entire continent.”792 Observing that the 
Falklands crisis had aggravated tensions in the Organization of American States, the 
Soviets crowed that the “Nicaraguan leadership was able to use the Anglo-Argentine 
conflict in order to…strengthen anti-imperialist sentiments in the very system of inter-
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American relations.”793 By November, the Latin American Department of the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry was reporting that the Sandinista leadership, “as a result of the 
intensifying aggression of imperialist circles in the United States and the reactionary 
Central American regimes,” viewed the USSR as “the moral [and] political guarantor of 
the Nicaraguan revolution.”794  
In March, 1983, following the NAM summit in Delhi, Daniel Ortega traveled to 
Moscow to conduct negotiations on further military aid.795 The Reagan administration 
had stepped up its covert war against the Sandinistas and the contras were seeking to 
provoke an open conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras that could serve as a 
convenient pretext for open U.S. intervention. In the months after Ortega’s visit, Soviet 
arms shipments to Nicaragua escalated.796 By March, 1983, the Latin American 
Department was warning of “the emergence of large-scale armed formations of former 
members of Somoza’s National Guard.” The counter-revolutionaries, “trained by 
American instructors and outfitted with modern American weapons…terrorize the 
civilian population.” The Sandinista government “intends to turn to the U.N. Security 
Council” with the express purpose of “assigning to Washington direct responsibility for 
this dangerous military adventurism.”797 In April, the department reported on the success 
of Nicaraguan efforts in the Security Council, noting that the Nicaraguan delegation 
“succeeded in drawing the attention of the U.N. and international society to the 
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aggressive actions against Nicaragua [and] in assigning direct responsibility for the tense 
atmosphere in the region to the United States.”798 At the NAM summit in Delhi in March, 
the representatives of some Latin American countries “spoke out against viewing these 
problems in the context of East-West relations, and emphasized the socioeconomic 
causes.” The foreign ministers of Honduras and El Salvador had, “as expected,” acted on 
behalf of the United States in the U.N. Security Council, “practically repeating Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick’s lies about the threat from Nicaragua to neighboring countries [and] human 
rights violations.”799 The department characterized Honduran President Roberto Suazo as 
“a marionette in the hands of the local oligarchy and the Reagan administration,” and 
noted that the “real power in the country belongs to the head of the armed forces, General 
Gustavo Álvarez Martinez, [a] reactionary leader [who] takes an even more openly pro-
American position than the president.”800  
Reagan had appointed Jeane Kirkpatrick, an academic, as U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations. Kirkpatrick subsequently became notorious for drawing a distinction 
between authoritarian governments, such as those of the Southern Cone, and totalitarian 
states, like those of the communist bloc. She argued that the former could transition to 
democracy, whereas the latter could not. Though her views won plaudits from the 
country’s conservatives, her hectoring and confrontational speeches at the United Nations 
did not win her many friends in the international organization. Her tenure as ambassador 
to the U.N. coincided with a period during which a substantial proportion of the U.S. 
public had taken a dim view of the organization. Much of U.S. ill-will toward the U.N. 
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had been the result of the infamous Resolution 3379 declaring Zionism racism, and more 
broadly, the hijacking of the U.N. agenda by the combined forces of the Third World and 
the Soviet bloc that the resolution reflected.801 In late 1983, Republicans in the Senate 
passed a bill cutting U.S. funding for the U.N.; President Reagan had to personally 
intervene to request that the bill be shelved. Public opinion polls showed that only thirty-
six percent of Americans held a favorable view of the United Nations.802 
In November 1983, the United States invaded Grenada. This was a major source 
of anxiety for the Sandinistas, who feared that a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua would be 
forthcoming. The Soviets also worried that the Reagan administration would move 
quickly to stamp out the FSLN. Soviet arms transfers to Nicaragua were stepped up as a 
direct result of the U.S. invasion of Grenada.803 Kirkpatrick had to use the U.S. veto in 
the Security Council to head off a resolution condemning the invasion. She was unable, 
however, to prevent the General Assembly from demanding the immediate withdrawal of 
all U.S. personnel from the island.804 
In December, the Soviet embassy in Nicaragua noted that the Sandinistas, along 
with Cuba and “other progressive developing countries,” spearheaded “a struggle in the 
Non-Aligned Movement, where some countries under the influence of China tried to 
impose…a line directed against the interests of the socialist countries and the world 
liberation movement.” The Soviets charged that “Chinese propaganda has recently joined 
the wide imperialist propaganda campaign directed against Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
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Grenada,” and noted that after the election of Nicaragua as a temporary member of the 
U.N. Security Council in 1982, contacts between representatives of Nicaragua and China 
“in the international organization have become more frequent.”805 With the entrance of 
Nicaragua and Grenada into the non-aligned movement, the Soviets had begun to 
contemplate the emergence of a “Latin American stage” of NAM and to call for the 
restructuring of the inter-American system to facilitate genuine independence.806 One 
scholar has argued that the entrance of Nicaragua into the NAM essentially subsumed 
U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral issues into the movement, while conferring international 
legitimacy on the Sandinista government.807 The special meeting of the Non-Aligned 
Coordinating Board in Managua in January 1983 demonstrated that the radical influence 
of Cuba and Nicaragua had prevailed in the absence of a “counterbalance to the radical 
litany of U.S. aggression and imperialism.”808 Soviet assessments of Latin American 
leadership within the movement reveal the extent to which the Chinese were still viewed 
as a threat to Soviet influence in the Third World.  
Also in December, the Soviet embassy in Peru noted that despite Peruvian 
President Fernando Belaunde’s repeated statements emphasizing his commitment to the 
principles of non-interference and self-determination, “Peru’s dependence on the 
U.S….in the economic sphere exercises significant influence on Lima’s approach to the 
Central American problem.” As a result, the Peruvian delegation to the United Nations 
had introduced a resolution in March 1983 – “the so-called ‘peace plan for Central 
America.’” The resolution, which was introduced “not without prompting from 
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Washington,” sought to transfer the entire issue from the U.N. to the OAS, “where the 
anti-Nicaraguan approach to the resolution of the situation is more assured.”809 
 On February 15, 1984, at the funeral of Yuri Andropov, Daniel Ortega met with 
the Secretary General of the CPSU, Konstantin Chernenko. Ortega informed Chernenko 
of the “steps the Sandinistas are taking in connection with the complication of the 
atmosphere surrounding Nicaragua.” In turn, Chernenko expressed “sincere solidarity” 
and a “readiness to deepen cooperation” between the Soviet Union and Nicaragua. As a 
result of the meeting, “it was decided to render Nicaragua additional economic aid.” The 
Latin American department noted approvingly that the Sandinista leadership “supports 
the peaceful initiatives put forward by the USSR at the 38th session of the U.N. General 
Assembly.”810 Indeed, at the 38th session, “practically all the resolutions introduced by the 
USSR and other socialist countries were supported by Nicaragua.”811 
 In March, 1984, the Soviet embassy in Managua noted that “our Nicaraguan 
friends” were seeking to expand relations with the Andean Pact countries in order to 
“facilitate peaceful settlement of the Central American crisis and the growth of ‘Latin 
American solidarity’ with the Sandinista Revolution.” It was hoped that the strengthening 
of ties with these countries would “counter the U.S. policy of economic and political 
isolation of Nicaragua.”812 Embassy officials believed that “the fact that the Nicaraguans 
refrain from contacts with FARC and M-19…facilitates good relations between 
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Nicaragua and Colombia.”813 The Soviets had experienced difficulties with other Latin 
American states as a result of Cuban support for armed guerrillas in the hemisphere, and 
clearly sought to avoid becoming associated with such support in the case of Nicaragua. 
 In September 1984, the Latin American Department reported on the internal 
situation in Nicaragua on the eve of general elections. The Sandinistas, “realizing that the 
issue of elections is one of the main arguments in the anti-Sandinista campaign,” had 
agreed in December to hold general elections in November 1984 as part of “the creation 
of positive internal and external conditions for the further acceleration of the process of 
progressive transformation in the country.” The Soviets anticipated that the elections 
would “weaken outside pressure, especially from the United States.”814 However, the 
United States was “carrying out a plan to wreck the elections by organizing the political 
isolation of the FSLN.”815 
 A delegation headed by the deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet visited Nicaragua from the 7th through the 12th of January, 1985. The Nicaraguans 
informed the Soviets that their government was “ready to support the USSR in 
international forums, including the U.N. and the Non-Aligned Movement” and was 
“interested in further…consultations and exchanges of opinion with Soviet 
representatives at all levels.”816 Due to the recent election of Daniel Ortega as president 
and the “institutionalization of the Sandinista government,” the Sandinistas had received 
the “very necessary international recognition” as well as “wide support inside the 
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country.”817 Nicaraguan representatives informed the Soviets that the government felt 
that it had successfully “rebuffed U.S. attempts to isolate the country in the international 
arena and above all in Latin America.”818 The Nicaraguans reported that they “intend to 
turn to the countries of Latin America, the Non-Aligned Movement, and…democratic 
international organizations…with a call to strengthen pressure on the U.S. Congress and 
U.S. public opinion in order to cut off funds for the support of counter-
revolutionaries.”819 The Soviet embassy in Nicaragua reported that a total of fourteen 
Soviet delegations had been sent to Nicaragua in the first quarter of 1985, and that “the 
majority of the delegations worked actively on a plan for conducting foreign policy 
propaganda in the country.”820 The delegations apparently held talks with the leadership 
of the Agitprop Department of the FSLN on “the development of cooperation in the 
realm of foreign policy propaganda.”821 
 In sum, although the Soviets and the Nicaraguan leadership quickly developed 
good relations, the amount of aid that Moscow provided Managua was contingent upon 
the Reagan administration’s continued hostility to the FLSN and its funding of the 
contras’ efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas. Had the Reagan administration adopted a 
more hands-off approach to Central America, it is quite possible that the levels of Soviet 
aid and weaponry to the FSLN would have much lower. Moreover, even in the early 
1980s, when the Reagan administration’s rhetoric about the Soviet Union was at its 
fiercest and most confrontational, the Soviets were less interested in expanding their 
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presence in Central America than they were in using their own power to combat U.S. 
interventionism. This resulted in greater provision of material aid to the FSLN, and in 
robust political support of the Nicaraguan government in international organizations. 
GORBACHEV’S “NEW THINKING” AND CENTRAL AMERICA 
With the ascendance to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, a major re-evaluation of 
both domestic and foreign policy was launched. In tandem with perestroika, which 
envisioned economic reforms aimed at introducing market forces, “the new thinking” in 
foreign policy entailed a fresh look at Soviet national interests and an increased emphasis 
on East-West negotiations to resolve regional conflicts in the Third World, reduce 
international tensions, and improve relations with the United States. Gorbachev’s reform 
program was put forth at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986. In his speech at the 
congress, Gorbachev called for a “world security system” that would reject the bipolarity 
of the Cold War international system and incorporate the legitimate security needs of all 
world actors.822 The emphasis on international security was accompanied by a focus on 
domestic economic revival. Gorbachev’s economic team hoped to reduce military 
spending, expand opportunities for international trade, and invest much more heavily in 
the civilian sector.823 Thus, the prior emphasis on strategic parity, which had governed 
Soviet military doctrine, gave way to the concept of “reasonable sufficiency” and the 
Soviets accepted asymmetric reductions in nuclear weapons.824 
In the months after the congress, this platform was expanded upon, and 
Gorbachev pushed out the old foreign policy elite and brought in a team of “new 
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thinkers.” Gorbachev’s re-assessment of international relations involved a further 
diminution of the significance of ideology, a commitment to the peaceful resolution of 
regional conflicts, and the firm opposition to the export of revolution.825 His most 
influential foreign policy advisers, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Edvard Shevardnadze, 
advocated the subordination of class interests to national interests, leading to a further 
weakening of ideology as a factor in policy formation.826 This fundamentally altered the 
Soviet approach to the Third World. Whereas the 1970s had witnessed the zenith of 
Soviet influence and prestige in the global South, Gorbachev explicitly sought to scale 
back Soviet commitments and to prevent them from draining further resources from the 
domestic economy. During the 1970s, moreover, the Soviets had rejected the linkage 
between support for Third World regimes and détente. However, under the new thinking, 
linkage was embraced, and Gorbachev tied the improvement in East-West relations with 
the paring down of commitments to the Third World.827 
 A key element of the Gorbachev team’s “new thinking” was the political 
settlement of regional disputes. Thus, the Soviets unilaterally withdrew from Afghanistan 
and scaled back their presence in Southeast Asia and Africa. They also supported 
negotiated settlements to the regional conflicts in the Middle East and Central 
America.828 On December 7, 1988, Gorbachev delivered a speech at the United Nations 
announcing that the USSR would cut its military forces by 500,000 men and 10,000 
tanks, and pull back its presence in Eastern Europe and China.829 Moreover, the Soviets 
pressured the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia and the Cubans to withdraw their 
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forces from Angola. The process of phased withdrawals from both countries began in 
early 1989.830 The Soviets did not, however, revoke their commitments to Cuba and 
Nicaragua; in 1988, Cuba received $5 billion in aid, while the Sandinistas received $1.2 
billion.831 Then, in April 1989, Gorbachev visited Havana, where he signed a Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation pledging Moscow’s continued support for Cuba.832  
At the same time, however, the Soviets encouraged Cuba to pursue better 
relations with the United States, and the emphasis of Soviet policy toward Latin America 
was on expanding ties with large industrial states like Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil.833 
Castro was not thrilled about Gorbachev’s embrace of perestroika and glasnost, and the 
two leaders clashed over continued support to the Sandinistas.834 Cuban Deputy Foreign 
Minister Raúl Roa argued that continued provision of U.S. military and material aid to 
the contras necessitated the continuation of support for the FSLN, while Gorbachev 
insisted upon the immediate cessation of all foreign intervention in Nicaragua.835 During 
the late 1980s, with the advent of summit diplomacy between Reagan and Gorbachev, 
and the drawdown of Cold War tensions, the Soviet Union and Cuba once again found 
themselves at loggerheads. Castro was not at all keen on the “new thinking,” and resented 
Soviet efforts to improve relations with the United States at what was perceived as the 
cost of selling out the revolutionary forces in Central America.836 
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The evolution of the Contadora peace process shows, however, that Latin 
American leaders were not content to allow the East-West conflict to determine the 
outcome of events in Central America. In January, 1983, the foreign ministers of 
Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela had gathered on Contadora Island off the 
coast of Panama to discuss “Latin American solutions to Latin American problems.”837 
While the foreign ministers disdained unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin American 
affairs, they also sought to keep the region free from the taint of the East-West conflict, 
and thus desired to prevent further Cuban and Soviet encroachment into Central America. 
In July, 1985, a support group composed of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay formed 
around the permanent members of the Contadora group, which in addition to the 
countries listed above included the five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua).838 The support group sought to prevent 
the East-West conflict from dominating the region, and joining the peace process was 
envisioned as a show of Latin American solidarity.839 
 Though the Sandinistas welcomed the Contadora group’s negotiating strategy, 
they were hemmed in by the Reagan administration’s continued support of the contras, 
and concerned about the possibility of direct U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.840 From the 
beginning, the process was plagued by the conflicting interests of the United States and 
the Central American countries, and by accusations of bad faith. In the case of U.S. 
diplomats, these charges were at least partly true, as the Reagan administration sought to 
bog down the peace process in the hopes of creating a fait accompli by means of the 
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contra war against the Sandinistas. Many of the Contadora group’s members, moreover, 
faced domestic pressure to exhibit foreign policy independence from Washington.841 
President Reagan himself was opposed to any settlement that left the FSLN in power.842 
The administration repeatedly sunk negotiations by demanding preconditions 
unacceptable to the Sandinista government.843  
 In a letter to the Contadora group, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega accused 
the United States of pursuing a “brutal war of aggression” and a “policy of state 
terrorism” against his country and expressed his fears of “the dangers of direct military 
intervention.”844 The conditions created by U.S. support for the contras made it 
impossible for the Nicaraguan government to commit to reductions or monitoring of 
weapons, which would “place [Nicaragua’s] national security at risk.”845 Ortega 
condemned Reagan’s speech at the U.N. General Assembly, in which Reagan had 
discussed the Central American conflict in the context of negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, as “a clear demonstration of contempt for the search for peace for the region 
which has been promoted by the Contadora Group on behalf of Latin America.”846 Ortega 
also censured the Reagan administration’s failure to “bring its conduct into line with the 
norms of international law.”847 The government of Nicaragua would not enter into any 
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treaty commitments until Central America was “free from any foreign military 
presence.”848 
 Nevertheless, the existence of the Contadora peace process, and the 
overwhelming international support for it, constrained the ability of the Reagan 
administration to act unilaterally vis-à-vis Central America. The Soviet bloc, the Non-
Aligned Movement, and the majority of member states of both the Organization of 
American States and the United Nations all supported the Contadora group.849 The 
Reagan administration could simply not afford to flout international public opinion by 
pursuing a unilateral solution to the regional conflict. 
 In May, 1985, the Latin America Department reported on the positions of Latin 
American leaders on the Nicaragua issue. The president of Argentina had announced that 
the situation in Central America could only be settled “on the basis of the principle of 
non-interference,” while the Brazilian foreign minister came out against sanctions on 
Nicaragua, and Bolivia’s minister of information declared that the United States was 
violating the norms of the inter-American system.850 Several Latin American leaders 
expressed their commitment to the Contadora group, with the Venezuelan foreign 
minister anxious that Ortega’s recent trip to Moscow could complicate the Contadora 
group’s work, and the Colombian foreign minister emphasizing his country’s “intention 
to continue efforts within the framework of the Contadora group.” The Mexican 
government also stated that U.S. actions were in direct conflict with the goals and 
principles of the Contadora group, and expressed opposition to U.S. attempts to turn 
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Central America into an “additional element of the East-West confrontation.”851 Officials 
of Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, Surinam, Barbados, Belize, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras all made statements in various degrees of opposition to 
the U.S. embargo against Nicaragua.852 Only El Salvador supported U.S. sanctions. The 
Permanent Council of the OAS passed a resolution condemning U.S. political 
interference and economic sanctions.853 The U.N. Security Council also passed a 
resolution reiterating the “sovereignty and right of Nicaragua and other states to freely 
choose their own political, economic, and social systems, and to develop their 
international relations…without foreign interference.”854  
Despite Nicaragua’s “political triumph” in the Security Council, and despite the 
“worldwide condemnation of the U.S. embargo,” Soviet officials reported that the 
“political positions of Nicaragua in the framework of the Contadora process are now 
weaker than they were in January of this year.”855 The Contadora countries were reported 
to be “leaning toward the U.S.-suggested use of…a ‘dialogue’ between the FSLN and the 
armed counter-revolution, which the Sandinistas decisively reject.” Though the Soviets 
felt that the resumption of the Manzanillo talks would be a “positive development” in the 
effort to “relax tensions around Nicaragua,” they also warned that it could “serve as a 
cover for a U.S. dictate, for the preparation of intervention and consolidation of the 
rightist opposition and…as a means to further sabotage the Contadora group.” 
Nevertheless, the Soviets considered that it would be “beneficial for Nicaragua to achieve 
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normalization of bilateral relations with the United States and removal of U.S. 
trade/economic sanctions.”856 In June, Daniel Ortega had informed a visiting Soviet 
delegation of his “decisive rejection” of U.S. accusations of the Nicaraguan government’s 
“participation in terrorist acts,” and expressed his “readiness to immediately sign the 
Contadora Act.”857 
 By September, the Soviet embassy in Washington was reporting that the July vote 
of Congress to allow humanitarian aid to the Contras was “a sharp turn from its earlier 
position, having voted at the end of 1984 against any form of aid to the Contras.”858 
Embassy officials attributed the shift in the position of the U.S. Congress to be a result of 
the Reagan administration’s “active propagandizing in order to create a more hostile 
attitude toward Nicaragua,” specifically citing the distribution of a State Department 
pamphlet on the “Sandinistas and Middle East radicals,” which charged the Nicaraguan 
government with “participating in international terrorism.”859 The embassy warned that 
the Reagan administration “hopes to create an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of 
military aid to the Contras.”860 During a July visit of a Soviet delegation to Nicaragua, 
Ortega had informed the members of the delegation that U.S. was “determined to 
strengthen military pressure on Nicaragua and to isolate it from Soviet and other socialist 
aid.”861 Ortega also warned that the Reagan administration was attempting to “subvert the 
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Contadora process” and would “not allow a peaceful settlement of the Central American 
conflict.”862 
In August, 1986, the Soviet Foreign Ministry prepared a report on Moscow’s 
position regarding the situation in Central America. Soviet concerns were concentrated 
on the Reagan administration’s continued interventionism in the region, and its impact on 
international and regional stability. On April 2, Gorbachev had told an Algerian journalist 
that “our sympathies are fully on the side of peoples struggling for freedom, national 
independence, and social progress.” He pledged to continue to provide Nicaragua with 
political, moral, and material support, and swore that the Soviet Union was “not looking 
for any advantage or profit for itself in this endeavor.”863 At the request of the Nicaraguan 
government, the Soviets had provided “some forms of defensive military weaponry” in 
order to help the country with “strengthening its defense capabilities.” The Soviet policy 
was based on “the fact that the United States is leading an undeclared war against the 
Nicaraguan people, [and] armed bands of American mercenaries are committing acts of 
terror and attempts to overthrow the legally elected Sandinista government.”864 The 
Soviets accused the United States of “trampling on the U.N. charter [and] elementary 
norms of international relations, and violating U.S. domestic legislation.” The Soviets 
also declared U.S. actions “intolerable from the standpoint of the OAS charter.”865 The 
Soviet Union had “many times subjected to sharp criticism U.S. attempts to mask its 
interference in Nicaraguan affairs with the hackneyed theses of ‘extension of 
international communism, ‘hand of Moscow,’ and ‘threats to U.S. national security 
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interests.’” The Soviets pledged that they would continue to “decisively reject” 
Washington’s efforts to portray events in Central America “in the context of the East-
West confrontation.”866 
 As the Esquipulas peace process, spearheaded by Costa Rican president Oscar 
Arias and built upon the Contadora process, gained traction, the Esquipulas II Accords 
were signed on August 7, 1987, by the presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, 
El Salvador, and Nicaragua. The accords provided for a drawdown of hostilities, an end 
to armed support for the various factions involved in the conflict, and measures for 
democratization and elections in Nicaragua.867 In October 1988, the Soviets announced 
the temporary suspension of heavy weapons delivery to Nicaragua, partly in response to 
the Reagan administration’s decision to cut off military aid to the contras.868 
 By 1989, the Nicaraguans were praising perestroika and actively supporting the 
Soviet Union’s “new approach to international relations,” which was evaluated as a 
“positive development” and a spur to the growth of “the international authority of the 
USSR.” The Nicaraguan delegation had “expressed support for the concepts and concrete 
proposals put forward by Gorbachev at the U.N. in December 1988.” The USSR 
promised to “continue to render the country political support” but material support was 
restricted to “whatever it can [afford].”869 
 On February 9, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze signed a joint communiqué in Moscow vowing to accept the results of the 
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elections in Nicaragua, to formally recognize the new government, and to respect 
political pluralism in the country.870 On March 3, Baker sent Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze a letter expressing “hope” that the Soviet government would “encourage a 
peaceful transfer of power” in Nicaragua. “Clearly,” he wrote, “any attempt by the 
Sandinistas to retain power would draw the certain condemnation of the international 
community and only worsen the damaging confrontation that has marked Nicaragua’s 
relations with its neighbors and with the United States.”871 Baker observed that “the 
ability of the Nicaraguan government to hold free elections and transfer power to its 
democratically elected successor will mark a milestone in U.S.-Soviet cooperation on 
regional conflicts. Indeed, it may well mark the turning point in the search for peace 
throughout Central America.”872 
 On April 25, in internationally monitored elections, Violeta Barrios Torres de 
Chamorro, running as head of the National Opposition Union, a coalition of anti-
Sandinista parties, unseated Daniel Ortega. Gorbachev sent a personal message to 
Chamorro, who had apparently averred that she “fully agrees with the words of the Soviet 
leader about the necessity of de-ideologizing international relations.”873 Chamorro stated 
that she “firmly intends to demobilize the Contras and demilitarize the country” and that 
her government would “strive for constructive mutual relations with the Sandinista 
leadership.” In the realm of foreign policy, Chamorro pledged to respect political and 
parliamentary contacts with the USSR and to “develop relations with all states, regardless 
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of socioeconomic system.”874 Despite Chamorro’s statements, the Soviets felt that she 
was planning to “reorient Nicaraguan foreign policy toward the Western countries.”875 
CONCLUSION 
The resolution of the conflict in Nicaragua set a precedent for the United Nations. 
The FSLN had requested the presence of U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar 
to monitor the presidential elections, and on July 27, 1989, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 637, which called for the secretary-general’s “good offices in the region.” It 
was the first time that the United Nations sent observers to oversee the purely domestic 
affairs of a member-country.876 The impact of the Contadora peace process, and the 
subsequent Esquipulas process, on U.S. policy toward Central America had been a 
limiting one. The mere fact of the Contadora group’s existence constrained the Reagan 
administration’s attempts to act unilaterally in the region.877 Moreover, the group’s 
efforts underscored the degree to which Latin American leaders were unwilling to allow 
the region’s destiny to remain in thrall to the East-West conflict, and the determination of 
these to adopt Latin American solutions to Latin American problems. 
The Soviets, for their part, were avid supporters of regional peace efforts, and 
throughout the period of the Nicaraguan revolution had taken care to provide the 
Sandinista government with only as much material support as Moscow deemed necessary 
for the revolution’s survival. Though the FSLN had consistently pressed the Soviets for 
offensive weaponry, Moscow did not seek to inflame tensions in the region, but 
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continued to provide material and political support to its regional allies. This support was 
envisioned not as a means of expanding Soviet influence throughout Central America, 
but merely as a counter-weight to U.S. aggression and the Reagan administration’s 
support of the contras. As U.S.-Soviet relations improved, and the summit diplomacy of 
Gorbachev and Reagan yielded substantive achievements in reducing East-West tensions, 
the Soviets were more than happy to curtail their support to the Sandinistas in the hopes 
of stabilizing the situation in Central America.  
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Conclusion 
While Marxist-Leninist ideology certainly conditioned the worldviews of Soviet 
leaders, the ideological predisposition of any given Latin American regime was not an 
accurate indicator of Soviet support for that regime. Though the Arbenz administration 
was sympathetic to both domestic communists and to Soviet Russia, and though the 
Guatemalan communist party and other regional communist leaders petitioned the 
Soviets for aid to Arbenz’s government, the Soviets took a cautious approach. It is 
notable that this occurred during the early Cold War period, before the Sino-Soviet split, 
when the United States was the clear number one enemy. Though Moscow refused to 
provide Arbenz with significant material support, the Soviets were quick to capitalize on 
regional opposition to the U.S.-backed coup, and to use the United Nations to score a 
blow against the Yankee imperialists and register sympathy with the small banana 
republic struggling under the weight of U.S. hegemony. By the time of the Cuban 
revolution, Moscow had already launched the Soviet Economic Offensive, designed to 
pry Latin America away from its economic dependence on the United States, and had 
begun laying the groundwork for an expansion of Soviet influence in the region. 
The Cuban revolution transformed both Soviet-Latin American and U.S.-Latin 
American relations. Even during the honeymoon phase of the relationship between 
Moscow and Havana, the Soviets and the Cubans moved cautiously so that Castro had 
time to strengthen his domestic support and consolidate the revolution before attracting 
the ire of Washington. Rather than driving Castro into the arms of the Soviets, 
Washington’s increasingly confrontational stance drove the normally cautious Russians 
into the arms of the Cubans. As warm personal relations between Castro and Khrushchev 
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developed, the Soviet premier was driven by a variety of factors – ideological solidarity, 
the quest for strategic parity, and a desire to strengthen Soviet legitimacy and credibility 
in the face of the radical challenges posed by the Chinese communists and the fidelista 
groups sprouting up all over the Western Hemisphere – to take one of the most daring 
risks of the Cold War. The Cuban missile crisis quite literally brought the world to the 
brink of a nuclear holocaust, and Khrushchev wound up giving away the store, offering 
concessions that Kennedy had not even pressed for. In the process, he revealed that when 
push came to shove, the Soviets were more comfortable selling out their Cuban allies 
than pressuring the United States to make concessions on their behalf. The Cuban-Soviet 
relationship, as a result, suffered from a breach of trust and confidence that was only 
repaired by a massive infusion of Soviet economic aid. This gave the Soviets enough 
leverage to bring Castro into line, and though the jefe máximo never truly abandoned his 
support for the armed struggle, he did adhere to the Soviet foreign policy line and defend 
Moscow in the Non-Aligned Movement. 
The Soviets learned important lessons from the alliance with Cuba; among the 
most important was to avoid extending similar security guarantees to another Latin 
American country. Thus, although the election of Salvador Allende in Chile confirmed 
the veracity of the Soviet doctrinal emphasis on the peaceful path to power, Moscow was 
unwilling to underwrite the Popular Unity government. Castro had proven an unruly ally; 
the Soviet economic commitment to the Cuban revolution had not yielded a proportionate 
increase in Soviet influence or prestige. On the contrary, Castro and the fidelista 
movements he inspired frequently challenged the Soviets for their perceived lack of 
revolutionary zeal. Especially after Allende had evinced difficulties imposing discipline 
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on his own governing coalition, the Soviets were hesitant to provide him with the same 
guarantees they had given Castro. Yet, as with Arbenz’s Guatemala, the Soviets were 
quick to capitalize on the coup that overthrew Allende. Becoming active participants in 
the transnational solidarity campaign that emerged to pressure Pinochet, the Soviets 
worked through front groups and international organizations to isolate Pinochet’s 
government and protest its human rights violations. This activism was not driven by a 
genuine concern for human rights, but was aimed more at appeasing the Chilean 
communists and improving Moscow’s position in the Third World. The Chilean 
communists in exile in the socialist bloc were at the forefront of efforts to reshape the 
narrative of the coup and to push for the resumption of the armed struggle in Latin 
America. 
As the Sandinistas waged a violent struggle to depose Somoza in Nicaragua, a 
new cycle of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence was inaugurated. The 
Reagan administration came to power promising not just to contain communism in the 
Western Hemisphere, but to roll it back; the centerpiece of this effort was support for the 
contras. Reagan was personally convinced that Cuban-Soviet aggression was inflaming 
tensions in the region; the Soviets were equally convinced that U.S. interventionism was 
to blame. As such, the Soviets sought to provide just enough support to the Sandinistas to 
provide a counter-weight to U.S. aggression. With the rise to power of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, ideology as a policy factor was basically jettisoned. Karen Brutents, the first 
deputy chief of the International Department of the Central Committee, wrote in 1992 
that “we have effectively banished from our political and diplomatic practice those 
elements that only recently were inseparably linked with the image of a superpower: 
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ideological messianism, global confrontation with the United States and its allies…and 
the view that force was central to the conduct of international relations.”878 As U.S.-
Soviet relations improved, Moscow supported regional peacekeeping efforts and scaled 
back support to the Sandinistas.  
 Even at the height of Soviet involvement in Latin America, the region still 
occupied the lowest place in the Soviet hierarchy of strategic interests. Interestingly, it 
seems that because of this, regional and local actors exerted more influence on Soviet 
policy than did their counterparts in areas of greater strategic interest to the USSR. Kiva 
Maidanik, a senior researcher at the Soviet Institute for International Relations and the 
World Economy (IMEMO), has noted that the “pluralism of ideas and the richness of 
debate about Latin American in the Soviet Union” is “irrefutable evidence of the absence 
of real Soviet interests in Latin America.” This is because “open discussions could not 
have taken place about areas such as Eastern or Western Europe where the Soviets had 
true national security interests.”879 Of course, the Soviets clearly had an interest in 
maintaining their credibility and saving face in the Third World; moreover, Soviet 
prestige would have been adversely affected by a failure to support the USSR’s putative 
allies.880 This was tacitly acknowledged by the maintenance of support for Cuba, even 
after Marxist-Leninist ideology had been nearly totally abandoned by Soviet leaders. 
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that Latin American communists and others ideologically 
sympathetic to the USSR played a major role in shaping the Soviet approach to the 
region. 
                                                
878 Karen Brutents, “A New Soviet Perspective,” in Smith, The Russians Aren’t Coming, p. 74. 
879 Kiva Maidanik, “On the Real Soviet Policy Toward Central America, Past and Present,” in ibid., p. 90. 
880 Sergo Mikoyan, “The Future of the Soviet-Cuban Relationship,” in ibid., p. 133. 
 255 
THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE COLD WAR 
In the early Cold War period, the United States actively used the U.N. as a tool 
for achieving certain foreign policy goals and marshalling world public opinion behind its 
international policy agenda. In the early 1960s, however, the influx of decolonizing states 
into the world body irrevocably transformed its composition and functioning. As 
developing nations solidified into the largest single voting bloc in the U.N., they began to 
determine the organization’s agenda. From the beginning, the United States was on the 
wrong side of the so-called “colonial question.” In December 1960, the U.N. General 
Assembly, at the behest of the Third World bloc, voted to implement the “Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” The United States did 
not vote for the resolution.881 The fiscal crisis that the U.N. suffered during the 1960s, 
combined with U Thant’s aggressive efforts to bring a peaceful end to the war in 
Vietnam, convinced many U.S. officials that they had lost all control over the U.N. 
agenda.882 By 1975, in the words of one scholar, “Turtle Bay no longer symbolized 
American glory but reflected America’s eclipse.”883 
 The Soviet view of the utility of the United Nations in waging the Cold War 
underwent a major shift after Stalin passed from the scene. According to Victor Israelyan, 
a former Soviet diplomat who served at the U.N., “the members of the Soviet mission 
recognized that the U.N. was the main stage for playing out the political and ideological 
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.”884 As such, Soviet 
                                                
881 Firestone, The United Nations under U Thant, pp. 46-47. 
882 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
883 Gil Troy, Moynihan’s Moment: America’s Fight against Zionism as Racism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), p. 38 
884 Victor Israelyan, On the Battlefields of the Cold War: A Soviet Ambassador’s Confession (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), p. 127. 
 256 
actions in the international organization reflected the “fundamental immorality of Cold 
War diplomacy,” in that “its goal was often little more than to impose damaging 
decisions on political adversaries instead of seeking mutually acceptable solutions to real 
problems.”885 The United Nations was also viewed as an ideal venue for espionage. 
Israelyan recalls that “all Soviet diplomats at different stages of their careers, in one form 
or another, have assisted the KGB.”886 Indeed, there were more KGB agents in the Soviet 
mission in New York than there were in the Soviet embassy in Washington!887 
 With the development of the Non-Aligned Movement, the USSR moved to 
capitalize on the emerging Third World political bloc. Tellingly, Moscow never 
recognized the NAM as truly non-aligned, believing that its member countries “tilted” 
toward one superpower axis or the other; the Soviet line has emphasized that the origins 
of the movement lie in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and that 
therefore, the USSR and the socialist camp are the natural allies of the NAM.888 Though 
relations between Cuba and the USSR were rife with tensions, the Cubans consistently 
and spiritedly defended the Soviets in the NAM, and suffered from a corresponding loss 
of credibility among more moderate members who recognized that an acceptance of the 
natural ally thesis would effectively destroy the non-aligned nature of the movement.  
The United States did not have a similar ally within the movement. NAM 
statements and declarations were consistently replete with harsh criticisms of the United 
States; in the rare case that the Soviet Union was even mentioned, it was usually 
approvingly. This was the case until the Soviet invasion of a non-aligned member 
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country, Afghanistan. Even after the invasion, the condemnations of the USSR in NAM 
and the United Nations were not of a piece with those that had been lobbed at the United 
States for its various ill-conceived Third World interventions. The Non-Aligned 
Movement became hugely influential in determining the agenda of the United Nations; 
indeed, by the mid- to late 1970s, many in the United States were complaining that the 
combined forces of the Third World and the Soviet bloc had effectively hijacked the 
international organization. Such complaints reflect the failure of U.S. policy both toward 
the Third World and in the United Nations.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
The primary debate over the nature of U.S. policy toward Latin America has been 
whether the most significant policy determinants have been economic or geopolitical. 
The phrase “economic imperialism,” while inadequately defined, is usually understood to 
occur when the United States harnesses political and diplomatic means to achieve 
economic ends. Several scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations have contended that 
U.S. interventionism in Latin America has been in pursuit of economic and financial 
dominance rather than national security interests. These scholars have explicitly denied 
that U.S. national security interests were ever at stake in Latin America.889  
However, such evaluations are premised on an overly narrow definition of U.S. 
national security. Other scholars have recognized that official U.S. perceptions of 
national security have tended to be much more expansive. Thus, although the Cuban 
missile crisis was the only episode of Latin America’s Cold War during which the 
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Soviets posed a military – indeed, an existential – threat to the United States, Arbenz in 
Guatemala, Allende in Chile, and the FSLN in Nicaragua all challenged other vital 
components of U.S. national security. One scholar has argued that “except in situations of 
direct military threat, security is a state of mind.” Thus, a broad definition of U.S. 
national security interests in Latin America recognizes that “it is in the United States 
national interest that there exist in the hemisphere friendly, prosperous states, with stable 
responsive governments that permit the free movement of goods and services through the 
region, that respect the political integrity of their neighbors and that offer no support to 
the United States [sic] global political rivals.”890 Indeed, ever since the proclamation of 
the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. presidents have considered the prevention of extra-continental 
powers establishing a foothold in the Western Hemisphere to be in the national 
interest.891 Thus, although Arbenz, Castro, Allende, and the FSLN nationalized industry 
and directly challenged U.S. corporate influence in their countries, they also pursued 
friendly relations with the United States’ Cold War superpower rival and conducted 
independent foreign policies that explicitly sought to undermine U.S. leadership of the 
hemisphere. Successive U.S. administrations were antagonized by all of these 
developments.  
Thus, it would seem as though the “economic imperialism” school adheres to an 
over-simplified narrative of the motivations for U.S. interventionism in the Western 
hemisphere. Regardless of whether the United States faced a military or existential threat 
from the Soviet presence in Latin America, U.S. officials clearly perceived national 
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security interests to be at stake, and those perceptions matter. Whether U.S. policy toward 
Latin America served perceived U.S. national security interests is an entirely different 
question, and it seems quite clear that the answer is “no.” The United States repeatedly 
engaged in politico-military interventionism that undermined stability in the Western 
Hemisphere, and thus transgressed the very goals they hoped to achieve. When viewed in 
the context of the Soviet approach to Latin America, it becomes clear that U.S. policy 
blunders did encourage the Soviets to advance a more active agenda in the region. Had 
the CIA never attempted to overthrow Arbenz, the Soviet Economic Offensive might 
never have been launched. Had the United States not provided Castro with tangible proof 
of the threats to the revolution that he used to increase both his own domestic legitimacy 
and Soviet material support to his government, the course of the Cuban-Soviet 
relationship might have been much different. Of course, this is a case of hindsight being 
twenty/twenty, and it is unfair to hold the cold warriors of the past to the standards of the 
present or to expect that they should have known what we know now. 
How should we evaluate the oft-repeated claim that successive U.S. 
administrations grossly exaggerated the communist threat emanating from Latin America, 
and the charge that U.S. officials failed to distinguish between “international 
communism” and homegrown nationalism? It seems that the more pragmatic U.S. 
presidents clearly did distinguish between nationalism and communism, while the more 
ideologically driven administration of Ronald Reagan did not. For Reagan, this was at 
least partly due to the rigidity of his worldview, which did not frequently appreciate 
subtlety and nuance. Moreover, U.S. threat perceptions focusing on Moscow’s search for 
opportunities in the region got it exactly backward: it was not the Soviets who sought to 
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extend their control over the Western Hemisphere, but Latin American communists and 
Soviet sympathizers who petitioned Moscow for its support. That the Soviets needed 
convincing in most cases suggests that U.S. analyses should have focused more on the 
indigenous roots of discontent in the hemisphere and less on the goals and ambitions of 
Moscow. 
 In the case of Guatemala, the Eisenhower administration viewed the threat posed 
by Arbenz’s government as primarily regional in nature. Though the media frenzy around 
Guatemala focused on the machinations of “international communism,” administration 
officials were aware that the ties between Moscow and the Guatemalan communist party 
were tenuous at best. Propaganda intended for domestic and regional audiences, however, 
bruited the threat of Soviet penetration of the Western Hemisphere.  
As had been the case since the advent of the Cuban Revolution, it was the Cubans 
who were most active in supporting Latin American armed insurgents and guerrilla 
movements. In this endeavor, Castro was not acting at the behest of the Soviets; indeed, 
Cuban radicalism frequently jeopardized the attainment of Soviet goals in the region, 
especially as those goals shifted from encouraging national liberation to establishing and 
expanding traditional diplomatic relations with the countries of Latin America. Moreover, 
Cuban support for the armed insurgent groups in Central America in the 1980s threatened 
to complicate Soviet efforts at détente with the United States. 
In the case of Chile, it seems clear that the Nixon administration did not view 
Allende’s UP government as an isolated threat, nor did it detect an alarming degree of 
Soviet influence. The Nixon administration viewed Allende as a regional threat, and the 
danger was clearly seen to be internal and regional developments, not Soviet penetration. 
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The administration notably did not over-estimate or exaggerate the Soviet menace in 
South America; to the extent that it did, it was intended for domestic consumption, not 
for internal distribution.892 Covert actions involved “playing up” Soviet involvement in 
Chile; thus, the propaganda line promoted by the administration did not correspond to its 
own internal evaluations of the threat that Chile posed.893 It seems safe to say that 
although the CIA does not bear the primary responsibility for Allende’s overthrow, it 
certainly contributed to creating the conditions that made the coup possible. The CIA has 
been subjected to fierce criticism for its covert operations aimed at destabilizing the 
Allende regime; this is at least in part due to the brutality of Pinochet’s thuggish regime. 
Though the precise numbers are still disputed, the military junta is estimated to have 
executed at least three thousand Chilean citizens, with several thousand tortured and tens 
of thousands forced into exile or imprisoned without trial.894 Yet, as one scholar has 
opined, “there is no reason to assume that the virtues of a vanished regime increase in 
direct proportion to the iniquities of its successor.”895 
In the case of Nicaragua, it seems clear that the Sandinistas’ ties to the Soviet 
Union, especially in the realm of military cooperation, developed in direct proportion to 
the escalation of U.S. aggression.896 Moreover, the Reagan administration seemed 
determined to portray the upheaval in Central America as the direct result of Soviet and 
Cuban meddling, rather than accept that the revolutionary ferment was driven by 
domestic and regional factors.897 There is no small irony in the fact that by this stage of 
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the Cold War, the U.S. administration was far more ideological in its outlook than was 
the Soviet Union. However, just because the prospects for Soviet armed aggression in 
Central America were slim does not mean that the Reagan administration did not 
perceive U.S. national security interests to be at stake.898 
It is clear, though, that U.S. support for the contras did not contribute to the vital 
U.S. interest in hemispheric stability, but instead undermined it. Not only were the 
contras a profoundly disruptive force in the region, but their involvement in drug 
trafficking directly conflicted with the Reagan administration’s counter-narcotics 
policies. Moreover, Reagan himself found it difficult if not impossible to envision a 
scenario in which U.S. national interests could be preserved while the Sandinistas 
remained in power. For Reagan, the two were mutually exclusive. The Nixon 
administration had learned the lessons of Cuba; administration officials took care not to 
be so overtly hostile to the UP government as to provide it with a convenient foreign 
target for domestic discontent. Reagan, however, seemed not to have learned this lesson, 
and the contras were constantly invoked by the FSLN as the reason for continued 
economic and political turmoil.899 
 Ultimately, because U.S. threat perceptions were incongruent with both Latin 
America’s realities and the extent of Moscow’s capabilities and goals in the region, they 
led to heavy-handed politico-military interventions that proved counter-productive to the 
long-term U.S. interest of stabilizing the Western Hemisphere. 
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